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Preface

ConservatiSnl, once at the periphery of An1erican politics. nO\V occupies
a central and strategtc position in the seat of political pO\VCr. The 1994
election confinned a realignn1ent ot Atnerican politics along conservative lines In the general electorate, but in the halls of ac.1den1e conservatisnl ren1ains a neglected subject, on the fringes of the curriculun1 and
outside the door of the f.1culty lounge Man\ acadenllC\ <1re politically
liberal, and fe\v scholars u1 the social suence disuplines t.1ke conservative
intellectual poc;itions senously. 1
Students 1n the classroon1, bv contrast. are very interested and supportive of conservative Idea~:., Cnfortunately. their enthusi.l'\111 is often
keener than the1r acquaintance \Vith the thought to \Vhich the\ ha\·e
such a fervent devotion. Many pre,ent-dav converts to Atnencan conservatisrn are astonished to discover that it has a long htstory that pre<.htes
the election of I~onald I~eagan in 1980
We have wntten this book priinanl} for our students and colleague
and also for anyone Interested in .1 surve) of the Ide.ls .1nd traditions
of An1erican conservative political thought. Not stnce the 1950~:.,, \vhen
Clinton R.osstter's Conseruatt5111 111 America appeared, has a cotnparable
survey of conservative thought been published. Our survey approach
necessarily n1eans that itnportant Ideas are gtven bnefer attention than
the reader, or the authors for that nutter, would hke. Each of the sections
of this book could be greatly expanded and still not do JUStice to the
ideas associated with the topic. We have included an expanded bibliography in the hope that the serious reader will independently pursue related books on subjects of interest.
We have found conservatisn1 to be a con1plex subject. Although conltnonly considered an ideology, tnany of its best-kno\vn adherents do not
believe it is; conservatisn1 is not easily defined, and its pnnciples often
appear in conflict. Its evolution tn Atnerican history has been long and

\'111
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rnt.>andering .1nd is likdv to rt.>n1am so g~ven tht.> present dtalogue 1n
\V.1sh ington.
Today, son1t.> conservative .1<.ihert.>nts \VOuld 5.1\ that there IS no <)lgnific.lnt const.>rvativt.> tradition in Atnt.>rica. Here \Ve \VIII argue other\Vise, believing that the ideas of conservatism \Vere forged in the cnictble
of history and experience in reaction to hostile ideas and unfortunate
events.
Unlike conll11llllisnl. \Vith its Ccm11111111isr J\fa11ij£·sto, conservat1sn1 ha
no coherent ton1c of principle : it did not spring-fresh and sparkhngfroJn the ch.1n1ber of the hunun 111ind. Hetero rcneitv,
, rather than ho1110gentity. typifies it history. .,., onservatisnl i cotnposed of a dtverstty
of groups and a con1plex1ty of ideas. Its futurL' is hotly debated; sorne
.1rgue th.lt it h.1s tini hed its course, \Vhile others belit.>VL' its be'\t (Ontnbutions lie .1he.1d.
In the first chapter, .. he En1ergt.>nce of ontetnpor.ll) Atnencan
on erv. ti Ill ' ' \Ve examin" the re.1sons \vhy conservatisn1 Inoved fron1
back rage to cent<: r tage on the AnH:rican politic.1l sct.>nt.>. We urvey
rnajor currents of con t rvative thought sin ct.> World W.1r I I Ch.1pter 2,
"The Problen1 of Defining .,., onservatisnl," discusses variou\ definitions
of con t:rvatisrn, noting hc1\v they .1re alike and diflerent. Con5ervat1sn1
is defined and placed in the context of Atnerican poht1calculture. "The
Ten Most Irnportant Beliefs of onservan~nl," the third ch.1pter, sets
forth the fundanh::nt.d principles of con\ervansm as .1ccepted by n1ost of
its advocates. The next t\VO chapters explore the tradtt1on of An1encan
conservatisnl. Chapter 4, "The CLl'\siG11 I~oots of Conservative
Thought,'' exatnines the non-Arnencan roots ot Arnencan conservatisnl, covering such subjects as classical and rnodern political thought,
the Enlightentnent, and utopian ideologies. Chapter 5, "The Historical
Developn1ent of Arnerican Conservatisn1," sho\vs ho\v conservat1sn1 developed since Atnerica 's foundtng. The stxth c.h.1pter, entitled "The
Con1peting Conservative Traditions In An1enca," presents the political,
e(onornic, and religiouc; past of An1encan conservatisn1. The final chapter, "'The Dtrect1ons of Contetnporary Atnencan Conservati 111," conternplates the present state of conservatisn1 and Its prospects in light of
changtng conditions.
Our work IS a sun1n1ary of conservative thought; the hsts of canons,
principles, and definitions are not advanced as an Ideological blueprint.
Many individual (Onservatives rnight \Vtsh to add to the infonnation \Ve
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present here, and son1e might well take exception to some of our statements. We accept responsibility for any errors in our presentation and
invite constructive criticism. Conservatives argue among themselves as
to the proper ranking of their values and will disagree on the practical
application of their principles. One need not adhere to every conservative idea to be known by that label. These qualifications aside, we believe that the ideas in this book constitute the core meaning of
conservative thought.

Note
1. Stanley Rothman, "Academics on the Left," Society, Vol. 23, No.3., March/ April
1986, pp. 44-49. For a conservative analysis of this problem see T. Kenneth Cribb,
"Conservatism and the American Academy: Prospects for the 1990s," (Washington,
D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1989). See also: Everett Carl Ladd, Jr. and Seymour
Martin Lipset, The Divided Academy: Professors and Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1975).

CHAPTER ONE

The Emergence of Contemporary
American Conservatism
In the United States at this time {19 50}, liberalism is not
only the dominant but even the sole intellectual tradition. For
it is the plain fact that nowadays there are no conservative ...
ideas in general circulation.
LIONEL TRILLING •

A

s World War II ended, liberalisn1 stood as the foremost ideology in
American politics. Louis Hartz wrote that "America represents the
liberal mechanism of Europe functioning without the European social
antagonisms. " 2 A fluid class structure, unbounded opportunity, and acquisitive individualism stood out as hallmarks of Hartz's analysis ofliberalism's dominance. Conservative emphasis on community, authority,
deference, and the sanctity of tradition appeared out of place.
Acknowledgment of a large role for the national government in
American life became a widely accepted truism after the New Deal.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt announced in his 1932 inaugural address that "the money changers [haveJ fled from their high seats in the
temple of civilization. " 3 The ostensible creators of the Great Depression,
finance capitalists and advocates of private markets, relinquished their
position to the priests of a new order, government officials with a vision
for management.
An entire generation, marked by the unforgettable collapse of the
national economy and the successful mobilization against German and
Japanese aggression, accepted the idea that government should set the
economic agenda and care for the welfare and security needs of society.
Conservatism's "last rites," pronounced by Lionel Trilling in 1950,

')
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'\l'l'I11Cd .lppropriate for ,111 l'l":l of optimis111 ,lbout ,1 /litt<?rin._r .111d bountiful hberal future.
But th1c; \\ J<., not to be \\\ ee ping cultur.1l ch.u1~--res, .1 \Vorscning ccononllc cond1t1011, :1nd the n.llion.ll tr.1u111.1s of Vietn.un .1nd W.1tcrg:1tc
eroded thl' ltber.1J conficknce in a stJ 011,' 11,ltl011.1i r()Vl:'ll1111l'llt in Jess
tlun thrl'l' dcc1d<:s. The"' rc ulb <. the 1<. <. t nlldtenll de<. ti< n concluded
,l trend tlut b<:gJn \Vith the ek-tion c f l( nal I Re ••111 111 It 81 .1nd
continu<:d \Vith a con <?f\".1tive tnunll h 111 • rc1u 1 ll n < hher.1l post\V:lr expc t.Htons.
tcr
Tod.1v, Jibe r.1li-..n1 i 111 retreat· Hl c 1\ tl 111 utll\ c i lt L t ntcs.
'
tht· election of Ron.1ld Re.1g. n 111 1 , 0, no th u htful p >huc.1l le.ltkr
could profit .11n<. ng voter b) \vtlltn .rl ' ~l u·1 nng the l.1l el o "ltbcr.1l."
Thl' 19<J4 tnidtenn elt t:lOJl ll: ult
c:l cl ben h111.lt"k (L' tinloni.ll
to the defc.ll of Nc\V I >eel bbet.11t 111.
n el\, tl\C .111d l(el ublic.111.
ynonyrnou \\ irh vi lc I) 111 th. t de uon, tgn. lc i the. cept. n c >f the
tr:Iditiona]J leas of~ e )Jl, 1 re l n tb!lH n a 111, ller n, t1 n.il 7 vernmt.?nt. J=or the first rirne 111 fort
e. rs ( rH:\\ oltn . I l , rt \Von in
tht: l1ou t: of l~epn.: en taU\ e . ere un :r the p lCntl. I (; r rc h.~ 111 7 the
American legi I. ti ve , genda < r the next qu. rtt:r cciltU I).
<.

Causes of Conservative Resurgence

r

Why did tht• libcr.11 sulution t: II out
i:\V )J" \\ Hh the elect r.Ht' .md
allo\v conservati 111 to t~tkt: center t~•ge 111 J\men<., n Jt illi .II It e? Olllt'
~ay tlut liber.1l ick(1 l.1cked \Vi le .1 cept.lnte: l thct believe thclt f:1ikd
policies led to a rejection ofhbl"r,dt 111 • • gtlldt f()r tnltuc.l cl uon: ~till
others think that tht: interruption in hber.1l le.tder htp 1 tCnlpor.lf)'.
Here \\'l' \Vant to explore this dr.un,ltJC tut n.1round in poliric.1l outlook
and cultural attitudes by prc~t: 11 ti ng the conserv.ltt ve pol itic.1l vic\\ of
the good society. 'rhc conserv.Hive ,tscenti.lncy is best understood by
ex~unining its n1ajor pre1nises, the incidents th.lt changed Atnerican culture, and the ideas of protninent \Vritcrs as~oci.Hed \Vith the con:-;t'rvatl\'l'
n1ove1nent.
Most \Vriters agree that the genesis of the conserv.1tive rcn.1issance 1
found in the events of the 1<J60s. The Kennedy and Johnson adnlint\trations raised hopes that poverty, racistn, and chronic unen1ployn1<.'nt tlssociated \Vith business cycles \vould disappear through bbcr.1l lq.;1\lation
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and Supreme Court decisions. Some groups, disappointed that government action did not bring immediate and far-reaching results, resorted
to street protests and violent confrontations.
On college campuses, middle-class youths became outspoken critics
of American life, protesting the war in Vietnam, parading for civil rights,
and seizing campus buildings to demand changes in university rules and
policies. The youth revolt took the form of unconventional clothing,
socially conscious rock music, the widespread use of illegal drugs, and
uninhibited sexuality.
Black Americans, seen as special victims of American society, received
much sympathy with their plight from artists and intellectuals in the best
of circles. "Radical chic" was in style. Tom Wolfe chronicled the new
fashion, typified by "the [Black] Panther women trucking on into the
Bernsteins' Chinese yellow duplex, amid the sconces, silver bowls full
of white and lavender anemones, and uniformed servants serving
drinks." 4 One writer commented at the time, "Should these various
people have their way, society as we know it, in all its imperfections but
also in all its glories, would be replaced by a desert inhabited by the
nihilistic and the bored rich. " 5 Conservatives had an alternative vision
of the postwar world.
The idea of conservatism is distinctive: it emphasizes political stability
as the forces of change slowly become integrated into time-tested institutions. During the liberal ascendance of the postwar era, the themes of
state rather than federal action, fiscal responsibility, decreased government spending, and a reduction in governmental regulation of the economy sounded anachronistic. The New Deal, Fair Deal, New Frontier,
and Great Society endorsed government as the positive force that ameliorated wrongs and expanded the freedom of the individual. When freedom became indistinguishable from anarchy, many people who
supported the liberal emphasis on individual rights looked for an alternative vision for society. Even as the liberal ethic flowered, the conservative alternative blossomed.
The intellectual and philosophical resurrection of contemporary conservatism began in the 1940s with the publication of several books. First,
Friedrich von Hayek's The Road to Serfdom (1944) presented a bulwark
for conservative economics against the high tide of state-managed economic policies. Milton Friedman later incorporated competitive freemarket principles and government noninterference in the economy in

4
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hts popular book Free ro Choose (lc 7 )) . \ct ond. Univer!'ity of ~hicago
profes or R.tchard Weaver's Ideas I {,we Con equcnru ( 1948) tr.tced the
dechne of Western culture since n1edieval timL's .1nd foresh.ldO\VL'd a
Lner University of Chictgo professor'$ best-seller. t\ll.ln Bloon1 's ri11e
Clo.\111,~ <?frhc A111erirm1 1\lind (19~7). \vhich crniqued hber.tl culturalcxce<;.;,es in .1C1ckn1e .1nd the so icty .ll l.u·ge. Third \V, Peter Viereck's
Conservati.'m Rct·isircd (1 c 49). fe.ttured tn ..!7, T1111e f Lc ndon ,1s "the
n1ost intcllie;ent
sunlJll,trV o t )n erv.HJ m. l a c 1 elf on tht principks
....
of British st,lttS111.111 E bnund Burke."()
Btt\Vl'tn 1<.SO and 1 53, etght l o<. k ( J 1 e.1rc l th, t h. i thetne conlp.nibk \Virh the \VOrks o l I yek. \Ve. ver, , n i Vacre k . ~hey mdudL:d
R.ussell Kirk"s 71lc Co11. ullati11e li11d n " in It eventh e ltttCHl~ Eri
Voegeli n 's ·nil f\lt w '.cienc of I>< litic~; \V dlJa 111 E Buckley, Jr.' Jod and
fall at )~de: Certrude I hmnltlf.lrh · Lmd I ton; I t'l
tr.tu~
i\clfWcll
Right and I li~tmy: John I Llllt \Veil' '"f7z e \!oral l..ormthtion of /)u1lo mcy:
Whittaker h.unber
r Vztllt ~ : ani 1Z. l Crt l 11 bet' ( >ue t Jot Comnw11ity. Each of tht.:sL' bock dt cu t:d the; r k ultural tradan n pl.1 ' in the
t.thilitv of a o ietv.
r1) 1<JSS Clinton R Iter! C ot1SC111a/IS11J i11 lmencn: 17ze "ThmzkltS PerSllasion won rhe
harle 1\. lk.1rd kan n . 1 i>nzc , n I (tnrll un td to
the.; acadtnlic \Vorld th. t l ein to the n 7 ht of enter \V~l tnttllc.;cttt.llly
ur: ome cnttcs
n:spectabl .7 \Xlhen rde.1sed, Ro Her' 1 k L rL:. te
considered it .1 defc:nse o the lll.tin rre.tnl >r tnodtr.ltc c ·ntt r uf /\rnerica n politic. rather t h.1n . st.llt'Jl1e n t of pure Iy t nser v .It i vc p ri n ci p ll's.
R.~:gan.llt: " s of this deb,tte , thl" book contnbutcd to the.; ~nnving .lttention
bri ve n to the ideolot,ric. 1 origin of public I oltcy.
e\V con~ervative journ.d c f ot inion. such .1 the ~ati(lnal I<er•it.w.
1\!odcm .)1.~e. and tht: Inren:olle,giate Ur11iew arnvcd on the Iitt r. ry !'Cenc
during the 195()s. Con ervative think t.tnk . indudin,., the Am<?ri ,111 Enterprise Institute, the Center for tr.ltl'bric Studies ,lt rCOJ"/L'l0\\'11 University, the An1enc.u1 Security ouncil. tht I Ioover Institution ..1nd thL·
Foreign Policy R.csearch Institute at tht Univer~ity of Penn-.vh·.u11a,
began to offer alternative visions for the An1eric.1n experience. Pnor to
the creation of such center:-;, ne\v ideas in An1erican pollllt'> rern.uncd
aln1ost exclusively the dotnain of hber,ds in ~uch places as the l3rooktngs
Institution.
R.evived interest in t\VO classics also occurred. Akxis de Tocquevtlle 's
Denwcracy in America and Edtnund Burke\ Rcficctwns on the f<cllolllttOII in
;

J
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France emphasized custom and order as the protectors of social morality
and fit the needs of a nation wondering about its values after achieving
economic abundance. 8 The themes of respect for cultural tradition and
fear ofhuman tinkering with proven institutions permeated these works.
Collectively they had much to say about current problems. Viereck and
Kirk applied Burkean principles to the contemporary debate on the
Cold War, comparing Communist excesses to the revolutionary indulgences in France that had alarmed Edmund Burke. Conservatives later
used the same logic to draw parallels between the excesses of the New
Left of the 1960s and those of the Jacobins of the 1790s. The depravity
of human reason unchecked by tradition, conservatives argued, produced such dictatorial monsters as Stalin and Napoleon.
Richard Weaver and Leo Strauss traced conservative thought back to
the classical ideal of Plato's "ordered society," with its sense of noblesse
oblige. To conservatives, American society placed too much emphasis
on rights and not enough on responsibilities. They argued that change
had to be gradual and consistent with society's foundations. Classical
scholars, such as Weaver, Strauss, and, later, Allan Bloon1, contended
that America's hurricanelike changes in civil rights for minorities, the
women's revolution, and the street confrontations with government authorities that characterized the 1960s and early 1970s caused the nation
to lose its cultural anchor and drift in a sea of relative values.
Political seeds of conservatism budded alongside these intellectual
works. In the postwar years a consistent chorus in the Congress rejected
the liberal themes. Senator Everett Dirksen's regular bickering with
presidential social welfare legislation made him a national figure. Senator
Barry Goldwater's The Conscience ofa ConseJVative (1961), which frontally
challenged American liberalism, sold millions of copies. 9 Also on drugstore shelves were the writings of William F. Buckley, Jr., James J. Kilpatrick, and M. Stanton Evans, which contributed to the discussion of
conservative ideas in the general populace. Buckley's Up From Liberalism
(1959), Kilpatrick's The Sovereign States (1957), and Evans's The Liberal
Establishment (1965) added to the philosophical resurgence of contemporary conservatism. 10 Their commentary in news magazines and newspapers and on television formed a cornerstone for the conservatism of the
1980s and 1990s.

6

CHAPTER ONE

Conservative Cycles
According to Arthur .rvL 'chlcsingl·r. Jr., tht f olit1 .11 c rde is .1 ·ontinutng struggle bet\veen co!1'\L'lV.ltivc v.1lue ~uch :1" the ..tnctity of priv.lte
property, the tn:txitniz.Hion of profit. .md the free 111arket .1nd liber.1l
v.1lues uch :ts equ.1lity. frecdon1. oci.l re 1 nsibilit:y. and public rl'gulation of property :.1nd pro It. Schle 1ngcr conten l , ' 'The r ot of this
cyclic:.11 ~d -sufficit ncy foul tie ltc deep 111 the n. tural l1fe of hulll:.lnit r." 11
The cv le of liberalt 111 \vhi h bt: n \Vtth l r. nkhn R. < evdt in
1932, do1ninat~d t\n1cncan pohtic , nd publt pohc) even dunng Republic.ln c1d1njni tr.uion . J>rc tdent l:1 t:nh~ \ver, ~ rex. rnple. nl.ll e little
ctTon to revc r e the ude t f l1 bet. I l 1e\V I eal pohcte ctnd Pn: I dent
Ntxon h.1d linle ucce s in ch. ngtn the ) 1. 1 \'. el . re . gend. of the
Cont,rn:~ . Before 1< , the Rcpul he, n P. rty rcner lly repre en ted
\Vhite-collar VOtt and the I )erne J' t1 P. rt ', lue-colL r VOte.;
en
years later the p:1rtie re~ rc cnte i t"\VO 1 leolog~ , ll
d1't;rt:nt e · of
upp<."r tniddlc-cla " vote : •·'"r he 1 e1 ubb n
1ne to rCJ rt: t:nt the
n1ore con crv. tive \V1ng of the tra HI On. 1 n11
the I t tnocrats the tnore leftist \ving of the hber I JnJddle
l r tht: 'ne\v
class.' '' 12
The politic:.1l succe of Ron. ld Reag n ur pl.n1te the libcr.1l .1nd
Den1ocraric ethic of public ·u1 t rvt ion \Vith Hlt en1ph.1 i-zing priv,He
and loc:.1l initiatt\'es. 'T'he 19< 4 tni ltenn clct tll)ll btnu hr the e ide.1s to
the legislative h:.1ll of ongre but the jury reTnaul n1t Hl thL·ir continued do1ninancc of public policy over ever. I ie de ,1 Roosevelt·~
l'.:e\V Dt:al did. Both Pre ident Ron, ld Re( g. n 111 the 19
, n l ptaker
of the U.S. House of R.eprt ent.nive Ne\Vt ,ingri h in the I c 9Us
quoted R.oosevclt bee. u e they s,l\V then1 elves .1s the s,une kind of harbinger for a ne\v political er.1.
Should the conserv:.ltivt: cycle be abbreviated, its intc rn.tl tensions n1:.1y
be a 111a.JOr c1use. Sotne conservatives \Vho \vandcred for forty ye.lf\ tn
the postwar \vildcmess resent freshtnen conbrressn1cn, upstart acaden1tcs,
and th1nk-tank activists. Longtin1c philosophic:.1l conserv.1tives tnay also
resent the populan7ers who write \Veekly ne\VS colun1ns and host radto
talk shows.
For son1e, the term conservatisn1 conjures up a unity of ide:.1s satd not
to exist in fact. To dlustrate, consH.ier that Barry Gold\vater dtd not even
;
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merit a mention in the index of the seventh edition of Russell Kirk's
The Conservative Mind. 13 Even after Ronald Reagan's election in 1980,
some conservatives criticized his administration because it failed to adhere to a strict agenda of economic, social, and foreign policy items.
They targeted "moderates," such as senior advisors James Baker in
Reagan's first administration and Howard Baker in his second.
With no master plan to guide and unify American conservatism, haphazard developn1ent and setbacks marred its progress. The low point
came in the 1964 presidential campaign of Senator Barry Goldwater,
when the outspoken conservative carried only six states in the electoral
college; yet even this defeat had a silver lining. The Goldwater campaign
demonstrated that: (1) a significant segment of the American public reacted favorably to the conservative message; (2) conservatives could organize and capture control of one of the two major political parties; and
(3) the political infrastructure built by conservatives in the early 1960s
could be used as a launching pad for political success. Ronald Reagan
first gained national political notice when he spoke for Goldwater in
1964, an appearance in which he seemed a more reasonable conservative
advocate than the Republican presidential candidate.
Shared traditional values held conservatism together during the turbulent postwar era. These values emphasized local control, a sense of morality, and respect for tradition. The disposition toward religion among
many conservatives caused them to adopt an emphasis on the limits of
man's power of reason. "We know," wrote Edmund Burke, "and it is
our pride to know, that man is by his constitution a religious animal ...
religion is the basis of civil society." 14 At the tum of the century, mainline Protestant religious establishment figures appeared as "the Republican Party at prayer." Eighty years later religious leaders, such as Jerry
Falwell and Pat Robertson, worshipped at the Republican altar. In the
years after World War I the rise of the Social Gospel movement and the
response by fundamentalists to the attack on the traditional authority of
the Bible led to a split in American Protestantism. 15
By the 1970s the debate over abortion, "together with a number of
other issues that divide the public along much the same linespornography, homosexuality, school prayer-the question of public morality and its relation to government policy has provided a continuing
source of tension between religious liberals and religious conserva-

8

CHAPTER 0~1

tJYes. " 16 The dec~de ~fter the sixties \Vitn "'ssed .1 nst 111 publi · concern
~bout cultural V,1lues ~nd the future or Arneric.ln ociety.
R.on.1ld H. c.1g;1n \ landid.tc r in Jt l"! I \VOn endorsernent frorn rnany
conserv.1tive relig1ous groups, inLiuding the ·1nr,ll ·L1j Hity, tht: E.1gle
Fon1111. and the Rc.:·lrgtous Roundt.1hle. The ( hristi,tn C n,tlition .md
other conserv.1tive religiou t,rt'Olll s unLk r 'lrdcd Repuhlr ,111 vi tories in
the 1990s. PL·opk '"h >hcbt ve l the Bible to l c C, )lr '" >rei .111 II itt r.tlly
true usu.11ly .1vored mrre ..1 ed L <?fen e pen ling, , t ugher J >hey \Vith
Ru,si .. oppt sition to aboruc n ... n l r.:t) er rn pubh
h l . 17 Fron1
o 1. te I \Vith the
conservative ideologJ .I Clr le , n1e llJl rte
An1eric.1n Enterprise In nnne. the I l ver In tlllltl n. an tht: I lerit, c:
Found.Hion. 1.tny . dH he , b. n i nc i the1r t • htr 11.11
I L~nlocr.Hic l>.uty to embr.t e the R.epubhc n pl. t~ nn.
plank opposmg .lbortlon . \Vhrte cv. ngelr . I .. rh \VIlltC
h.tvt·
been rnoving a\va r ron1 the I en1o ran Pc1rt) rncc the [
According to con c-rv. uve the rnergcz
1 le I '"1 . l , n
trand of thought reveal . truth . b ut nlenc, n l ht1
con ervative , fedc.::rally funde I ex e u , t10n I. e . h 111 exu.d rights.
abortion the E }ll.l R1gh An1en ln1ent . .: n the l hu n
pr~yc.:: r viol.Hc l ,1crcd l nncr pic len\ c fr rn the Ju e - ( hn tl. n ht rit.lge of the \Ve ter11 den1 cr:-t 1c . C ne \\ ntcr ununc 1 Uj the theolo~tc.ll
differences thi \vay: ·· on erv,ltrvc ten lt) l clrcve, ltber.l t d )Ubt." 19
When the s<.:'a oft1ith recule. u>rl etV.llJVe , r :rue, the bl>d r p >liti f.tct·s
nihilisnl in .111 its tark de,p.lll . rot quevrl]c rec >glllzed the ltnport,\IH
.lffinity bl't\Veen religion ,111d de1110 r. cy 111 lllCrJCcl \Vhell he \\'rOll' or
the role that churcht .md other 1 riv, te \'( luruary or r,uti7., til ns play in
affinning tht comn1unity tit:s on \vhich An1enc. n derllO r.l 1 dept nds.
Traditional values 'l'rved , .111 urnbrdL un kr \vhi h v.trinu religrous
group ~ could unite. and religion pl.tyed .111 11nport,1r1t role in the rn,Hur.ltion of political n1oven1ent .
R.eligious conservatives took for gr.uHcd school pr.tyer ,a .lthktic
events and pastoral serrnons at baccalaure.lte sl'rvice · until thev . . uddL'nly
had the rug of religious security pulled fi·onl bene.Hh thern S1nce rn.1ny
of these people believed in An1erica's hristian origins, they ~.l\V these
actions as hostile to the very core of their national c:xperience. In the
1970s the debate on the: origin and purposes of An1eric.1 heated up. \Vlth
n1ost liberals arguing that the nation had only a notninal ~hristian hentage that had been superceded by a respectful tolerance for social and
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religious pluralism. Conservatives contended that the distinctive character of the Judeo-Christian tradition explains why the American republic
developed as it did. They believed that liberal social policies erode the
very foundation of the country.
The 1963 Supreme Court decision against official prayers in public
schools kindled the fire of debate on religion in public life. Subsequent
cases asked whether creation science could be taught alongside evolutionary theory in the public school classroom. Could the Ten Commandments be posted on public school classroom walls? Is secular
humanism a religion that denies God and holds to relative, rather than
absolute, moral standards? Could it be taught in textbooks and public
school classrooms in place of Christianity? Could public school students
meet for religious purposes in public school buildings if the meetings did
not interfere with school activities? Could the Catholic Church have its
tax-exempt status revoked because of alleged lobbying activities against
abortion? Could a religious school have its tax-exempt status revoked
because its religious convictions forbid interracial dating and marriage?
These, and a long list of other religious issues, made their way into the
courts between the 1970s and 1990s. Millions of An1ericans, influenced
by these debates, petitioned the judicial, legislative, and executive
branches of government for differing interpretations of the Constitution.
In 1964, while campaigning for the presidency, Lyndon Johnson said,
"We're in favor of a lot of things, and we're against mighty few." Support for Great Society programs, including Medicare, Medicaid, the
food stamp program, legal assistance for the indigent, economic revitalization for distressed areas, and medical research, rested on the belief that
economic growth facilitates funding. Such illusions, no less than the
programs they spawned, became the first casualties of the Vietnam War.
In the decade of the seventies public confidence in government as
an equitable economic arbitrator shook when the economy languished.
Running against Gerald Ford in 1976, Jimmy Carter devised the "misery index," defined as the addition of rates of inflation and unemployment. In 1976 the misery index stood at 12.5 percent; by 1980, when
Ronald Reagan ran against Carter, it had reached nearly 20 percent.
Reagan cited this poor economic performance as evidence of Carter's
lack of leadership: "In Reagan's campaign and presidency, the principal
accusation against Democratic predecessors and rivals [was] that they
were guilty of pessimism. " 20
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Libec:ll public policies, once .lCcl'pted uncritic.1ll '· t:1ccd nl'\V challenge". Do not publtc housing projects .uHi higll\v, y construction progranls de"trov the comrnunity :1nd the integrit' oflo(al ncighborhoods?
The Great Socicty progr.1111s not only .1tlcd tho <.: to be h<.:·lped, they abo
turned thl' 1ntended bendici.HH:.'s .1g.11nst thl' pro,rr,lllls. School busing
aJ,o outr.lgt·d the people it \V.ls de ignell to ht.:lf . In the cvcntie busing
tor purpo~c~ of integrati n bee. n1c the 111 t
ntr vers1.1I polni -.1! issue
in the COUntry. Ill' of the b . rtbc.lt
nscrv. tlVC th ught is lts , sSl1111ption that the c 011111 n1 ntt y ts l'll t r .d to t ht defi m tt on o the Ill d i vidual. African An1cri c.111 , nd othc • t~ kel the JllJU tl e o ht u ing
prot-rr.uns . nd hu 1ng dec1 1 n , l ccau c such , ll n for 1bl · evicted
thenl from th<.: ir ncighl or h o l t • h1cve rac1. I b l.m e. 1 I he c untroversie JUhlicized hl er.d ,1s un1J tl< n . n eX!. n ie I lternc nvc pnlicil's that Ctvored con er-v,Htvc value .
Both .1 n.l an l, 11 c t n n11c 11111 ul c un crgir e I R.c. n ' VI rory
in t 98( . \' l11lt:: uppl r- 1 k: e on 1111
c UJIC the he. Uu1c the oci.1l
agenda r,dv.lm'Zcd ind1v1 lu I , llqp.u1 e t Re g. n .m I the Republi ,m
!'arty: .uHi-~tbortion , )r hool pr. ycr..1'. 1n t ho )I hu 111 '· nppu ed
to pon1ogr .tphy, .1g.1in t govcrmnent regulau< n f I n v. tc .tnd r II rio us
schools. ho ulc to unployrnent qu< t. , nd npJ edt the Equal R1ghrs
A1nendment. Repubh .111 i vorc l tllltl n t. ~· credit
r 1 ,ucnt of chtldren in priv. te .tn i rdtgiou cho >1 • nd rn t ho >l its tplin ·. Supren1e Court decisions 111 the I ~60s ,tnd ll 7t I .tdded I11tlll1C'1Hlllll to this
agt:nda. The ourt' oppo ition to t hool pr. ycr. n i upport for .lbortion, for CX,l!npll". ~lrOU ed ,1 J.trge .tnd V< ,d ppt ill )I) ,lfllOllg the COnServative public.
To conservatives, th~ equ.tl rights itnpul <.:: .1nd the honH>sexu.llnlOVL'Inent undennined traditional cultur.d v,due th.tt h.td stood the tl'st of
tin1c. Many An1ericans bcli eved tlut ~oci.d e.xpen men t.tti on \Votdd dl'stroy proven values. An appeal to .1 in1pkr pa t, \Vhcn Anleric:llls h.1d
confidence in then1sdves .tnd \Vhat they stood for, l1.1d iJninedi.ltL' .H.ceptance during the 1980s. Entenng the dcL.llk ofthL· ninetiL'\, the .lcbntm~
tration of President Gl'orge Bush either openly supported R.e.1gan
adn11nistration policies or only quietly dL'I11urred fi·o111 tht'I1L Contmuity
rather than conflict was the non11.
Neoconservati<;J11 cldded 11l011len tUI11 to the right- \\'tng re'IU rgence. It
IS a moverncnt nude up, 111 the phrase of Irv1ng Knstol, of "hber.ll\ \vho
had been 1nugged by reahty. " 2 } M.1ny of it~ adhercnts \Verl' oncl' active
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supporters of the New Deal; some even thought of themselves as liberals
until they reacted against the events of the 1960s and the overextension
of liberal public policies that characterized the time. They number
among their ranks Irving Kristol, who helped found the highly regarded
journal The Public Interest; Jeane Kirkpatrick, who became ambassador to
the United Nations under President Reagan; Harvard University professor Edward Banfield, author of The Unheavenly City (197 4); and former
Harvard, and later UCLA, professor James Q. Wilson, author of numerous works critical of liberal public policies.
Some prominent intellectuals also shifted from ardent advocacy of
liberal politics to conservative values, such as anticommunism and a
smaller role for the federal government. The most dramatic example of
such conversion from liberalism to conservatism was Norman Podhoretz, whose book Breaking Ranks typified the shift to new values. Podhoretz would subsequently edit the highly regarded neoconservative journal
Commentary. 23
Aside from being disenchanted with employment quotas, affirmative
action, pornography, and other perceived excesses ofliberal public policies, neoconservatives reacted to the weak position of modem liberalism
on communism. The staunch anticommunist position, of course, was
not new to conservatism. During the late 1940s and early 1950s, several
writers developed the conservative position of strident opposition to
communism. Among the most prominent works were Whittaker
Chambers's Witness (1953) and James Burnhatn's Containment or Liberation (1953). 24 Anticommunism had immediate appeal to Catholic intellectuals from Eastern Europe, whose homelands were under communist
domination.
Neoconservatives want to reverse the agenda of government, tum
away from grand governmental schemes, and reform America by relying
on the private sector, the market mechanism, and traditional institutions,
such as the family and local community. They argue that efforts to promote equality in the sixties threatened individual freedoms in the eighties. Neoconservatives also decry the oppressive encroachment of
government bureaucracies on the spontaneous exercise of free-market
capitalism. They prefer that local communities solve their own problems
without national government interference.
Conversion from liberalism to conservatism is the distinctive mark of
neoconservatives. The failed idealism ofliberalism preceded their accep-
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tance of conc;erY.ltive c;oci.tl theory. tv1any neoconserv:1tives are collegeeducated adultc; \Vho \Vere raised in libt:r.tl hon1es, . ttended f.1shionablc
Institution of htghcr karning. ,1nd s~unpled the v.1lucs of the sixties.
Thetr attitude ren1ains antic t. blishmcnt, but the v.1lut~ tlut the ' reject
arc liberaL not con\crvative.

The New Conservatism
By the 1<Jl s conserv.

111 un envent a n1e 111 rph 1 111 df-in1age.
I uring the 1< 4 s and 1 :JS
, n I even 1n the 1
It h.lt .1 rnorc
negative tone. c.trping ab ut g vermncn~d 1 oltc1c but o cr ing fc:\V .tltcrnatives. The.:: consen'.lllVe I okcd .H h11n df .1 the I. t c nll)' o s,1nit'
Il crv.lttves offen::d
against the m;~ority Vle\V ( l.lte donHn ( I) <:. Sull.
fc\v spc.::citics to contr.- dtct the ptcv"" tim ltbt .. I ·ltn1. tc
tlVIsll1.
cultural pluralisrn .•u1 I eyual nrrh .
The conservative: ren( 1 ance rc tc I on belle th, t the trsr t., k of
govermnent should be the 1 r te t1 n of n non. I life. onsc lll( ntly.
con crv;nivc policyn1ake ur J'C th.H nltht ry progr. 111 re eive rre.ttcr
funding priority th. n .H .1ny t1n1e 111 e the Vldll. 111 \V. r. Stron rer n.ltional defense. a prionty o con erv.tuve pol !C) rn. kers 111 the decatk of
the 1980s, assisted the demi c of S< VJC'l c OllH1Hllll rn • nd provu.i necessary for the \Var ~1ga inst ...tddam 11ussci n in I l) 1. ons r v,HI \'l's etn phaS17e defense for S<.::VCr.tl rc.::a Oil. f::j , t, it \\',lS bditVtd thclt the ~OVil't
Ur11on had gained an adv.tnt.l 't.: over the Unitc.::d St.H<.: 1n the seventie .
The United )Utes \V.l rhe "second 1110 t pO\\'Crful n11ltt.try n.Hion,"
according to R.onald l~eagan in the 198 de non. he de e.tts the Pentagon suffered in Vietnam \Vere but .1 p1eludc to kepticisn1 .1bout ne\V
vveapons systcn1s and tht clCCu .ttion of. n exaggc:r.ttc:d Ru~si.tn tlueat
that greeted n1ilitary plannc.::rs on apitol I Iill. Second, the United St.ltL'S
rnilitary enjoyed a technological advantage-becter b01nbs and r.1cbr,
faster planes and 1nissiles; but the seventies rc.::vc:alcd an erosion of technological don1inancc that ttvored Japan and other P.tcttic Run nanons.
To rcrnain a vvorld leader, the: United States needed .1 n:newed con1n11tn1ent to research and developrnent of high -tc:ch \vcaponry.
Early in the I~eagan ad1ninistration attc:ntion to Pentagon prOJects
gained f:1vor, but when a nun1bt:r of t:xpcnditures for iten1s \Uch .1s coffee
pots and hamJners becanH! su bjt:C ts of u1vesttgattve n1t:d1.1 stones, the
tJ
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military realized that priority funding came at a price. These stories
seemed to discredit the newfound fascination with exotic military weapons, until the 1991 Iraqi war confirmed the conservative devotion to the
military. The Patriot and Cruise missiles and laser-guided bombs proved
that the American military remained the standard for comparison in the
world. Since Iraqi weapons came from the Soviet Union, their destruction by American technology was especially sweet. President Bush
basked in the sunlight of Reagan administration defense initiatives as he
led the nation in defeating Iraq, then the world's fourth largest military
power. The long shadow of Vietnam-era pessimism about the military
receded in the bright sunshine of a Bush-led victory in the Gulf War.
Gradually, conservatism took on a more positive cast with an agenda
of reducing social spending, emphasizing traditional values, reshaping
the tax code, and rebuilding national defense. Through the 1970s and
1980s more Americans characterized themselves as moderates than either
liberals or conservatives, but whereas in the early 1970s liberal and conservative responses to survey questions were given in equal numbers, by
the end of the eighties, "conservative responses outstrip [ed] liberal ones
by a ratio of about 4 to 3. " 25 The conservative view shifted to a positive
and majority conviction as it became energized to fight within the political realm. For example, rather than just being against Keynesian New
Deal economics and big government budgets, conservatives gradually
developed constructive policies of their own that emphasized supplyside solutions and market alternatives.
In the Reagan administration implementing these conservative ideas
had the highest priority. The 1980 Republican Party platform declared
that "the family, the neighborhood, the conununity, and the workplace
[were] vital alternatives in our national life to ever- expanding federal
power. " 26 The policies emerging from such conservative think tanks as
the Heritage Foundation and the Manhattan Institute found widespread
acceptance in mainstream America. They confirmed the rhetoric Ronald Reagan had preached for years-an enhanced, vital free market, uninhibited by government intrusion, excessive taxes, or regulatory
burdens. The economic results of such an approach were spectacular:
the 1980s "have seen the longest, or perhaps second-longest, expansion
in the entire history of the American business cycle. " 27
At the end of the Reagan administration, even some liberals embraced
conservative capitalistic ideas. The era of national renewal emphasized
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traditional values, the dignny of \vork. love tor t~11nily and neighborhood, t1ith in God, a belief 111 pe.1Cl' through strcn.rth, .111d .1 con11nitrnent to protect fn.::edon1 .1s .1 unique kg.1cy of t\n1eric.1. ,eorgc Bush
<;atd 111 ht" Jn.lut,·,-ural address. "V./e know lH '" to c urt' .1 more just and
prosperous ltfe fC.1r 111.111 on l'.lrth: th1 ough ti·ee lll,lrkets ti·et· speech. fn:e
dectton,, .1nd the e.xer i =- o ree \Viii unh.1111pered b ' the st.lte."
c n >ll1JC Indicators.
ut 1de 1 s philonc\\
nd ) n1bol . The
g.1ve t nergy t
n en. ll\ e lcgt n . hortJon.
b.1nning chool Jr. ver. lenten<.) 1n h n ling cnn11n. I . J l jU t,ls. riots
.l!H.i vi olen e on c. tnpu e "n
111 1t1e , por rH r ph), . rh.l the Equ.1l
l~ights 1\nH: ndmt'rH
ndd be '1 U.lll7.c I !lHckl • n l c le. rly by the
n1.1sses. In the m.1l.u c- ot the ( . rter c- • R n. II IZ.c.1 :T.l.Jl a1d, "I .un
deeply conctrncd \Vith the ''. ve
hedt 111 rn, the hurnc rH t philosophy
o prev,1lent to L y, . n] l eheve tl11 n. tt n rnu t h.\ e , Jlntu.tl rebtrth .
•1 rededication to (he n1oral pre CJ l \\ h1 h f,Ttll le i u or o n1u h of our
pa t .1nd \\ e rnust have u h • rcbtrth 'el) oon. ,. R.cc: g.u'l ''' th(:
.. Great ... ornnHmicat r'' bee. u c he re. he I . nd o the the .111xictic~
of AnH;rican concerned b{ ut the uture . I e flere I. n .. ltcrn. tlVe vie\v
of to1norro'v b. ~ed on the \ lue that '' rkcd 'c tcr L).
The R.c-. g. n pre tdenly lu::ply JnHuen ed the J\n1t'n • n <. nscil'ncl'.
To rnany i\Jneri ·an~, iclenti 1 • uon \Vllh tht Rc .• n pre 11..len y \V,ls like
marrying .1 popul.u .lllsl', >ne th.1t ch.u1ged the ''"Y p )pic thought
about their government ,md it rolt· m the1r ltvt .
llltz hi11C}Wt1 Po.'r poll
in July 1<. HR found th.1t 111 re than h.1l - S2 J ercent- o the-re pondent'
believed th,tt the COU!ltry \V,l better of bee, U C ) l~e.l r,trl' pre idency:
only one-third said tht:y were wo c ot , and I 1 ~ er ent ,1i his tenure
n1ade no ditTerence. 1
ontinuing to foliO\\' .1 general! , const•rv.uive
agenda, Prcsidt:nt Bu h l'njoyt I .1 kvt 1 of popul:1r· supp H t higher dun
that of hi:-~ predect:ssor .tnd the hight· t of ,1ny presidt·nt .It cornpar.1ble
tin1e~ m his prt: idcncy. Both Rc~1g.u1 ,1nd Bu!-~h helped ch.1ngt' tht• way
n1ost AnH.:ricans thought ,lboul the fl'deral govcrn111ent, the ] ~epubhcan
Party, and the conservati vt: politic a I ideology.

The 1990s
The intem1ption in this generally conservative rt:nai-;sance can1e 111 1992
when Bill Clinton won the presidency as a "New Den1ocr.H," pron11S1ng
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an administration consistent with popular conservative themes. Within
four months of his inauguration the disapproval rating of the new president soared and there emerged an almost visceral level of mistrust and
dislike for him, a rejection not just of him as a leader or politician, but
as a person. Much of the aversion seemed to be based on cultural issues,
such as homosexuals in the military, abortion, and doubts about the
president's character. These controversies, breaking early in his administration, set the tone for his first two years in office. Then the 1994
midterm election delivered an enormous setback to the ideals ofliberalism and the Democratic Party.
Conservative radio talk shows, popularized by irreverent hosts such as
Rush Limbaugh, prospered during Bill Clinton's presidency in the
1990s. President Clinton's positions on abortion, feminism, homosexuality, and other moral issues became their cannon fodder. No liberal talk
show even came close to rivaling Rush Limbaugh's audience ratings.
While conservatives often decried liberal dominance of the print and
electronic media, they reigned aln1ost unchallenged on radio both nationally and locally.
From the 1940s into the new millennium, conservative authors wove
a common thread into the conservative quilt, undergirding and strengthening its fabric. The list of books in Table 1-1 docun1ents the growing
influence of conservatism. Three books, among many, illustrate this
common thread during these decades.
First, Compassionate Conservatism: What It Is, What It Does, and How It
Can Transform America3 1 by Marvin Olasky, which significantly influenced the 2000 presidential campaign of George W. Bush, provided an
antidote to the charge that conservatives lack compassion for the less
fortunate in society. Not only did "compassionate conservatism" serve
as the centerpiece of the Bush campaign, but the President's policy
agenda also reflected its influence on such issues as education. "Compassionate Conservatism" offset the historic advantage of liberal and Democratic presidential campaign slogans and policy agendas, such as New
Deal, Fair Deal, and Great Society.
Second, William ]. Bennett's best-seller, The Book of Virtues, unearthed a gold mine of great moral stories in the conservative tradition. 32
Covering such subjects as self-discipline, compassion, responsibility,
friendship, work, courage, perseverance, honesty, loyalty and faith, his
book reveals the quality of character that conservatives claim n1ust be
restored in the personal lives of Americans. Moral education, Bennett
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TABLE t- 1
ontcntporary Arncrican

~1olding

Decade

Year

Author

1940s

1944
194
1949

r=nc Inch von H

1951
1952
1953

on crvatisrn
itJc

ck

Rkh rd \T/c \ cr
Peter V1ercck
Ludv. •g \on h c
\V1lh~un

F BuckJc . Jr
Enc Voc elm
Ru elJ Kul

11u~

Road to Ct aom
Ideas Hat c Cou cqucuus
Con rn att " Retfl tted
Huma11 cttorr

G d and
11r

trrllllttlll)

h ml ~

1955
1957
1959
1960

It

r

19 1
2

1965

1970s

1970

1978
1979

Harvey tv1an 1ell
M. :. Brad or I
onnan Podh rctz

17rr l trltcm ruly C1ty
17tr H r ) mbol o tlu~
l men ,111 Politi 't!l 1rad111cm
11 tlr J) m ,,1trc Idea ur
m nc
Ra t mrd 1 otromu:
17re C 011 en atu ( lt~tdlrrwal Hot cmwt
mcnc.a uu.c 194 5
11u• prnt of Lrbemlrsm
13etrcr G111dc 17um Reason
Brtn •ttrg Rnu •

1<J80

J\·hhon nd Ro c
I·nedm:m
George ,,Jdcr
I lcrbcrt Stonng
Mi chael Nov k
George W1ll
Rtch ard Ncuhau
C harl es Mur .ty

l·rt c to Choose
IVealth [; Pm,ct l)'
7/rc Antiftden1ltsts
111e pmt of Dcmocrntu Capitalism
tatccrnfi as ouloafi
11rc 'akcd Publtc quare
L.osm~ ( 'ro1111d

1972
1975
197

1980s

I· dv. rd B n tel I
\Vallmoorc Kcnd 11

1981
1982
I <J83
19R4

I homac;
corgc
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TABLE 1-1 (Continued)
Selected Books Molding Contemporary American Conservatism
Decade

1990s

Year

Author

Title

1987

Allan Bloom
E. D. Hirsch

The Closing of the American Mind
Cultural Literacy

1991
1992
1993
1994
2000

Shelby Steele
Dinesh D'Souza
William Bennett
M. Stanton Evans
Marvin 0 lasky

The Content of Our Character
flliberal Education
The Book of Virtues
The Theme Is Freedom
Compassionate Conservatism

argues, is the key to restoring not only personal character but also to
reviving national greatness.
Third, The Theme Is Freedom, by M. Stanton Evans, presents a compelling case for America's Christian heritage, arguing that no society
can survive without a solid religious foundation that provides absolute
standards for moral and educational development. 33 Evans argues that
the historical record refutes two liberal myths: (1) that our liberties stem
from secular doctrines and (2) that religious absolutes endanger freedom.
No discussion of the 1990s would be complete without noting congressional and constitutional changes. The Contract with America,
which defined public policy debates during and after the 1994 midterm
election, offered a positive conservative prescription for America's policy
ills in the Congress. Reforming welfare, balancing the budget, reducing
the size of the national government, and returning power to state and
local governments highlighted this agenda. The Supreme Court, dominated by a narrow conservative majority, attacked such liberal icons as
affirmative action, separation of church and state, and national control
of public policy through the commerce clause of the Constitution, inciting long-awaited cheers from a previously silent conservative audience.

Conclusion
American conservatism emerged in the 1980s and 1990s as a viable alternative to post- World War II liberalism; it was not an isolated event. The
popularity of the New Deal and Keynesian economic policies began to
wane in the seventies when government policies triggered stagflation.
Federal initiatives in education, health, and employment raised the stan-
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dard of living for tno t An1ericans but led to bureaucratic stupor and the
specter of ocialized regulation.
Conservati n1, donnant during the postwar years, flowered when liberalism began to wilt in the heat of the soctal and economic turmoil
during the sixtie and even tie~. In 1979 the Reagan can1paign commissioned a poll about the value and a ptratton of the electorate and found
that An1ericans regretted the lo of value tn octety, parncularly tho e
associated with bu ine etluc and tradtttonal n1eantngs. The next year
the Connecticut Mutual Ltfe In uran e otnpany found that the values
of the nation's leaders- In bu Inc , the new n1edta, government, cience, education, and la\v---confltcted \Vtth tho c hared by the public.
The gap between rank-and-file Arnencan and thetr leadershtp elites was
as n1uch a 30 percent on uch fundan1cntalt ue ~ aboroon, pornography, and hon1osexuahty. \4 The on ervattve lteagan revoluoon trategically appealed to value ernphastztng an "era of national renewal." one
that would "revttahze the value of fanul), work and netghborhood. "'5
A diverstty of econonuc, poltocal, rehgtou , and octal optnton resurrected tradtttonal con ervatt 111. The cause of Its rebtrth were Interrelated, but con ervatt n1' tun1around u1 the 198( and 1990s would have
been itnpo ible without the philo opht al foundation provided in the
forty years after World War I I. The turbulent change of the txties hastened the appeal and vt tbtltty of con ervatl 111 111 the general public. The
neoconservative itnpul e contnbuted an e enttal n1ornentun1 to pu h
society to con tder the tradtttonal con ervatlve agenda.
Five conclu tons about con ervan 111 are evtdent fron1 thi review of
the literature. First, phtlo oplucal and Intellectual dt course on conservatism preceded popular and political treati e . econd, a wide variety
of political, econornic, octal, and religiou wnttng contributed to its
developn1ent. Third, political ucce required everal decades of maturation as various philosophical ideas gradually penetrated the public
n1ind. Fourth, no rnaster plan directed the rise of con ervatisn1. Contemporary Arnerican conservatisn1 is heterogenous, not hon1ogenous. No
one strand of thought and no single writer, leader, or group presided
over the resurrection of conservatisn1 fron1 the dead. Fifth, to achieve
political success in the future, candidates vying for conservative support
must carefully walk through disparate conservative ideas.
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CHAPTER TWO

The Problem of Defining
Conservatism
What is conservatism? Is it not adherence to the old and tried,
against the new and untried?
ABRAHAM LINCOLN '

A

political C\.llture is a patterned way of thinking about politics and
government. The American political system is supported by a culture that fosters a sense of civic duty, takes pride in the nation's constitutional arrangements and provides support for the exercise of essential
civil liberties. Although Jesse Jackson and Ronald Reagan, Ted Kennedy
and William F. Buckley, Jr., Paul Simon and Jesse Helms differ on specific issues of public policy, they still have much in common. Even these
political adversaries agree that the two-party system is important, that
there should be free speech and the competition of ideas, and that one
should respect the opinions of others. A political culture consists of the
fundamental assumptions citizens have about how the political process
should operate. It is the "rules of the political game" for the social order.
A political ideology differs from political culture by en1phasizing what
the political process should accomplish or do. How government and
politics should function may find conservatives and liberals agreeing, but
what government and politics should do customarily finds them differing. Their respective goals and desired results lead one to want to ban
abortion, the other to support it; one to oppose passage of the Equal
Rights Amendment, the other to desire its adoption; one to oppose new
taxes, the other to support them. For political scientists, liberalism and
conservatism are ideologies, meaning that they provide a guide for how
the government should function. Not always are the differences between
the two as crystal-clear as the examples above, but the tendency an1ong
ideologues is to disagree on major public policy questions.
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In um, political culture is the general agreement on the means to
achieve political ends, while ideology IS the reftecaon of differences on
the ends to be achieved. Poliacal culture IS the common ground for
conservatives and liberals bile poliacal tdeology lS most often their
fighting ground: "The dimension of the diVJSton between liberalism and
conservatism today refers to atatud about government role ... m the
protection of order and certam moral valu and commuruty standards. " 2
To define political conservaasm, e must exanune tt m context with
liberalism. Both liberals and conservaav accept the e tmg political
order. Both ant to use tablished tnsatuaons of Amencan government
with theu guaranteed procedures and prmcapl , but they want to use
them to achieve different resul . ne difference between liberals and
conservaaves IS that each one plac a different emph lS upon key points
in the Amencan poliacal culture. Amencan conservaa
have looked
to Tocqueville' Democracy'" Ammt41 and Russell Kirk' 1M Roots oftht
Amtriaua Ortkr as the best defiruaons of the original Amencan political
culture. These works
the uruque aspec of the Am ncan social
order and the differences between the ne ly fonned naaon and Its older
ancestors m Europe.
For most of 1ts history the Uruted tat of Amenca has been an
excepaon to the history and octal fabnc of Europe. It
founded in
oppostaon to European adeals and tradiaon , and from the beginning
the guiding rule of Amencan foreagn policy was to keep out ofEuropean
affiairs. Thomas Patne wd that the Old orld naaons had theu origin
in conquest and tyranny, but the "Independence of America [ ] accompanied by a Revoluaon tn the prmaples and pracac of Go emment. " 3 To conservaaves those tandards of government tnvolved
agreement on certain ideals which defined the character of the new
nation. To explain the American culture associated with ho conservatism will be defined, we begm by examining elements of the "national
character" of the country, as viewed by conservatives:
• Liberty-the importance of freedom to allow individuals to seek
"life, liberty and the pursuit ofhappiness" with limited restraints.
• Property granting individuals the right to own property, recognizing it is a primary means for individuals to find their place in
society, and to determine what they want to do with their lives.
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• Community--substantial deference to the role of the community
in defining society's standards and providing stability and continuity
from generation to generation.
• Theology-recognition of and respect for the important role religion plays in defining American values.
• Democracy-often called the "rule of law," meaning that governmental power must be exercised within constitutional limitations.
• Equality-of citizens before the law, allowing each American to
compete for jobs, income, status and education on an equal basis
with others.
• Opportunity-or "rugged individualism" referring to rewarding
personal effort and achievement rather than a person's social class,
family standing or some other arbitrary privilege that has not been
personally earned.
• Duty-encouraging Americans to fulfill their civic duty to participate in politics and community affairs by voting and being tolerant
of opposing views.
• Efficacy-the belief that each individual has the privilege of trying
to influence the political system and American society.
According to conservatives, these nine beliefs blend together to
form the unique "national character" of America. In such a system each
trait is related, for example, with liberty necessitating property, and
equality requiring opportunity. Conservatives give unique definitions to
the terms in the list above. For example, equality is defined by them as
opportunity to compete, not a guaranteed quota or insured result. Similarly, democracy is rule limited by the Constitution, it does not imply
a license to political power for each disaffected group or interest. For
conservatives the value of duty implies patriotism and allegiance to community; such loyalties dictate a rejection of government expansion.
Conservatism is about cultural traditions and values which defy simple
definition. In America, the status quo which conservatism defends is a
complex amalgamation of beliefs and values not easily summarized. A
good way to begin the definition of conservatism is with an explanation
of the cultural legacy so important to its premises.
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The vital tdeas and faith Wtthin conservatiSm are best undentood by
examming the moral foundations of
tern culture. Leo trauss, a leading conservative scholar, argued that the oul of the histoncal
and
rooted in an understanding of tts tntellectual tradibon. For tra
numerous other conservauves,
tern culture
on the classical
Greek and btblical hentages, hat h called the "G
Tradition" of
Western poliucs. The belief that classtcal poliucal philosophy
being
neglected and replaced by utoptan 1deologt like
, &scism and
ocialism as the core of the cnsu tra
m estern thought.
For much of Its history, the stud of polib mvol ed
about the
immutable pnnapl of JUSbce history and natural ngh for atiZenS.
The ne poliucal SCtence developed
r orld ar II changed this
focus. According to tra , ho condemns poliucal ence for rejecting the tradiuonal approach: "[For] them (modem political en ],
all human thought 1S histoncal and bene unable ev r to grasp anything
eternal. " 4 Allan Bloom descnbes polibcal SCience a disc1pline that "resembles a rather haphazard bazaar hop kept by a nuxed populabon. " 5
On the one hand, Bloom contends that the discipline
contact th
its past as the only social SCience that till has a gnificant branch m
philosophy; on the other hand 1 modem pseudosctentific methods ubvert the discussion of larger u of democracy, Ia and JUSbce.
The Greek tradibon of poliucal philosophy began th
, ho
pursued knowledge of the hole, and at the sam bm
·th
wonder and ptety the compleXIty of nature. The Gt~
recognized the
hierarchy of being tn nature as pomung to a transcendent Truth or
Good: "To know the Truth, to go out of the Platonic cave and to kno
fully the essence of the sun, would be 1nexpresstbly exhilarating and
would be the ultimate 1n attainment and satis&cbon. ''6 The logtc of uch
a discovery would show that man was not self-produced, that there as
such a thing as human knowledge and an unchangeable human nature.
The best politics was that which recognized order m society, with the
cornerstone of the state being the character of the individual citizen. In
classical Greek thought neither institubons, nor ctence, nor environment could make men good; it was up to the individual to develop the
intellectual and moral character necessary to improve the state.
The premise of traditional political philosophy was that men were by
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nature different and of unequal rank. You could have no virtue in a
society until such differences were recognized. The classical philosophers knew the linutations of n1an. Their idealism was tempered by a
realization that evil could not be eradicated-it could only be ten1pered
with wisdon1. The best political order entailed government by "good
men," defined as ones "who are willing, and able, to prefer the con1n1on
interest to their private interest and to the objects of their passions. " 7
The Judeo-Christian heritage was the second part of the "Great Tradition" of Western culture. Christianity teaches that there is a divine
intent to history and a supren1e God who holds subjects accountable for
their behavior on earth. Man is not an accidental product of a blind
evolutionary process; rather he is the capstone of creation. The Bible
sets forth the demands of n1orality and religion in a way which stresses
n1an's fulfillment in surrender to God's call. Obedience asks for a love
of God with all one's heart, with all one's soul, and with all one's n1ight
before it is possible to see society as an assembly of brothers and sisters
to be loved like oneself. In an insightful observation, Leo Strauss wrote,
"One can create obstinacy by virtue of some great villainy, but one
needs religion for creating hope. " 8 The conservative belief is that only
an appeal to transcendent virtues can n1ake men wise.
Christianity gave a purpose and direction to nullions of its followers
since the first century. In contrast to the n1aterialistic Greek concepts,
man in the image of God gave a distinctively different humanness to
society. Were it not for man's propensity to do evil, there would be no
need for a state, but that san1e sinfulness tneant that the political order
had lin1its. The apostle Paul in Ron1ans 13 instructed the Christians to
be "subject to the governing authorities," which in his case were pagan
Ron1an bureaucrats whom he called "n1inisters of God." But even the
obedience injunction found a limitation in Peter's declaration in Acts
5:29 that "We must obey God rather than n1an." In any well-conceived
community, matters such as marriage, vocation, and domestic life would
properly fall under the jurisdiction of the church, not the state.
To know Western culture was to know the traditions ofbothJerusalem and Athens. Augustine wrote, "We rate the Platonists above the rest
of the philosophers. " 9 Plato taught, as did the Bible, that heaven and
earth were created by an invisible God who set in place the natural order
of creation. Justice was compliance with this natural order, and it was
man who adapted to the arrangement of nature, not vice versa. The
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common ground between Christian and Jew was the belief that the
God of Abraham, I aac, and Jacob revealed ht character and nature in
the Ten Con1mandn1ents and that the e rule were vahd tn all circumstance .
It wa the Renai ance ptnt whtch evered the clas teal tradition of
Western pohttcal thought from Its roo and
erted the role of man.
Machiavelh broke w1th the cia teal tradtnon and dented that pohttcal
power was a rnean tn the erv1ce of htgher ends uch
JU nee, the
good life freedom, and erv1ce to God. Instead, Machtavelh assumes
that power 1 an end tn ttself; he eparates power fron1 morahty and ets
up the tate as an autonon1ou y ten1 of values Independent of any other
ource. Con equently, Leo trau noted, "He [Machtavelh] 1 notonous
as the cia tc of the evil way of pohncal thtnktng and pohncal acttng. " 1
By ignonng God Machtavelh ~en bed all rehgton to a human rather
than a dtv1ne ongtn . To hnn pohn al virtue w the pursutt of worldly
power and honor. Gone were the cia teal valu of elf-den1al and tru t
tn God.
The practlcal unphcatlon of Mach1avelh' work w to lower n1an to
the level of the bea ts. Defore h1n1, all pohncal wnnng-fron1 Plato and
Aristotle through the Middle Age to the Renai an e-had the goal of
Inlproving the ends of the tate. After Machtavelh, pohttcal power was
assun1ed to be an end tn Itself. and the htgher value ofJUStice, the good
life, freedorn and God were nnportant only to the extent that they
helped JU nfy that end. In Machtavelh' The Pri"ce, trau ob erved,
"The characten ttc feature of the work 1 prec1 ely that tt make no
dtstinction between pnnce and tyrant; It u e the tem1 'pnnce to de Ignate pnnce and tyrant ahke. " 11
A remnant of the cia teal tradttton urv1ved tn the Protestant Refornlation and the traditton of the Catholic Church. They extolled the
"Natural Law" which carne fron1 God and was not drawn up by man.
It was handed down to us by Christianity, Ron1an law, and Teutonic
culture and was knowable by revelation and ''right reason." Edmund
Burke wrote that we all con1e into thts world "in subjection to one
great, immutable, pre-extsting law, a law ... paramount to our feelings,
by which we are connected in the eternal frame of reference. " 12 The
freedoms enjoyed by An1ericans and Europeans today blosson1ed gradually over the centuries for a people in tune with "the eternal frames of
reference."
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Of course, Protestants and Catholics could not agree on matters of
the faith, and both were passionately religious. Protestants assailed the
papacy for losing the original ideals of the Christian faith and for having
adopted the worldly ambitions of lust, wealth, and power. Catholics, in
tum, invoked the natural law tradition of their medieval past in an effort
to remain the dominant force in European affairs. In the end, both the
Renaissance and the Reformation were overshadowed by an en1erging
new faith in science, which threatened any belief in the supernatural.
The modem ideologies of Marxism, utopian socialism, and secular humanism warred against the nature of things and attempted to superimpose a new design of solely human origin. In the end, both Catholics
and Protestants agreed that natural law n1iraculously came from God and
not from man.

The American Tradition of Conservatism
In the eighteenth century the Western world faced the twin phenomena
of Scientific Rationalism and the Enlightenn1ent. French writers of the
period believed that human reason was the absolute standard by which
political conduct and social institutions were to be measured. The
French Revolution began with a call for the "rights of man." There was
much talk about reason and the will of the people. Voltaire's adn1iration
for English progress in science was such that ''whenever he thought of
God, [he] tended to think ofNewton at the same time." 13 In the 1750s
the intellectuals of the time were captured by the idealistic view of man
which emboldened the French Enlightenment. The accent was on freedom of form and spirit, on feeling and originality, with a sympathy for
primitive nature. Gone were such traditional religious doctrines as man
born in sin facing judgment before an omnipotent God.
Modem American conservatism and liberalism trace their roots to the
writings of this time. The Frenchman Jean Jacques Rousseau (17121778) and the Englishman Edmund Burke (1729-1797) presented differing conceptions of the nature of God, n1an, and the state. Rousseau
believed that truth was derived from human reason, while Burke found
inspiration from the tested traditions of nature and Holy Scripture.
Burke approached the problems of society in the knowledge that "we
owe an implicit reverence to all the institutions of our ancestors," and
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that "1de.1'\ of religion .1nd govc: r111ncnt .1rc closl'l 'co nnected." I k railed
at the rdonner. in France: "All 'O ur ophi~ter .uu1ot 1 roducc anything
better adapted to presc.: rve .1 rati )J1 I nd n1anly fn:.:edon1 th,ln the: course
that \Vt' h.1ve pur. ucd . " 14
Con'\t rvatJvt nHc: Rou e.n1 as the ph do )I her 111 t re pon ible for
the problen1s of rn dernH '· He 1
1d to have unlea hed the roinantic
rnoral clin1. tt \Vhi h ~ chara lenze the \\/c l t) t '· In h1 person. 1 life
R.ous e.nr \V~l v.llll ,md
. 1 ·cl, nng hun1. n p.
the center and Inca ure
over runent he l elieved the
·rate? \Vas so on tituted th t ''rn. n • n be.: rce I tl be fret.,. 'Through
Rou~seau'
eneral \\'Ill there 1 the VI
the 111 iern 1 I of collective 111. n. Burke
''n. tura) nght ' b. e i on ,
"state of n ure .. , I , \\
r 1ng t) Burke
and \V<?re cont. 111el 111 the ''n, tur 11.\\ '' t
7 he Co11. t tvatille Cultun:

The ten IOn benvccn 13urke ll
u e. u \ c: terd, \,
, • n benvet n
ltberal and con erv nve t d \,
'er the Cllll ha 1 n cert. 111 cultur.d
, I
values .lt the cxpen c Jf orhe . I c
t le Jnttion )f
the rlt'W nanon \Vhen he \VfOte th. t " he UnHC St.. lC
/\znenca Illcl r
be said to be the r nly coun tI) 111 the '' orl i "h1 h \\.
n1n ed in explicit oppo nion to 1aclH. velh.tn 1 nn IJIC .' 1
pp Itt )I) to 1. chi.tvellian principle n1e. n that Ul tead of era d - 1ntere t • n l rreed. rhe
expn:~ e i pnnciple oi the Arneri .ul rei ubh \Vere • en e of Hnrnunity partiCipation, ,m .tpJ re iation o n. tural r1rrhts, .1 re pect for <.:Stablished n:ligJou v.tlue . ,111 a degree
bben; unkno\vn Jrt Europt. \uch
are the valut con ervarivcs cheri h.
As tht: nation devtlopecl ti un1 the truth in tht· I )ecl.lr,ttion of Independence, con~erv:nive believe.: it took on a dt tin rivc:: ch.lr.Ktt•r \ h1ch
n1crits respect and protection. In · r.m c1s \Vt! on's 'lite _, 1 ej~>r ... onsenmllS111 (1951 ), conservatisn1 is defined .1s ".1 philo ophy of socialcvoluuon.
1n \vhich certain lasting v.1lue~ are de t•ndc.:d within the· fi-.lnlc\vork of
the tension of political conflict." his philosophy is ''pritnarily .1 ..,p1rit
anin1ating political behavior . . . a \vay of life ... a n1.1nner ofjudbllng
life." 16 Wilson views conscrvatisn1 as an ,lttitudc about governn1L'l1t that
'
is n1ore than a 1nere political ideology guiding day-to-d.1y pohticll deos1ons.
'--'

THE PROBLEM OF DEFINING CONSERVATISM

29

Russell Kirk, who, like Wilson, does not believe that conservatism is
an ideology, concludes: (1) that conservatism, unlike liberalism, offers
no utopian agenda as the solution to society's problems; (2) that conservatism is more a state of mind about life than a program for action; and
(3) that change should arise out of experience, history and tradition
rather than being imposed upon society from some prescriptive rule
book. 17 The last tenet, a traditionally accepted one of conservatism,
holds that change--econo1nic, political, religious, and social-should
take place gradually and within the bounds of existing custom and local
institutions rather than rapidly through expanding, centralized govemn1ental bureaucracies. Like Wilson, Kirk believes conservatism is more
an attitude toward life than a plan for political action.
While accepting much of what Wilson and Kirk have to say, Robert
Nisbet disagrees with them about whether conservatism is an ideology.
Nisbet defines an ideology as "any reasonably coherent body of moral,
economic, social and cultural ideas that has a solid and well-known reference to politics and political power." Such a body of ideas serves as a
"power base to make possible a victory for the body of ideas"; "remains
alive for a considerable period of time"; "has major advocates and
spokesmen"; and has "a respectable degree of institutionalization., Nisbet believes that conservatism is a viable political program that can be
translated into specific policy proposals for consideration by voters. 18
Willmoore Kendall critiques several definitions of conservatism emphasizing the uniqueness and specialness of the American experience.
To Kendall, tradition by itself is not a sufficient guide for political action,
especially if that tradition is rooted in relativism and positivism as it is in
many European countries. These relative influences are found in contemporary society, even in the prescriptions of conservative thinkers.
Kendall maintains that definitions of conservatism should be avoided
until the criteria for judging the adequacy of such ideas can be specified.
For him, government submits its ideas for scrutiny by the society as a
whole and as a creature can never judge the truth in society.
Definition

Conservatives have been reluctant to define what they believe. The
definitions by Nisbet, Kirk, Rossiter, and others have been subjected to
unending scrutiny by peers, who find various flaws in need of correc-

30

CHAPTER TWO

tion. The definition of con ervatt 111 u ed here emphasizes the moral
constitutional tradition of the We t that produced a reasonable society
able to judge the action of tts governn1ent. o characteri tic of American conservati n1 is n1ore prevalent than tts preoccupation with the preservation of thi unique cultural hentage.
Con ervatisn1 as it 1 defined here 1 both an atntude about hfe characterized by defendtng the tatu quo and a pectfic tdeology based on
the law , cu ton1 and tradttton that have proven u eful tn the past.
Con ervatives would agree that raptd change, even tn the direction of a
desirable or noble goal, 1 dangerou . They would avotd change that did
not ari e from the expenen e, ht tory, or tradttion of a octety. Con ervatives would defend the pohtical, octal and economic tn titution from
all but the 1110 t gradual and ure alteration. Ftnally, con ervanve would
agree that the expenence of the Untted tate tn government 1 untque
and erve as a beacon for emergtng den1ocract around the world. We
define conseroatrsm a a defen e of the polrtrcal, ecotlottuc, relrgrous, and social
status quo from the forces of abnlpt claat~ge, that 1 based Otl a belref that established customs, laws mad tradtttotts provrde contumrty at1d tabrlrty '" the guidance of society.
It i the conservative re pon tbthty to keep cultural tradttion tntact by
reasserting con1n11tn1ents to the n1oral tradttion whtch gave tt btrth. Figure 2-1 presents a umrnary of con ervative behe~ , as contrasted with
liberal tendencie . The hberal tradttton ernphastze hun1an reason, the
developn1ent of the tndtvtdual free fron1 the re tra1nts of government,
and governmental action tn the redre s of octal and economic tnequalities.
By contra t, conservatives tend to en1pha tze: (1) orthodox and traditional religious values; (2) les faith in the goodne , reason, and perfectability of mankind; (3) belief tn less power for the centralized
government; (4) more identification with state and local government in
the federal system; (5) a nationalistic and patnotic ptrit; (6) the duties of
the individual more than his or her rights; (7) a trust in the free markets
of capitalism; and (8) a desire that econon1ic, political, religious, and
social stability be n1aintained through gradual changes within existing
institutions.
Conservatives have always believed that the political structure of a
state, if it is to be stable, must reflect the traditions and customs of that
society. In the past two decades America has been undergoing a political
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FIGURE 2-1
Conservative and Liberal Beliefs:
Contrasting Emphases and Tendencies
Topic

Liberal

Conservative

Indtvidual
National
Internationalist
Direct

Community
State and Local
Nationalist
Indirect

ToMan

To God

Faster/ Utopian
Equality
Governmental Refonn

Slower/ Prescriptive
Liberty
Spiritual Regeneration

Central Government
Public
Regulation
Socialism

Markets
Pnvate
Competition
Capitahsm

1. Government

Primary Focus
Preferred Government
Direction of Sentiment
Method of Government
Influence
Accountability of
Government
Rate/Type of Change
Relative Importance
Justice Achieved By
2. Economy

Source of Authority
Growth Sector
Government Function
Tendency

3. Cultural and Religious Values

Ultimate Source of
Knowledge
Biblical Interpretation
Moral Standards
Relative Emphasis
Moral Emphasis
Relative Importance to
Man
Origin ofEvil

Reason

Nature/ Bible

More Symbolic
Relative/ Situational
Man
Social
Rights

More Literal
Absolute/ Orthodox
God
Personal
Responsibilities

Unjust Social Systems

Original Sin

crisis. Since the 1960s, the fear an1ong conservatives has been that the
United States is adopting values similar to those of secular Europe. They
saw the siren song of socialism capture 1nany intellectuals in the 1950s
and 1960s, which led to an unhealthy experin1entation with both the
economy and the social fabric of the nation. The fear an1ong conservatives is that metaphysical values (belief in God, respect for order and
belief in community) have been eroded by the liberal faith in n1aterialism
and human reason.
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At no place i thi ero ion n1ore apparent than in universities and
college . Mo t universine tn the 1990 seek to promote pluralism and
diversity by recrutttng nunontte for faculty position and setting up
eparate course for the purpo e of dentgrattng alleged xenophobia, raci m, and ext 111 1n Atnencan h1 tory. In tead of Inculcating the values of
We tern culture, the new untverstty cumculum eek to "empower"
tudents to political action. Lo t on the untverstty campus is the belief
that cholarshtp can n1ove toward an tdeal of truth. "Although the revolution first hook the hutnantne and the octal ctences, 1ts reverberations are now betng felt tn law chool , medtcal chool , and cience
departn1ents, whtch long con tdered them elve largely exempt from
campu agttanon.'' 1
The con ervattve vtew 1 that there are dt tinct hnuts to human reason
in general and tn the po tbthne of governmental action tn particular.
The con ervanve believes that no one n1an or group of men has the
capactty to fore ee all the con equenc of any tngle government policy.
For tht reason the on ervattve favors caunon, humthty and the broade t base of den1ocrattc upport the first requuetnent for en tble governnlent. Order 1 better than octal expenmentanon, and everyone has
a take tn pre ervtng order. In Ftgure 2-l the con ervatlve emphasi
1 on gradual change, obedten e to God, personal re pon tbtlity, and
con1n1un1ty value .

Five Contemporary Types

of Conse"'atr

m

After World War II con ervanve offered theu values as an alternative
to the octal agenda of refon11 hberal . But 1n the decades of the 1950s
TABLE 2-1

Representative Types of Conservative a Defined by
Conservative cholar
English

Harbour

Lora

Insuncuve
2 Econom1c
3 Philosophical

Authonun:m
2. Econom1c
3. Rehgtous

Ps) chologtcal
2 Posses 1ve
3 Philosophtcal

ash
1 L1ben~man
2 Trad1uonahst
3 Anucommurust

Rossiter
1 Temperamental

2 Possess1ve
3 Pracucal
4 Philosoph1cal

See: Raymond Enghsh, "Conservausm the Forb1dden Fa1th," Amtncan Scholar 21 (Autumn 1952}:
pp. 393-412, Wilham R. Harbour, 11re Foundatrons of Conservative Thought (1982}, p. 103; Ronald
Lora, Conservatwe Mrnds rn Amrnca (1976), p. 3; George H. Nash, Tirt Conservatwe lnttlltctual Movement "' Amenca srnce 1945 (1976), pp. vm-1x; Chnton Rosmer, Conservatrsm rn Amtnca (1962}, pp.
6-11.
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and 1960s, the nation was n1ore interested in change than the preservation of traditional values. By the end of the 1970s the national mood
was more somber, and conservative values seen1ed appropriate for the
tin1e.
Listed in Table 2-1 are five representative types of conservatisn1. Probably the most noticeable on1issions from the lists are the n1ovement neoconservatives and populist conservatives who will be discussed later. The
emphasis of the table is on the various forms in which conservatism may
be found.
Raymond English sees conservatives as clinging to the known and
the accustomed, defending econon1ic privilege, and adopting an attitude
toward politics that stresses the value of tradition, habit, and authority.
William R. Harbour pictures conservatives as longing for order in society, valuing the leadership of elites, desiring freedom for business and
industry to function, and placing great importance on virtue and morality in private life. Ronald Lora views conservatives as wanting to preserve custom and opposing changes that would disrupt it. Lora also
believes that conservatives understand virtue and will forego self-interest
in the pursuit of philosophical convictions. The three types defined by
George H. Nash include libertarians, traditionalists, and a new type,
anticommunists. Libertarians defend free enterprise and oppose governmental interference in any market activity, while anticomn1unists believe
in the importance of a strong national defense to contain foreign threats
abroad. Finally, Clinton Rossiter distinguishes four types of conservatives: temperamental, possessive, practical, and philosophical. They, individually and collectively, oppose substantial change in society, seek to
defend personal acquisitions, value comn1unity, and subscribe to principles designed to justify the established order.
These types show that one can be of a conservative ten1peran1ent and
not possess a philosophical or intellectual understanding of conservatism.
In other words, it is possible to have the conservative "go-slow" state of
mind, and at the same time favor an active role by the federal government in, say, the prosecution of southern school districts for a failure to
desegregate public schools in the 1960s. Comn1on to these types are a
concern with property and the status quo on the individual level, an
emphasis on community at the group level, and an intellectual defense
of virtue on the societal level. Some types of conservatism are more
concerned about preserving one's position in society, while other types
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emphasize an aggre ive public stance toward life which i intellectual
and philosophical.
This dt tinctton. between "attitude-type" con ervattve who have
traits \vithout nece anly tht nktng through the phtlo ophy, and " actiontype" conservaav
ho have carefully constructed public philosophy,
is m eVIdence m the poliacal proc . Poliactans may adopt aspects of
conservaasm and then abandon the posture h n crws or tuatton
on and onald
built
changes. For example both chard
thetr
d bo
thetr DOSllQ
door

tb

encan history o
stanc polittcaltdeologa
pie. Thomas Pam
tmctJo and p en "~,,.
ilton by con
ad oca
by an elite c . Th
thetr tune, are exampl
Ltberals and conservau
to ard authonty, thetr
o th econo
~wes should play m odd poli
trastmg tendenaes of liberalism and co
.
The first tendency,
the authontanan na
of tdeologa
seen m the conflict between Thomas Pame and UeJtan1aer Hamilton.
Pame, With his emphasis on the elimination of ngad c
distmct contrast to Hamilton, ho &vored a leadenhip
these men, and thetr tdeas, played an tmportant part m
encan political, social and econonuc history; but each had a difFerent e of ho
the soaety should be structured and who hould be eligible to partiapate
in political decisions.
Paine, for example, was an authoritanan m the ns that he wanted
to use government power to eradicate class distinctions and to achi e
egalitananism. He did not believe in a leadership class like Hamilton
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did. Con ervatives believe that in any ocic ty son1c people \Viii be tnore
dotnin.ult oci.1lly. cconon1ic.tlly and polittcally. Thcrr leadership and influence give t.1bility to ocicty and en urc an orderly tran ·fer of po\ver
.1nd \Ve.llth. AutlH rity rightly re \Vith the1n, and the on crvative ethic
i to recognize .1nd rc\\ .1rd ach1cvcn1cnt \vhencvc r it occurs in ociety.
Elite are both inevltable and nece aT), but not every conservative
\Vould \Vi h to recogn1ze chtt 111 the ''a) H. n11lton de 1red.
econd. econon11c c n en. u 111 etnph. tze pnv. te propert) and the
profit JHOOVt a t\\ 111 ba e f the An1en . n e on Ill) de Jgtled to encourage 1ndiv1dual 1111t1. tl\ e, \dule e non11 ltberah n1' ernpha i on
ociali n1 ha hdped to bnng uno An1encan hfe u h adca and practice
a ocial ecunt), Meda . re and Med1 . 1d. In I ra t1 c n1an) An1cncan ,
and rnany c n en'. tl\ e . upport b th the pr It 111 uvc and o ral ecunty.
on enfatl\ e ha\ e . I\\ a\ l ecn de en de o the nght of property,
recognJztng that "propern '' 111 lu :le n1ore th. n 111. ten. I thrngs. For exanlple. the talent of an . rtl t pr te ted 1n •
P' nght r the acadetnic
treedorn of. un1vc It) profc r 1 a I r pert\ nght. I he cxcr 1 e of an
1ndividu. 1' nght to unpro\ e hun elf ec n nu nU) 1 , ba 1 con ervanve
value. apH. h 111 1 defended be . u e 1t 1 the be t ) tern to .llo\v individual expre ton, the c urn ulan n of Inatt·n.l g d , . nd the \Vorking
of free Jnarketo.;.
Third, interrunonal con enr. t1 n1 tre e reah 111, pragn1.1ti 111, and
pO\Vt:r politic 1n the ondu t of An1l.:n an ore1gn p hey, preferring to
have a trong nanonal defcn e, t develop ne\\ \\capon y tcn1 , and to
roll b.tck the borders of conln1lll11 111. I ntcrn. tlorul ltberali 111, on the
other hand, peak n1ore 1dcalt tlcally about An1cncan foreign policy in
relation to fort: ign po\vers an l the con1n1un1 t \vorld cnlphajzing good
\viii and hunun rights. Internattonal ltberali 111 Ius n1uch rnore confidence in international org.1niz.ttion hke the United Nanons and is rnore
likely to trust conununist leadL"rs in intt: rnation.tl agreernents.
The realisrn of conserv.ttisrn is based on .1 vie\v of h urn.u1 nature that
is suspicious of a per on's prorniscs .tnd of a nation's tre.lties and agreernents. In Novernber 1t.JRS the editors of the conserv.uive journal Commentary invited rnore than thirty intellectuals to respond to questions
about An1erican developrnents since the end of World War I I. The nlajority of the writers larnented the continued po\ver and oppressive policies of the Soviet Union, but they rnaintained that the United States had
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remained powerful precisely because it was suspicious of n1oves the Soviets had made around the globe. 20
Fourth, liberalism has historically emphasized the concept of equality,
but not the absolute negation of liberty, and it has played a part in such
movements as the abolitionist n1ovement before the Civil War and the
contemporary civil rights rnovement. Political conservatism with its emphasis on liberty has stressed the freedon1 of each citizen to pursue his
ambition without undue restraint, especially fron1 the government.
Conservatives take special pride in the accon1plishments and opportunities capitalisn1 affords to its citizens.
Conservatism instinctively senses that the liberal passion for furthering
equality can only be brought about by greater and greater uniformity.
Centralized planning n1eans a decrease in regional, neighborhood and
individual autonomy, variety, and liberty. Part of the conservative allegiance is to known institutions which stand between the citizen and his
government.
Fifth, populists, though historically considered liberal, have since the
1960s included a highly vocal conservative segrnent. Agrarian populists
of the 1890s and 1920s en1phasized redistribution of economic goods,
setting forth a strong anti-business platfom1. Equity was the don1inant
theme of populist refom1ers. By contrast, conservative populists have
emphasized a grass-roots agenda of traditional n1orality, pro-school
prayer, anti-abortion, and anti-Equal Rights Amendn1ent. Whether
conservative or liberal, populists appeal to basic values held by common
citizens.
Sixth, religious conservatisrn has a tradition beginning with the early
settlers and continuing through the founders of most of the first colleges
and universities, such as Harvard, Yale and Princeton. The first colleges
were originally theologically conservative, but they gradually adopted
liberal theological positions. Religious liberalism accon1n1odated European values to the An1erican experience. 22 It does not have as long a
tradition in An1erican history, but its roots go back to ideas like Thon1as
Jefferson's Deism. Today it continues with such groups as the National
Council of Churches and Nom1an Lear's "People for the American
,
W ay.
The personal religious commitments of any particular liberal aside, it
remains true that liberalism is less opposed to a secular society than is
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conservatistn. Since the 1960s Catholics and Protestants have united to
complain about the moral decline of the West.
Social conservatism, the seventh category in Table 2-2, is concerned
with maintaining order and continuity in society, while social liberals
are n1ore interested in change to achieve certain desired ends. University
of Chicago Professor Richard Weaver, a native of the South, wrote
nostalgically about regional values and the threat to southern culture and
tradition posed by socialliberalisn1 in his book The Southern Tradition at
Bay (1968). 23 No region of the country is more supportive of social
conservatism than the South. The ideas of person, position, and place
have the greatest meaning in the South because of its unique history and
social legacy. This type of conservatism is also found extensively in the
vast rural, small-town, and agricultural regions of the nation. Social liberalism, by contrast, is of an urban sophistication and emphasizes change,
especially to achieve major reforms. Social liberals have been in the vanguard of civil rights movements, organizations like the American Civil
Liberties Union, and the labor movement.
For conservatives the primary need in any society is order. Without
political stability nothing else-not justice, not equality, not liberty, and
not prosperity-can be accomplished. Order is not an end in itself,
rather it is a means by which one can bring disenfranchised groups into
the society. No expansion of the benefits of a society is possible without
political stability.
Although there are clear relationships among all eight conservative
values in Table 2-2, there are also differences among those who adhere
to them. For example, an economic conservative is not necessarily a
religious conservative, nor is an economic liberal necessarily a religious
liberal. Son1e liberals are very optimistic about hun1an nature, and at the
same time counsel a realistic foreign policy with adversaries. We see a
strong relationship between the politics and theology of American politicians which we will discuss in Chapter Six. 24

Neoconservatism
Neoconservatism and neoliberalism are products of the reaction in the
1960s to the excesses of liberalism. Though having much in common,
they have moved in different directions politically. Many neoconservatives have adopted the Republican Party, while neoliberals ask for re-
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fonns within the Den1ocratic Party. Neoconservatives support a strong
national defense n1ore than neoliberals do. Neoliberals are critical of
large govemn1ent bureaucracies and the historic ties Democrats have
had to labor unions. They have revived an crnphasis on the importance
of con1n1unity and the negative aspects of the \velfare state. Neoliberal
leader Charles Peters, editor of the n1agazine !Vashington Monthly, says
that "Neoliberalisn1 is first and foren1ost a n1ovcn1ent of comn1unity. We
believe in a society that shares its burdens and rewards. We reject the
Me Decade and the proliferation of special1nterest groups. " 2 1
Peters argues that neohber,1ls \vant to free hbcralisn1 fron1 automatically favoring big unions and b1g governn1ent agamst business and the
n1ilitary. He thinks the Den1ocrat1c Party could gain by becon1ing critical
of public education, the ovd serv1ce, and labor un1ons, even though
these groups have h1stoncally been c;taunch defenders of hberalisn1.
Neoliberal vle\vs sho\v that con5ervatiYe thought, \Vlth it distrust of
large govemn1ent progran1s ,1nd approval of con1n1un1ty solutions, is
having a dran1atic unpact on the pohocal lett. Neohberalisrn and neoconservatisn1 are both reactions to the octal expenn1entation \vhich
characterized the 1960s, but neoliberahsn1 l'i c;eek1ng to recapture those
major block of voters loc;t to the R.epubhcan Party. Wh1te southerners
and Catholics abandoned the I)en1ocrat1c Party In large nun1bers during
the tenns of the !~eagan presidency. It iS apparent that the Den1ocratic
Party cannot return to po\ver unless It recovers the e traditional constituenCies.

Libertan'anism
Libertarianism, SOinetin1es con idered a type of conservatisrn, believes
in the autonon1y of the individual and a tninin1al role for the government. The 1na.xin1un1 reduction of sooal and governn1ent action is required so that the greatest possible roon1 is left for each individual to act.
Libertarians think that individuals should be free fron1 governn1ental
restraint in both econon1ic and noneconon1ic areas. For exan1ple, libertarians would say that the govemn1ent should not regulate abortion since
that is a personal n1atter. The heart of contemporary libertarian belief is
the primacy of the individual.
Although the Libertarian Party remains on the fringes of American
politics, its ideas have stimulated much interest and admiration among
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traditional conservatives. Libertarians oppose the interference of government in the private lives of citizens, seek an unfettered free market, and
oppose laws regulating the prices of consumer commodities. Libertarians
favor nonintervention in the affairs of other nations, and call for a drastic
reduction in the defense budget and defense policy.
Traditional American conservatistn, modeled after Edmund Burke's
philosophy and built on a substantial regard for religious values, would
reject many libertarian proposals. Conservatism has great respect for
community customs, morals, and the traditions that have guided public
policies in the past. It holds that there are some religious and moral
values that may be superior to individual rights and freedoms. Philosophical and religious conservatives attack contemporary libertarians as
radicals who are unconcerned about preserving the historic values of a
society. Libertarianism, the critics charge, is a form of rampant individualism which lacks a proper respect for custom and tradition. Still, most
conservatives have great respect for the more modest libertarian belief in
trying to restrain governmental activity in the economic realm.
The ideas of the libertarians have influenced both major parties. The
Republican Party in 1980 took a much n1ore aggressive stand against the
social programs of the 1960s and 1970s partially as a result of libertarian
influence. The programs to reduce income tax rates and deregulate some
business and industry show a distinctly libertarian influence. The Democrats have become more critical of intervention in foreign affairs and
supported broader freedom from government interference in so-called
victimless crin1es (prostitution, pornography, gambling) and the practice
of abortion and gay rights also as a partial result of libertarian values.

Midwestern Conservatism
Midwestern conservatism has a long and distinguished tradition of
service to the An1erican experience. States like Ohio, Indiana, Illinois,
Michigan, Iowa, Nebraska, and Kansas have regularly sent individuals
to Congress who represented conservative, small-town values. Senators
Robert A. Taft (R., Ohio) and Everett McKinley Dirksen (R., Ill.) along
with former president Gerald Ford (R., Mich.) and current Senate leader
Robert Dole (R. , Kansas) are in this tradition.
They differ fron1 other conservatives on at least two counts. First,
they are less ideological, and more politically pragmatic and prone to
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con1pro1nise. Both J)irksen and l)ole have been leaders in Congress,
where their conservative ideology guides but does not dominate their
political behavior. Second, they n1ay accept or propose policies that
would increase the size of govemtnent for prag111atic political, hunlanitarian or other reasons. In the late 1940s, for exan1ple, Senator Taft proposed a n1ajor public housing progratn; Senator Dirksen was the key
legislative leader in gaintng passage of the 1964 C1vil I~1ghts Act and
the 1965 Voting Rights Act; although both 1neasures vvcre opposed by
conservative I~epublican prcstdennal candidate Barry Goldwater. Gerald
Ford was opposed for the I~epublican presidential non1ination in 1976
by Ronald !~eagan, pritnanly because Ford's conservative Ideology was
n1uch n1ore pragnuttc and less systetnattc than that of I~eagan and hts
followers. Senator l~obert Dole's pragt11at1c tnstincts have led hin1 to
con1pron1ise n1ore frequently 1n \vays that a tnore doctnnatre conservative vvould not. For exan1ple, 1r1 1985 Dole angered n1any conservatives
by forging a budget-cutting con1pron11 e 'vhtch reduced 1nany favonte
weapons progran1 at the Pentagon. 22

Conclusion
Conservatisn1 i5 best defined by exaxnining Its various types and their
differences with hberahsn1. To the extent that defimt1ons overlap vve
find it in1portant to note that both conservatiSnl and llberali 111 hold
certain values in con1n1on, such as at,rreetnent on the niles of the gan1e
in the political culture. Ho\vever, ltberals .1nd con ervattves di agree on
which traits of the Arnencan character are n1ost in1portant and \VhiCh
ones should be nourished and protected by governrnent. Conservative
place greater e1nphasis upon the roles of religion, tndivtdual duty, virtue,
private property, con1n1unity, and the ntle of la\v.
We define conservatisn1 as a defense of the political, econon1ic, religious, and social status quo against the forces of abrupt change. Con ervatives believe that established custon1 , laws, and traditions provide
continuity and stability in guiding society. The conservative attraction
to the past is rooted in a respect for institutions and a uspicion of n1odern political ideologies. Change n1ust be accotntnodated to custon1, history, and tradition-not in1posed fron1 son1e abstract blueprint or
scheme. Conservative pren1ises are traceable to the ancient traditions of
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both Athens and Jerusalem, as well as the modern tradition begun by
Edmund Burke.
Conservatives differ among themselves as to whether their beliefs are
an ideology, attitude, or state of mind. One thing is clear-many people
are conservative without necessarily knowing it or having thought carefully about why. They are attitude-conservatives, accepting conservative
premises, and can be contrasted with action-conservatives, who have a
seriously prepared plan of political action. Of whatever stripe, and for
whatever reason, conservatism has had a major impact on American
society since 1980 as n1easured by electoral and political success. Liberals
and neoliberals have been forced to adopt and shape conservative ideals
to fit a new agenda.
Sometimes conservatism is referred to as communitarian individualism. Conservatives believe that the con1munity serves as a healthy buffer
between the onerous power of the government and the anarchical tendencies of rampant individualism. The community enables the individual
to feel a part of one or n1ore groups which transfer custom and tradition
to him. It gives the individual not only a feeling of belonging, but also
ofbeing attached to the flow of history. In constrast, conservatives point
out, socialists consider the state the principal reference point and the
individual merely a tool for the ends of the state.
Though commonly considered conservative, libertarianism is actually
opposed to the fundamental premises of conservatism. More typical of
conservatism is the pragmatic midwestern variety that has incurred opposition from doctrinaire conservatism when it has either compromised
with liberalism or espoused policies that would enlarge government or
implement humanitarian objectives that might bring rapid change to the
American social order. Religious, philosophical, and economic conservatives have become much more important since the 1940s, while anticommunist conservatives have decreased in importance.

Notes
1. Abraham Lincoln, Address, Cooper Union, New York, February 27, 1860.
2. James W. Ceaser, et al., American Government (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1984),
p. 111.
3. Thomas Paine, "Thoughts on the Present State of American Affairs," in Political
Writings, Bruce Huklide (ed.) (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 29.

THF PROBLEM Of DEFINING CONSERVATISM

43

4. Leo Strauss, Nat11raf Rt~ht and I listory (Ch1cago: University of Chicago Press,
1953), p. 12.
5. Allan Bloom, '17tc Cfosi11~ of the Jlmerican Mind (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1987), p. 365.
6. John P. East, "Leo Strauss and Amencan Conservatism," in Modern A,Re, Vol.
XXI, Winter, 1977, pp. 2-19.
7. Leo Strauss. lVlwt Is Political Philosophy? (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959), pp.
85-86.
8. Leo Strauss. 11wll_(?,llls on Afachiauelli (Seattle, Wash : Umverstty of Washmgton
Press, 1958), p . 150
9. Augustmc,
Ctty of Cod, Henry Bcttenson (Trans. ). (Mtddlesex, England:
Pen gum Books, 1972) Book H, Chapter I 0.
10. Leo Straus-;, Tiwt~,e?,hts 011 \faclllal'clli, p 10
11. Leo Strauss, H1wt Is Polllical Pl11losophy~ (1959) p 289
12. Edmund Burke. ''Reflections on the Re\ olunon 1n France," in fVorks 'Boston:
Little, Brown, 1865)
13. Nonnan Hampson. 11n· Enli._(!htcllmcllt (NC\\ York Penguin Books, 1968), p. 79.
14. Edmund Burke. "Reflections on the Rc\ olution 1r1 France " cbastian De
Grazta, Machial'ellt 111 !Jell (Pnnccton, N.J : Pnnccton Uni\Crstt) Press, 1989).
15. Leo Strauss, 17toll~t?hts Ml Af,u/llcll'rllt, p I)
16. Francis Wthon. 17tc Cuefor Conscn•attsm (Seattle. W.1sh University ofWashmgton Press, 1958), p 13.
17. Russell Kirk. 71tc Coii(Cn'cllit•t.• .\lind (7th ed.; Chu:-.1go Rcgnei")' Books, 1986),
pp. 13-20.
18. Robert Nisbet, CollSen,atism (Mmncapolts· Umvcrsttv ofMmnesota Press, 1986),
pp. vm-20.
19. Dmesh D'Souz.l, "Illiberal Educauon," 711e Atlat~tic, v 267; n. 3 (March 1991)
p. 58.
20. "Sympostum· HO\\ H.ts the Umtcd C::,tates Met Its MJ_Jor Challenges mce
1945?" Commentary 80 (November 1985).
21. Charles Peters, .\..7<'!1' Road jo1 .l'lmcrica: 71tc 'colibeml .\ /ol'cmcllt (Lanham, Md.:
Madison Books, 1985), p. 9.
22. Martm Marty says the cnsts m Protestantism was due to four things: 1) the theory
of evolution; 2) the demgranon of the amhontv of the Btble; 3) the econonuc threat of
socialism; and 4) urbamzatwn m and murugranon to the U.S. Maron E. Marty, Ptlgrims
in Their Own Lcmd (New York: Vik.mg Penguin Books, 1984), pp. 297-298.
23. Richard Weaver, 17te Soutlzem Tmdicio11 at Bay (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlmgton
House, 1968).
24. Charles W. Dunn, American Political Theology (New York: Praeger, 1984).
25. Hedrick Smith, TI1c PofiJer Came (New York: Random House, 1988), pp. 491-

·n,c

49n.

CHAPTER THREE

The Ten Most Important Beliefs of
Conservatism
To be a consen,atil'c in tlzc umcatl5 of commtmication is the
road to dfectivellc.u i11 modem l~{c, i11 wltateucr dircctton o11c
wishes to be effcctil'c.
1
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I

he dictionary definition of culture, a\ the "tdeas, custorns, skills, and
arts of a given people," ha\ a part1Cular affinity for conservatism.
Conservatives have ahvays believed that the poht1cal structure of a state,
if it is to be stable, rnust reflect the traditions and cu<\tOnls of that society.
"Do what you znay," \vrote Alexis de Tocqueville, "there is no true
power an1ong rnen except 1n the free un1on of their \Vtll; and patriot1sn1
and religion are the only t\.VO tnotives 1n the world that can long urge
all the people toward the satne end. " 2 Conservatives believe that society
is not a n1achine \vhich can be tinkered \.Vtth and altered at \vhinl, rather
it is a living organistn nounshed by the values of the culture.
The conservative fear 1s that the Untted States as a ociety is una\vare
of the past values which n1.1de It exceptional; as a result, it is in danger
of adopting nevv ideas foreign to its history. The n1oven1ents of Darwin,
Marx, and Freud based on their ideas of evolution, econon1ic deten11inism and the unconsciou , and advances 1n rnodern science and technology have the potential of destroying rnodem n1an. In the minds of
conservatives, the crisis of the hour in the United States i that the permanent metaphysical things of our culture (the belief in God and an
understanding and shared sense of honor and duty) are gradually being
replaced by the rnindset of the twentieth century, which holds that such
ideals are prin1itive figments of the in1agination. In a book entitled Out
of My Life and Thought, Albert Schweitzer wrote shortly before his death
that two experiences had cast their shadows on his existence: the first
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was that the world was full of suffering, and the second was that he was
''born at a time of the spiritual decline of humanity.'' 3 If Schweitzer is
right, the conservative belief that there is a divine intent to history and
that man has a duty to conform himself to God-given and immutable
laws of morality no longer has meaning.
Of all the industrialized nations in the West, the United States has
remained the one with the highest religious and moral commitment. 4
The European example dictated that as the United States became more
secular, it would also become less religious; however, polls regularly find
a stable core of Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish believers in the United
States. Where moral values are concerned, the rule of thumb that "as
Europe goes, so goes the United States" has been disproven. Europe
modernized first and secularized first; the fear among conservatives is
that America might follow its example and adopt values which deify
politics and power, and denigrate piety and prayer.
The deterioration of cultural moorings is a special concern of E. D.
Hirsch, Jr., whose book Cultural Literacy was a nationwide best-seller.
Hirsch laments the loss of an American culture which fostered such
unique values as "Yankee ingenuity," inventiveness, independent-mindedness, a connection to the frontier, and a beneficence to the world:
"the American civil religion, as expressed in our national rites and symbols, is in fact a central source of coherence in American public culture,
holding together various and even contradictory elements of its tradition. " 5
Hirsch discusses the importance of a "civil Bible" as an inherited set
of religious sentiments honoring tolerance, equality, freedom, patriotism, duty, and cooperation in the society. The "civil Bible" of the
American republic incorporated items like the Book of Genesis, the
Declaration of Independence, the Gettysburg Address, certain articles
from the Federalist Papers, Horace Mann's Twelfth Report to the Massachusetts Board of Education, and Martin Luther King's "I Have a
Dream" speech. What these and other related documents have in common is a fundamental agreement on the principles of justice, freedom,
and progress which make the American experin1ent unique. Many of
these propositions are contradictory with respect to each other, but collectively they all have the effect of fostering a cultural heritage among
the populace. They owe their origin and popularity to the religious
heritage which gave birth to the republic.

THE TEN MOST IMPORTANT BELIEFS

47

The canons of conservatis1n are nothing more than the broad principles of society which are inherent in American culture. They are the
standards en1bodied in the "civil Bible," the ideals of the past which
1nake the society what it is at present. The definition of conservatism is
the skeleton of the society; the canons are its flesh and blood. Once
Winston Churchill was asked what n1ade the British culture unique. He
replied, "It is stirred on aln1ost all occasions by sentin1ent and instinct,
rather than by progran1n1es or worldly calculation. " 6 The canons of conservatisin embody the instinct of which Churchill spoke; the in1pulse of
a culture is the intangible values which n1otivate it to action.

The Soul of the Nation
In the 1980s an increase in the irnportance and use of the ten11 ''conservative" occurred. A National Opinion Research Center poll found that
roughly 35 percent of the respondents said they \Vere conservative con1pared with 24 percent who classified then1selves as liberal. 7 President
Reagan's econon1ic policies, cutting taxe \vhile decreasing federal
spending and increasing defense spending, \Vere characterized as conservative. Stands in other areas, like opposition to gun control and hostility
to communisn1, al o earned one the title of con ervative.
At the san1e tin1e there \Va a confusion in the n1eaning of the tenn.
Conservatives argued against big governn1ent, and at the an1e time favored large govern1nent projects like the Star Wars progran1, 1nore defense spending, and an expansion in biological \varfare research.
Conservatives were against the police state, yet were eager to extend
powers to the FBI and the CIA. They were in favor ofbalanced budgets
and fiscal responsibility, although the Reagan adn1inistration registered
huge budget deficits. Conservatives clai1ned to be the prin1e defenders
ofWestem civilization, while at the san1e titne they presented no unified
front on issues of biblical belief and opposition to abortion.
Not everyone labeled as conservative takes sides on every issue with
those sharing the label. As Frank S. Meyer has written: "Within the
consensus of American conservatisn1 ... there exist strains and tensions,
the origins of which are both historical and intellectual. " 8 What then are
the "true conservative" beliefs, and how do they n1ake the history of
the United States unique? Are certain opinions on various issues actually
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related? Can one identify a true conservative by asking a series of questions?
If defining conservatism is difficult, stating its canons of belief is nearly
impossible. Two verbatim descriptions of its tenets are given by Clinton
Rossiter in Conservatism in America and by Russell Kirk in The Conservative Mind. Rossiter lists in one place twenty-one tenets of conservatism. 9
Russell Kirk includes six tenets that summarize many ofRossiter's qualities.10 The ten canons of conservatism developed here are a synthesis of
Kirk's and Rossiter's ideas along with those of a broad cross-section of
other thinkers including Friedrich von Hayek, Richard Weaver, Peter
Viereck, Eric Voegelin, William F. Buckley, Jr., Gertrude Himmelfarb,
Leo Strauss, John Hallowell, Daniel Boorstin, and Robert Nisbet. 11 The
ten canons or principles of belief to which conservatives generally subscribe are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Continuity: Order and the Rate of Change
Authority: Power and the Limits of Government
Community: Decentralization of Social Institutions
Deity: Man and Morality
Duty: Responsibilities over Rights
Democracy: Limited Government and the Constitution
Property: The Role of Economics
Liberty: Equality's Other Brother
Meritocracy: The Leadership Class
10. Antipathy: The Anticommunist Impulse
These ten canons represent the best summary of what conservatives
generally think are its most important principles. Together they form
the unique American culture which conservatives seek to enrich and
protect.

Continuity: Order and the Rate of Change
The most widely accepted conservative tenet is the belief in the importance of order in society. The conservative believes that respect for tradition is the first requirement for good government. The structure of
society as a whole is said to contain the stability and wisdom of past

THE TEN MOST IMPORTANT BFLIEFS

49

generations-even the involven1ent of God in its development. Because
the conservative treasures the n1aintcnance of order in society so highly,
he is opposed to broad or <;weeping change, preferring instead slower
change within existing institutions, son1etin1es called organic change .
Edn1und Burke, who wrote extensively about the destruction of institutions and order in France during the French Revolution, developed
the principles n1ost often associated wlth n1odern conservatisn1. Burke
saw the radicals of France, those vvho desired to totally remake the fabric
of society based on their own reasoning, as the source of "sickness of
n1orality and social decencies'' as well as the cause of total disregard for
all property rights in that country. He found hun1an reason puny con1pared with the traditions establtshed by providence: "We are afraid to
put tnen to live and trade each on his O\vn private stock of reason;
because we suspect that this stock 111 each n1an is sn1all, and that the
individuals would do better to avail thetn.;;elves of the general bank of
capital of nations and age . '',.,
Clinton R.oss1ter affinns the tndt pensabthty and anctlt)' of inhented
institutions, value , .;;y1nbols, and ntuals as central aspects of the stable
society. He notes that the 1narks of the good society are order, unity,
equity, stability, continuity, secunty, hannony, and the confinen1ent of
change. "The An1erican," Rossiter observes, 'feels tnore deeply than he
thinks about political principles, and \\1 hat he feels n1ost deeply about
then1 is that they are the gift of great n1en of old." n Russell Kirk rnentions a profound distn1st in the ''soph1sters, calculator , and econotnists''
who would reconstruct society on abstract des1gns. 11
Conservatives are not averse to change; they sin1ply beheve that it
should be n1ade in accordance \VIth .lCcepted principles in oCiety. Peter
Viereck, in his book Consewatism Rcuisitcd, quotes Edtnund Burke as
saying, "A state without son1e n1eans of change ... is \V:ithout the tneans
of its conservation." 15 Conservatives sec change as necessary to preserve
the order they love; it is the n1ethod and rate of change \vhich nukes it
dangerous. The conservative values tradition, continuity, and order in
society. These values n1ust not be disregarded, however carefully reasoned or attractive an untested refon11 n1ay be.

Authority: Power and the Limits of Government
Conservatives are son1etimes attacked for the apparent contradiction between supporting increased govemn1ent spending for defense and accus-

50

CHAPTER THREE

ing the government of over-taxing and over-spending. But there is a
coherent philosophy behind this policy, and it is closely tied to the conservative's passion for order. In the conservative philosophy, the state's
primary function is to protect against foreign threats and to keep order
at home.
M. Stanton Evans has written that "government is morally obligated
to protect America's interests" in foreign affairs. 16 More strength and
firmness in foreign policy is also stressed by many other conservative
writers, ranging from neoconservative Irving Kristol to staunch anticommunist James Burnham. 17 The foundation of military strength is the
belief that the American social order is unique and worthy of protection
and respect.
The moral position of America n1eans that it must necessarily act as
umpire in a world which ignores international law. Military strength is
the surest means of preventing conflict by restraining evil leaders who
would otherwise exercise their option to destroy nations and violate
international law. The realities of the twentieth century dictate that a
strong defense is the best means of preventing international banditry.
The 1991 war against Iraq is but the latest instance of American moral
resolve in the face of international injustice.
Because the conservative values order so highly, it follows that the
police power is necessary to maintain societal institutions. M. Stanton
Evans indicts the U.S. governn1ent for its policy of stressing rehabilitation of criminals rather than their punishment. He concludes in Clear
and Present Dangers that the "crime rate could be cut in half merely by
requiring criminals already convicted to serve out their time." 18 The
conservative sees the state as the most effective means of protecting
against the selfish appetites of men, such aggression being manifest in
both the aggression of foreign nations and the domestic disregard for
civil authority.
At the same time, the conservative is skeptical of attempts by the state
to use its power for large-scale social planning. The growth of socialism
during this century, both in the United States and other countries, has
fostered a reaction against state involven1ent in the economy and in
society in general. Friedrich von Hayek stated in his landmark work,
The Road to Serfdom, that the "central direction of all economic activity
according to a single plan" brings "dictatorship" and "the suppression
of freedom." 19 Alan Otten, Edward Banfield, and M. Stanton Evans all
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find that the liberal solutions to the proble1ns of crime, poverty, economic growth, fan1ily, and dotnestic violence in society have failed. 20
Banfield and Evans even say that liberal reforn1s were the source of much
unemploytnent; they explain the plight of the hon1eless and other serious problen1s as rooted in ac;sumptions about man and society in the
1960s. 21
The conservative distruc;t of centralized state power and planning is
directly related to the conc;ervative's desire for only slow, organic
change. Russell K1rk puts it this way: "Change and refom1 are not always identical, and ... innovation i<; a devounng fian1e of conflagration
n1ore often than it is the torch of progrec;s. " 27 Chnton Rossiter echoes
that a basic belief of conservatisrn is "the dec;Irabihty of d1ffusing and
balancing power, social, econornic, cultural and ec;peCially political ...
the indispensibility and sanct1ty of inherited instJtutionc;, values, syn1bols,
and rituals, that i<;, tradition. " 2 J

Community: Decentralization of Social Institutions
The proper function of govenunent, say conservatives, 1<; not to concentrate power but to diffuse 1t to the Institutions of organic society.
Churches, trade unions, univer<;itie<;, ne\vspaper'l, bar as ociations, fanners' unions, businessn1en 's clubs-in the conservative v1ew, all have a
special role standing between citizen and govemn1ent. Institutions and
regional associations serve as checks on the po\ver of the central authority.
An important conservative 1dea \Vh1ch is linked to distrust of too
much govemn1ent power and a faith in traditional value is the belief in
the necessity of strong social institutions-fan1ily (including extended
family), church, neighborhood, and any other institution not controlled
by the state. Robert Nisbet, a social psychologist who is a leading proponent of the importance of social institutions, warns of the "advancing
power" of the state and the "moribundity of the social order." Nisbet
says that if we are to have a "truly free and also stable society, there must
be a revival of the prestige of the private as contrasted with the public. " 24
Nisbet notes two traditions in Western social and political thought:
(1) the belief that the govemn1ent has total control over all institutions,
as expounded by Hobbes, Rousseau, Bentham and others; (2) the belief

52

CHAPTER THREE

that there are clear distinctions between social institutions and the state,
as expressed by Cicero, Aquinas, Bodin, Althusias, Burke, Tocqueville,
and Proudon. He argues that the "cardinal proposition of the democratic
dogma," as seen by Rousseau, was that "structures such as public
schools" could do as well as families and kindred in raising and training
children. Nisbet counters by asserting the conservative belief that the
social institutions of the local community can better meet all the needs
that government has taken upon itself. In other words, extended families
do a better job handling welfare needs than state programs; and private
schools perform better and with less expense than public schools. 25
The stress on localism and neighborhood means the conservative
places greater value on decentralized, area government as opposed to
national bureaucracies. In the United States, World War II was a watershed after which the social and educational system gradually became
much more centralized, asserting a significant influence in the local
communities. With the New Deal came the large national welfare programs which were never reduced after the Depression. Conservatives
are heartened by the recent emphasis on volunteerism as part of what
they see as a trend toward a return to localism. Nisbet reiterates the
conservative fondness for localism by stating that the "spirit of nationalism," unlike that of localism, has seldom "entered into great creative
performance. " 26

Deity: Man and Morality
''Reverence for God and respect for history'' is a significant element
of the conservative tradition. 27 Russell Kirk, Frank S. Meyer, William
Harbour, and Ronald Lora, as well as three other scholars, Robert Nisbet, Clinton Rossiter, and Frances Wilson, all list it as one of their tenets.
The conservative generally has a strong belief in God and holds to traditional moral values as opposed to "subjectivism," also called "nominalism" or "relativism." C. S. Lewis describes subjectivism as the "whole
attempt to jettison traditional values as something subjective and substitute a new scheme of values for them. " 28 The main theme of Richard
Weaver's Ideas Have Consequences is that "Western man" made an "evil
decision" in following the "nominalism" of the twentieth century.
Weaver writes, "Man has an irresistible desire to relate himself somehow
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to the totality ... , and through religion [he] reveals his profoundest
intuition regarding his origin, his tnission on earth, and his future
state. " 29
The conservative view of n1an is centered around the Biblical doctrine
of"original sin"-the idea that n1an is n1orally flawed and imperfectible.
It n1ust be noted, however, that although son1e conservatives base this
belief on the biblical account of the fall of man, such a belief is not
a necessary condition for a conservative's distrust of human nature. A
conservative may distrust hun1an nature because he does not trust man's
ability to hold to n1oral values or to govern without making serious
mistakes.
Russell Kirk describes this central tenet as "belief in a transcendent
order, or body of natural law, which rules society as well as conscience."
He contends that political problen1s, at botton1, are religious and moral
problems. True politics is the art of apprehending justice and applying it
to the community of souls. 30

Duty: Responsibilities over Rights
An important corollary to the conservative view of God and tnan is the
belief in the preeminence of duties over rights. The conservative disagrees with French philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau, \vho held that
man was at his best in a state of nature, unbound by society. To the
contrary, the conservative contends that n1an's nature must be restrained.
Because man's selfish and evil appetites must be controlled, and because
God has the final authority over man, n1en should place n1ore en1phasis
on their duty to God and fellow n1an than on their own personal rights.
As Edmund Burke stated in a speech on the floor of the House of Coolmons, man's rights "are indeed sacred things," but they must "exist only
in obedience to God. " 3 1
Clinton Rossiter states that "rights are something to be earned rather
than given.... The duties of man--service, effort, obedience, cultivation of virtue, and self-restraint-are the price of rights. " 32 Conservatives
believe in historic, not human rights and view n1en in the context of
established communities more than as single alienated individuals. Man's
natural condition was to be in community, according to Aristotle, and
without that communal identity, man is lost.

54

CHAPTER THREE

The significance of this conservative tenet during and since the New
Deal is extraordinary. Contemporary public policy initiatives emphasize
rights, but there has been little, if any, corresponding accent on responsibilities. To conservatives, the liberal emphasis on rights encourages
Americans to think more about what the government can do for them
than about their responsibilities to do things for themselves. Conservatives believe they have frequently been put at a disadvantage in the debate on public policy issues emphasizing rights because it is politically
difficult to oppose rights. In his 1961 inaugural address, President John
F. Kennedy challenged the American people to "ask not what your
country can do for you, but what you can do for your country." Today,
the conservative wonders if John F. Kennedy or any president could
make such a statement in an inaugural address since the American mind
is so conditioned to emphasize rights over responsibilities.
The conservative emphasis on the responsibility of state and local government to solve their own problems rather than turning to the national
government is, of course, challenged by the emphasis upon rights over
responsibilities. Policies of the New Deal, Fair Deal, New Frontier, and
Great Society caused state and local officials to look to Washington for
solutions and money, instead of solving problems themselves without
recourse to the largesse of the national government. Governmental policies designed to help local communities instead created a dependence
on the federal government and contributed to the feeling that state and
local governments were not responsible for solving their own problems.
Politically, national politicians like the advantage they receive from giving out federal funds, and state and local officials enjoy the benefit of
getting money for projects without raising taxes. Conservatives believe
that these practices undermine not only individual responsibility, but
also the corporate responsibilities of the local community.

Democracy: Limited Government and the Constitution
A focal point of American conservatism in particular is its view of the
country's constitution. Because conservative and liberal views of the
state are so different, their respective attitudes toward the Constitution
and its interpretation are very different. Liberal scholars, such as Charles
A. Beard and J. Allen Smith, indict the Founders for creating a docu-
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ment which protected their own material wealth and personal power. 33
Martin Diamond, an important conservative author, challenges the liberal point of view in his book Our Democratic Republic by arguing that
the Founders proceeded on principles rather than a desire for material
gain. 34 Forrest McDonald also attacked the "economic" interpretation
of the Constitution put forward by Charles Beard and argued that the
interplay of econo1nics and politics created the unique American political system. 35
The Constitution is attacked by liberal scholars, who desire n1ore
planning and change, while conservative scholars praise the wisdon1 of
the Founders and advocate strict Constitutional interpretation. Conservatives argue that, where possible, the Constitution <ihould be interpreted according to the "original intent" of the Founders unless and
until the docun1ent has been an1ended. Not to do that, conservatives
argue, is to allow the Constitution to be reshaped like putty by the
moods and whims of the n1on1ent. Ifla\v changes with the circumstances
of the titne, it becornes uncertain and unstable. In such circun1stances,
Americans live under a govemn1ent of n1en, not of laws.
It is not uncon1n1on for conservative and liberals to disagree on
founding principles and the history of den1ocracy and the Constitution.
Such differences even extend to the description of the political system.
Conservatives refer to the system as a constitutional den1ocracy, to emphasize the constitutional lin1itations placed upon den1ocracy by the
Founders. Conservatives tnay also use the tem1 "representative den1ocracy" to en1phasize that the Founders did not establish a direct democracy, but rather one that allows representatives to act on behalf of the
people, a conservative tenet. Some conservatives say only that our inherited system is a federal republic. By whatever nan1e, it is clear that all the
definitions imply limits on the scope and role of govemn1ent.

Property: The Role of Economics
The conservative view of the economy is traceable to John Locke, an
eighteenth-century liberal who wrote in his "Second Treatise on Government" that the principal purpose of a people's govemtnent is "the
mutual preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates, which I call by
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the general name, property. " 36 The Lockean theory of property became
a defense of capitalism, and a central premise of conservative thought.
Russell Kirk in The Conservative Mind says that "property and freedom
are inseparably connected. " 37 Property is more than material things; it is
also the means whereby one develops his personality by changing the
external surroundings. The conservative fears any attempt at economic
leveling, the government's arbitrary taking and giving of property without regard to ownership in order to distribute more evenly a society's
wealth. A distrust of wide-ranging government planning is closely related to the desire to protect the right of private property.
Along with the sanctity of private property, most conservatives adhere
to the view that laissez-faire capitalism is the best economic system. Capitalism is built on the assumption of private property, and socialism on
the principal of state intervention. To economic conservatives, government should interfere in the economy as little as possible, allowing the
law of supply and demand to guide men in making profitable decisions.
Manifestations of this philosophy include not only the efforts of former
President Reagan to cut taxes, but also attempts to lessen government
regulation ofbusiness.
Scholars such as Peter Viereck and Clinton Rossiter contend that private property and capitalism are very different. 38 Property gives man a
place to stand, but no person can function in society and still be an
extreme individualist. The just and stable economy "is a mixture of
individual enterprise, group cooperation, and government regulation,"
according to Rossiter. 39
Most conservatives endorse limited laissez-faire economics, but others
advocate public housing and related social welfare projects. According
to Rossiter, the final test of any government program is: "Does this law
increase equality of opportunity?" 40 The common charge made against
conservatives is that their belief in a laissez-faire capitalist system makes
no provision for the genuinely needy who, through no fault of their
own, cannot meet basic human needs. The conservative response is to
stress private and community solutions to this problem on the assumption that increased governmental activity does more harm than good.

Liberty: Equality's Big Brother
Another key area of the conservative-liberal debate, which often centers
on econonuc issues, concerns the balance between liberty and equality.
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Despite the constant praise of both liberty and equality in our nation's
tradition, the two concepts work aga1nst one another. Inequality seems
a basic fact of nature, yet the vast differences between rich and poor
demand son1e leveling. Making tnen1bers of a society more equal in
material wealth and political power involves some change in the order
of things. To achieve equality, the state n1ust take possessions, such as
property and political influence, from some and give them to others.
Leveling naturally infringes on the hberty of those from whom wealth
or political power is taken; however, to allow some to acquire unrestricted wealth and political power createc; inequality.
There is no easy solution to th1s dispute. Theoretically a society with
total liberty has no equality; anarchy would be the result, as all n1en1bers
of society would have total freedon1 to do as they pleased. On the other
hand, a society with total equality has no liberty and requires a totalitarian govemn1ent to enforce con1n1on standards in all associations. Conservatisn1 celebrates equality by holding that people are entitled by God
and nature to be treated as a rncans and not an end. They are entitled
to equality of opportunity and suffrage; beyond this the conservative is
unwilling to go. In the conservative vtew, individuals have an infinite
variety of talents and are entitled to find economic, political, and social
rewards without fear of govemn1ent license or redistnbution.
Conservatisn1 favors liberty In the equality-liberty equation, but it
does not con1pletely sacrifice equahty on the altar of freedom. The conservative position in An1erica holds that while liberty IS relatively n1ore
important than equality, both n1ust exist in a society if it is to become
democratic. It is liberty that creates the wealth in the society, and the
stability of a regime is ensured only in a context of economic growth.
So liberty is equality's older brother in the sense that it creates the conditions for a discussion of redistribution.
There are three reasons why conservatives believe economic and political costs are low in a society where liberty is more in1portant. First,
government does not have to be enlarged to the extent of becoming
oppressive as the enforcer of equality. As Harvey Mansfield points out:
"A society of natural equals then needs government of unlimited scope,
that is, an enormous inequality of political power, in order to protect its
equality. " 41 Second, when equality outstrips liberty in in1portance, people lose their incentive to excel. Third, tnaterial equality is not nearly as
important as moral equality under God. Edmund Burke wrote that
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wealth is not the true source of happiness, and civil life establishes order
for the sake of the poor as well as the rich. 42 Social stability can b e
difficult to achieve if the emphasis on equality undermines order in society.
In contemporary society, with the advent of the New Deal in the
1930s and the more recent civil rights and equal rights movement,
equality has become sacrosanct and government has expanded accordingly. Until the 1980s conservatives often found themselves in the unenviable position of being perceived as opposing society's improvement.
But a burdensome bureaucracy and expanding government power eventually led to a backlash. The conservative emphasis on liberty found a
receptive audience when the economy began to collapse under the
weight of government regulation and interest group demands.
The most dramatic example of this backlash was the controversy over
the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), a proposal which would have
extended a wide range of rights to women. In 1972 Congress passed the
amendment by a wide margin and sent it to the states for consideration.
Within the first year, the legislatures in twenty-two states ratified the
ERA by overwhelming votes. By 1974-75, the ERA encountered unexpectedly stiff opposition from conservatives. Thirty-five states ratified
the amendment by 1978, three short of the necessary three-fourths
needed, but four states rescinded their earlier ratification. By 1982, the
Equal Rights Amendment was dead. In the end, the ERA was an issue
that symbolized the conflict over a broad range of cultural values in the
United States. Conservatives succeeded by raising the spectre of women
being drafted for combat duty and disallowing provisions which at the
time protected women in the workplace . In sum, the equality provisions
of the amendment were antithetical to the liberty women currently enjoyed in society.

Meritocracy: The Leadership Class
A belief in the importance of an aristocratic class is an idea that has long
been a firm belief of conservatives. In its American application, this belief was changed in important ways. When Edmund Burke defended the
aristocratic class, he defended a specific group of titled nobles in England; however, America was founded as a society opposed to titles of
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nobility. Peter Viereck notes that in the United States conservatives such
as John Adams spoke of a "natural aristocracy," which anyone could join
by virtue of n1erit and ability:11
Despite the difference between the An1erican and English aristocracies, the basic reason for the conservatives' regard for an aristocratic class
in both contexts is the san1e: an elite class provides order. Kirk notes
that the conservative believes that "Civilized society requires orders and
classes. " 44 The Atnerican aristocratic class includes, an1ong others, those
officials elected in our republican dernocracy to represent the people,
thus protecting against a tyranny of the tnajority, whtch conservatives
fear. Viereck stresses noblesse obhge rather than the elite class. He enlphasizes the in1portance of service by the n1eritocracy of society. To
Viereck, aristocracy is i1nportant only in the sense of the "aristocratic
heritage. " 45

Antipathy: The Anticommunist Impulse
Because conservatives believe An1encan values are unique and deserving
of respect, anticon1n1unisn1 has played a tnajor role in the gro\vth of the
moven1ent and has becon1e a very recognizable part of the conservative
philosophy. George H. Nash, in Tlze Consen;afive Intellectual A!ot;ement in
America, identifies the anticonununists as one of the three n1ajor groups
which brought about the revival of conservatisn1 ince 1945. 16 Nash's
list of key anticon11nunist thinkers includes Whittaker Chan1bers, jan1es
Burnhatn, and Frank Meyer, who once en1braced cotnn1uni 111 in the
1930s and turned against it in the 19-+0s and 1950s. Meyer's experience
was not unusual atnong other anticon1n1unists of the tune who earlier
flirted with communism only to ftnd it destructive of the rights of the
individual and damaging to the interests of the local con1n1unity. 17
As a belief, ::lnticomrnunisnl includes virtually every canon of conservatism. Those who hold particularly to the in1portance of n1aintaining a
strong national defense against foreign invasion and preserving the internal domestic order saw comn1unisn1 as a threat fron1 external hostile
Soviet actions and fron1 con1n1unist syn1pathizers internally. Cotnmunism is the ultimate manifestation of the conservative fear of a powerful
central government which squashes freedotn to impose its plans. Con1munism is also, to paraphrase Whittaker Chan1bers, the alternate faith to
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a belief in God. 48 Conservatives are appalled at the total obliteration of
traditional values in the face of "godless communism." The historical
record of the systematic starvation of the peasants in Stalin's Russia and
the oppression of the population by a totalitarian political system which
denied the transcendent haunts conservative fears about socialism in the
West.
The mainline conservative attitude toward communism is strong distrust. Most conservatives are opposed to the type of demagoguery represented by Senator Joseph McCarthy and the conspiracy theories of the
John Birch Society whose president, Robert Welch, even accused President Eisenhower of being in league with the Soviet Union. 49 The balanced conservative point of view is that while overreaction to
communism in the form of demagoguery and conspiracy theories is unwise, a vigilant attitude toward communism must be maintained.
The evidence undergirding the conservative attitude includes not
only the lack of liberty in communist countries, but also the list of
human rights atrocities committed in surrogate countries like Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Afghanistan. The squalid prisons in Cuba described by Armando Valladares in his book Against All Hope, and the
hopelessness of the slave labor camps documented by Alexander Solzhenitsyn in The Gulag Archipelago: 1918-1956, are the true reality of
communism. The chief crime of communism is not that it takes away
property, but that it removes freedom upon which property is based.

Conclusion
During his terms as president, Ronald Reagan n1ade it a habit to invite
special guests to sit in the visitor's balcony during his State of the Union
messages to Congress. In an address in his first term he hailed Lenny
Skutnik, who had earlier rescued several drowning passengers from an
airplane that had crashed in the Potomac River. Two years later he
lauded Sergeant Stephen Trujillo, an Army medic who risked his life
saving the wounded in Grenada. The president used this nationally televised speech to recognize a Vietnamese refugee who graduated with
honors from West Point, a Harlem resident who cared for drug-addicted
infants, and a high school student whose science experiment was carried
aboard the ill-fated Challenger shuttle. The subjects of these introduc-
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tions were frequently criticized by the press as a diversion fron1 the real
issues facing the nation, but the cntiCs failed to reahze the cruCial role
syn1bolic values play In governing.
The stones of these Indivtdua1s were an ernbodin1ent of a con1mon
then1e: "For [Arnericans] faith, work, f.1n1 tly, neighborhood, freedon1,
and peace are not JUSt words; they're expressions of what An1enca
means, definitions of \Vhat n1akes us a good and loving people. " 50 In
short, Arnenca IS a speCial place. Critics of R.eagan's speeches to Congress and hts presidency failed to reahze that rnost An1encans "vant to
believe that their nation is both good and unique. Conservattsn1 appeals
to this heartfelt desire. It IS fundan1cntally an attitude tO\vard nun and
soctety that exan11nes the Issues of life through pnnCiple.
The ten canons descnbcd here arc really ten pnnciples that conservatives use to gutde their personal lives and to \VOrk withtn con1n1unittes.
ConservatiSnl einbodtec.. a deep respect for the lessons of history and an
abtdtng regard for the \VOrk of deity \Vithin that record. It IS ultin1ately
a staternent of personal f.1ith that cn1phasizcc.. the responstbihtY of rnan to
his Maker and also to hic.. fdlo\v n1an. Conservattsn1 teaches 1nankind to
look first at \vhat one can do to solve one's O\Vn problen1s rather than
seeking solutions fron1 another source
Person, positiOn, and place arc irnportant halln1arks of the conservative f.1Ith. R..ccognitton of \vho one ts 1n a society clnd one\ rec..ponstbthties to that soCiety, respect for one's O\vn position as \vell as for the
positions of others In society, and reverence for place or ~enc..e of local
con1n1unity are In1portant to the <...onservative In creating and sustaining
social ham1ony and stablltty. The conservative vie\VS ucccss ac.. achieving
what one can within the confines of one's abilities, rather than attaining
son1eth1ng that one either has not \VOrked for or does not hcl\ e the
ability to earn. Conten1porary conservatives believe that the state n1ust
pron1ote virtue 1nd social responsibility and take appropnate tneasure
to in1prove the n1oral clin1ate of soCiety.
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CHAPTE R FOUR

The Classical Roots of
Conservative Thought
... [T]here is 110 doubt that conservatism as a modem
movement is a response to the excesses of rationalistic zeal let
loose by eighteenth-ce11tury radicals such as Jean Jacques
Rousseau (1712-1778). Indeed) the word ((conservative))
was coined from the French word conservateur, a name given
to certain French writers who wished to retum to the conditions
existing prior to the rise of Napoleon I (17 69-1821) and the
French Revolr-ltion.
JAY A

A

SIGLER

11 political action is guided by sorne thought of better or worse.
Political things are by their nature subject to approval and disapproval, to choice and rejection, to praise and blame. In democracies,
government power is retained only after the people approve of the
choices their leaders make. Politicians balance their decisions between
the extremes of preservation and change: "When desiring to preserve,
we wish to prevent a change to the worse; when desiring to change, we
wish to bring about something better. " 2 judgn1ents about the rate and
type of change do not exist in a vacuum, they rest on some conception
of what should be, of what is best for society.
The foundati0n of conservatisrn is the belief that the good society has
a reverence for proven values which guide the integration of new ideas
through time-tested institutions. Tradition is nothing more than the
concrete experience of this truth which is carried in comn1on by the
society. Knowledge of the past is the spiritual substance of shared living
that makes society distinctively human. The fundamental values of conservatism, the premises of resistance to change and protection of past
values, are best understood today as a reaction to the idealism of the
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Renaissance, the flawed vision of the Enlightenment which culminated
in the French Revolution, and the mistaken promises of modem utopian
ideologies.
The points of reaction which sparked the development of modem
conservative thought were diverse. Movements like the Renaissance and
the Enlightenment were complex social phenomena, but they still
evinced a distinct theme and view of man and the state which influenced
subsequent political thought. The French Revolution, the Protestant
Reformation, and the decline of the Roman Catholic Church's authority in society had a similar impact on social relations and politics. No one
of these events standing alone could explain the emergence of modem
conservatism, but together they led to an articulate conservative reaction
to the changes being wrought in society by these movements, events,
ideologies, and personalities.
It was Protagoras who said, "Man is the measure of all things, of what
is that it is and of what is not that it is not. " 3 In all the movements to
which conservatism reacted, there was a preoccupation with man-his
mind, his reason, and his ability to solve his own problems. Conservatism, with its religious roots (especially in the Roman Catholic Church)
and its classical ties (to the writings of Plato and Aristotle, with their
emphasis on balance and order in society) looked less to mankind and
more to deity, less to reason and revolution and more to principles and
traditions. In this chapter these foundations of conservatism are examined and explained.

Classical Political Thought
In the twentieth century, states are so large, so remote, and so impersonal
that they cannot fill the place in modern life that the city filled in the
life of ancient Greece. Four centuries before Christ, the art, religion,
ethics, economics, and politics of a citizen were set by the city in which
he lived. The life of a city was a social experience; its constitution, as
Aristotle said of Athens, was a "mode of life" rather than a legal structure. Consequently, the guiding ideal of classical political thought was
the harmony of life held in common in the community. The "polis"
was a divine association, where order ruled over chaos and where the
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ways of the gods, the ways of nature, and the ways of n1an came to close
approximation.
In Greece, the city was a place where It~ inhabitants were to live in
agreement, with as n1any citizens as possible taking an active part in a
con11non life. In ancient Athens offices were rotated to give more citizens a share in the governn1ent. On the basis of figures given by Aristotle
in his Constitution of Athens, It is estin1ated that in any year as n1any as
one citizen in six tnight have had son1e share In the civil govemn1ent,
even though it tnight have an1ounted to no tnore than jury service. Even
if he held no office, a citizen could still n1eet in a general assen1bly to
discuss city business at least ten tin1es a year.
Classical politiCal philosophy \vas charactenzed by 1ts tdeals, which
were directly related to political life. Looking at political hfe fron1 the
perspective of an enlightened c1t1zen or statesn1an in ancient Athens
n1eant that one day's pohtical discussions n11ght be the next day's government policy. l)iscu~sion of Lnv~ naturaily involved agreement as to
what was best for the society. Good n1lers \Vere those \vho placed thts
common interest above their private Interest; good decisions for the
polity were those n1ost in accordance \Vtth the requiren1ents of hun1an
excellence: "Since political controverstes are concerned with 'good
things' and 'just things,' cla~stcal pohttcal phllosophy \Vas naturally
guided by considerations of 'goodness' and 'ju~tice.' '' 1
The distinct question wh1ch guided the Platonic dialogues \Vas ''What
is virtue?" The ideas of h,lnnony and proportionality as applied to the
ethics oflife were a critical concern of classical political philo ophy. The
fundamental thought in the Greek idea of the state \vas the han11ony of
a life shared in con1n1on by all It n1en1bers. Life was conceived a an
activity directed toward son1e goal, but in order to pursue a specific goal,
a society had to be constituted in accordance with that goal. Classical
philosophy was guided by the question of the best regirne, even though
that ideal might rever be reached.
An exan1ple of this philosophy is Plato's n1ost fan1ous book, the Republic) written in his mature n1anhood, probably within a decade of the
opening of his school in the fourth century B.C. The book ernphasizes
that knowledge is virtue, a proposition which implies that there is an
objective good to be known and that it can in fact be known by rational
or logical investigation rather than by intuition, guesswork, or luck.
Government, to be just, must be based on this abstract good, which
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could only be realized by leaders who were properly educated: "Plato's
theory is therefore divisible into two main parts or theses: first, that
government ought to be an art depending on exact knowledge and,
second, that society is a mutual satisfaction of needs by persons whose
capacities supplement each other.' ' 5
The ideals of the Republic were never realized; today it is regarded as
the greatest of utopias. Still, its romantic ideas of free intelligence guided
by custom and the voice of reason remain as a legacy centuries after
Plato elaborated them. The book's voice is that of the scholar, whose
faith in structured activity society would do well to rely upon. Classical
philosophy strives for knowledge of the whole, the totality of the parts,
even though such knowledge may ultimately elude us.

Modern Political Thought
Modern political thought, by contrast, rejects the classical schemes as
unrealizable and unrealistic. The founder of modern political philosophy
was Machiavelli (1469-1527), who objected to the classical approach to
politics which emphasized an unrealized utopia. The description of the
ideal regime did not interest Machiavelli because its realization was improbable; instead he took as his standard the objectives actually pursued
by existing societies. His lowering of the requirements of conduct meant
that virtue could no longer define the good society; rather, the state
must have as its objectives the lesser ideals of prosperity, glory, empire,
and freedom from foreign domination.
By Machiavelli's time the classical tradition had undergone profound
changes; the conten1plative life had found its home in monestaries.
Moral virtue in the sixteenth century meant Christian charity. Machiavelli had no sense of religion as a deep personal experience; he saw it
only as an instrument of political domination. He held the church particularly responsible for the current state of affairs: it was too weak to unite
Italy and too strong to prevent anyone else from doing so. Ultimate
thoughts about the good were useless-what counted were ends and
1neans, power and its exercise: "The consuming problem of the sixteenth century was whether the state is to be regarded as a moral organism or simply as a power bloc. " 6 The great exponents of the ethical state
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stood in the classical tradition; Machiavelli was positioned in the amoral
camp.
The Renaissance

Today we remember the Renaissance as a tin1e of artistic and creative
greatness. The revival of comrnerce and urban life produced in Italy a
galaxy of brilliant city-states which contrived to balance political power
among themselves and endow their particular comn1unities with the
greatest of artistic achievements. The Renaissance "ideal was the exploration of all learning and all skills. . . . The universal n1an, the 'uo1no
universale ,' essayed to excel in sport, art, literature, exploration or war. " 7
It is corrunon to say that the Renaissance represented a rebirth in learning, but it is more accurate to say that it en1bodied a rebirth of an idea
about man.
A change in thinking took place; medieval Christian notions that rnan
was a flawed and sinful creature in God's universe were replaced by
an understanding that m an hirnself was the center of all things. One
commentator has written of Leonardo da Vinci, who is comn1only regarded as a prototype of the Renais ance man, that "throughout the
thousands of pages he covered with notes and ideas, God is seldom n1entioned, but nature appears innurnerable tin1es .... For [hin1] there was
no authority higher than that of the eye, which he characterized as the
'window of the soul. ' " 8 The abilities of Da Vinci and Michelangelo
were models as to what man is capable of being and doing. The change
in attitudes about the nature and purposes of n1an are clearly seen in the
art of the time.
In 1501, the government of Florence invited sculptors to submit their
designs for using a 17-foot block of Carrara marble that had lain in the
cathedral courtyard for seventy years. An earlier sculptor had begun
work on the marble but had given up, and subsequent artists judged the
marble to have been gouged so deeply as to be ruined. The winning
design was submitted by Michelangelo, who carved on the flawed marble for three years until he completed his masterpiece, "David." Asked
how he found the solution to the ruined marble, Michelangelo said
simply that he had seen the figure imprisoned and set it free. Such was
the Renaissance vision.
The view Michelangelo had of David is a prototype of the Renais-
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sance ideal for man. One scholar comments, " [the statue] towers above
us as revelation of a transferred humanity. . . . It is characteristic that
such a figure should appear dreamlike. " 9 In the perfect body of David,
the undercutting of the hair, and the strong anatomical features lie the
message that man has unlimited abilities. The ultimate hope of the Renaissance was that all men would realize and attain a perfection never
before known.
Not surprisingly, Machiavelli longed for a political David, a strong
and powerful leader who would return Italy to greatness. He assumed
that power was an end in itself, and he confined his inquiries to the
means best suited to acquire, retain, and expand power. Caesar Borgia,
who assassinated his older brother and the husband of his sister, was held
up "as an example to be imitated by all who by fortune and with the
arms of others have risen to power.... One can find no better example
than the actions of this man. " 10 Machiavelli, more than any other political thinker, defined the philosophy of the modern nation-state by idealizing the power of its rulers. In this view, the organized force and
supreme authority of the state obligate and regulate other institutions in
society.

The Reformation
The sixteenth century witnessed two great revolutions in thinking.
The Renaissance flourished in the city-states of southern Europe, while
the Reformation was characteristic of nation-states in northern Europe.
Although the original ideas of the Reformation were religious, religion
was readily used as a cloak for less lofty aspirations: "Nowhere was the
issue purely religious; in all countries it was mixed with political, dynastic, economic and diplomatic considerations. " 11
In many ways the Reformation was a reaction against the secular
church and humanism of the Renaissance. Renaissance idealism was
based on a revival of Greek and Latin models of man and human learning. Aristotle had been canonized when his philosophy was grafted onto
Christian theology by Thomas Aquinas in the Middle Ages. The
Church's approval had been extended in a general way to cover Aristotle's scientific as well as his philosophical ideas. Protestant reformers, from
Luther onwards, stressed the supreme authority of scripture and the fallacy of human reason. "The Reformation [took] the form of a revolt
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against the Roman Church, accused of having departed from the true
faith as revealed in the Bible." 12
Martin Luther was born in 1483 and lived until 1546. As a young
priest he was shocked by the in1morality in the church of his time. His
proffered remedy was "Sola Scriptura," a return to the Bible and a rejection of the hun1anist tradition in the secular church. In a letter to a friend
written in May 1517 Luther wrote, "Aristotle is going downhill and
perhaps he will go all the way down to hell." 13 A few n1onths after
writing this, on October 31, 1517, Luther nailed to the door of the
Wittenburg Church the "Ninety-Five Theses," whtch ended with a
bold declaration, "I an1 neither so rash as to wish that rny sole opinion
should be preferred to that of all other n1en, nor so senseless as to be
willing that the word of God should be n1ade to give place to fables,
devised by hurnan reason." 14
The Refonnation \.Vas a reaction to the f.:1bles, hun1anism, heresy, and
perversions that hun1an reason had added to alter the pnstine faith of the
early church. It was a specific rejection of the Renaissance, \.Vith its
idealisn1 and hopes for "uorno universale." To the reformers, the religion of the Renaissance was little tnore than pantheisn1, a behef that
God is not a personality but a force or n1an1festation that is behind all
religions. The vision of the refonners was that rnan was fallen, finite and
frail; they were not ron1.1ntic about rnan. Each Reformation country
showed the practice of checks and balances in Its govern1nent constitution to guard against the accu1nulat1on of power by rulers.
The Catholic fight against Prote tantism encouraged a corresponding
reform n1ovement within the Ron1an Catholic Church, the CounterReforn1ation. In 1534, Ignatius Loyola founded his Society ofJesus, the
Jesuit order, for the propagation and defen e of the faith. Whereas Luther discovered the Epistle of Rornans and subjected his self-will to the
grace of God, Ignatius concentrated on the suffering Christ and obedience to the represedtatives of the Church. The Jesuits took the lead in
refuting Protestant theologians and stimulating changes in the Catholic
Church. "The history of the Counter-Reforn1ation is in part the history
of the triumph of the conservative and the militant over the conciliatory
and the liberal. " 15 The Council of Trent, which began its deliberation
in 1545, affirmed the traditions of the Catholic Church and at the same
time legislated new rules cleansing the Church of past excesses.
For Roman Catholics particularly, the Reformation is seen as a chal-
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lenge to conservatism because it severed ties to a continuous line of
authority, spiritual and temporal, over several centuries. At cross purposes were two diametrically opposed doctrines, the Protestant's doctrine of the authoritative Bible and the Catholic's belief in the
authoritative Church. While both Roman Catholicism and Protestantism have produced many conservative scholars, their view of the Reformation differs. Contemporary conservative Russell Kirk, a Catholic by
conversion, puts the issue this way:
Obedience, submission to God, is the secret ofjustice in society and tranquility in life, quite as much as it is indispensable to eternal salvation. To
redeem Americans from sectarianism is the task of the intelligent social
refom1er as well as the duty of the priest; for free political institutions can
be secure only when the people are imbued with religious veneration.
Democracy, more than any other form of government, rests upon the
postulate of a moral law, ordained by an authority superior to human
wisdom....
Under Protestantism, the sect governs religion, rather than submitting
to governance; the congregations bully their ministers and insist upon
palatable sermons, flattering to their vanity; Protestantism cannot sustain
popular liberty because it is itself subject to popular control, and must
follow in all things the popular will, passion, interest, prejudice, or caprice.
The modem spirit, of which Protestantism is one expression, detests the
idea of loyalty, upon which the whole hierarchy of this world and the
next is founded .... 16

Historically, Protestants would vehemently dispute Kirk's view of the
matter. For them, the Protestant Reformation was conservative in that
it reconnected Christianity to its historic past, one that was nearly lost
through the corruption of doctrine and practices of the Roman Catholic
Church. Protestants believe that the Roman Catholic Church had
warped the foundations and traditions of the church. They endeavored
to return the church to its scriptural roots: "One could say that the
Renaissance centered in autonomous man, while the Reformation centered in the infinite-personal God who had spoken in the Bible." 17
To the Protestant the Bible is the ultimate authority; to the Roman
Catholic the church is the ultimate authority. The Roman Catholic conservative believes that the church is the repository of the continuity of
the ages, and her traditions are, therefore, authoritative. The Protestant
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conservative argues to the contrary that the Bible is the touchstone of
truth and that all hun1an action n1ust be n1easured against it. Whenever
traditions violate Scripture, Protestants hold that those practices n1ust
give way to biblical truth. Kirk's argutnent that Protestantis1n is subject
to popular control is n1et with the Protestant retort that the failure of
Rornan Catholicisn1 to subject itself to the tnlth of the Bible led to
the corruption of doctrine and practices, \Vhich were the cause of the
Refom1ation In the first place.
The Protestant vtew is that the RefonnatiOn was genuinely conservative in that it reconnected Christianity to Its true foundations and correct
traditions. To the Protestant, the Bible provides a standard of certainty
by which to judge £1ith and practice. The H. on1an Catholic Church, by
contrast, offers no certainty Since Its standards are liable to change fron1
generation to generation. As one Protestant \Vriter has said, "The Bible
gives a differe nt way to corne to God fron1 that teaching \Vhich had
grown up in the church through the previous centunes .... The individual person, they taught, could con1e to God dtrectly 'by £11th'
through the finished \vork of Chnst. '' 1 ~
Loyalty, the other i sue ratsed by Ktrk, .1lso arouses ,1 Protestant response. Kirk's standard of loy,1lty is n1easured by loyalty to the Rotnan
Catholic Church and her traditions. Protestant~. by contrast, have historically measured loyalty by one's \Vtllingness to believe in and to practice
the teachings of the Bible a under tood In con1n1on ver tons of the
original translatio ns. It was this type of loyalty ·which caused the Puritan
to embark on a journey to the Ne\V World in the first place, and it \Va
a similar allegiance that n1oved others to challenge church practices \Vith
the question, "Is it biblical?"
While Ron1an Cath olics and Protestants have these fund,1n1ental differences, there is still much that unites thetn. Both reject the Renais ance
humanistn and idealisn1 of that era, and both shan1e the corruption
which led to the original schisn1 bet\veen Catholic and Protestant. The
measuring rod of conservatisn1 n1ight differ between the two, but they
are in agreement that later currents of opinion are blasphen1ous to the
respective conservative traditions which both seek to protect.

The Enlightenment
"Rich and weighty as were the legacies bequeathed to us by ancient
Greece and Rome, the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and the Refonna-
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tion," writes Paul Hazard in European Thought in the 18th Century, "it is
the Enlightenment of which we are the direct and lineal descendants. " 19
The legacy of the French Enlightenment was a belief in the universal
regeneration of mankind, who, when remade by reason, would become
beautiful new creatures, happy and thoroughly secular in their thinking.
In such a vision man and society were perfectible. The romantic ideal of
the new political conununity would be one where all previous religions
would be replaced by a new civic religion, that of rationalistic humanism
in which the civic bonds themselves would constitute a kind of sacred
association.
Today tnost college courses on the Enlightenment exanune in detail
the writings of French personalities like Rousseau, Voltaire, and Diderot.
Very little attention is given to the Anglo-Scottish Enlightenment, and
writers like Locke, Hume, and Adam Smith. Yet it is the Anglo-Scottish
Enlightenment which most directly influenced the American experience. The traditions of the latter movement aimed "at gradual improvement of the human condition-a process, moreover, in which each
individual bears his share of responsibility for a successful outcome,
rather than salvation being provided 'from above' by a ruling party or
class. " 20 Although the American Revolution was inspired by a casual
mixing of the two Enlightenments, it was the Anglo-Scottish tradition
that was decisive in the end. Instead of a reign of terror, the American
Revolution ended in the Constitutional Convention. Instead of fratricidal warfare among revolutionaries arguing over utopian expectations,
the American Founders compromised on a limited government with
divided power.
The French Enlightenment was fueled by the vision of two men:
Voltaire (1694-1778), who sketched out four periods ofhistory culminating with the France of his time as the apex; and Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), who saw the primitive as innocent, and autonomous
freedom as realizable. Voltaire made freedom of speech his crusade, but
he had little interest in politics and no interest in the masses, whom he
regarded as cruel and stupid. Rousseau's freedom was a release from
God, culture, authority, and any kind of restraint-his pride was in the
"noble savage." Social conventions were the "chains" of his famous
dictum in The Social Contract: "Man is born free and everywhere he is in
chains." Deity, history and con1munity-the nametags of conservatisn1-were anathen1a to Rousseau. In the period of the French Revolu-
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tion, his ideas gave birth to the laws which made divorce as easy as
n1arriage, abolished the distinction between legitimate and illegititnate
children, gave France a new calendar with ten days in each week, and
established a new state religion based on reason. 21
The Anglo-Scottish Enlightenn1ent had more xnodest ambitions. Instead of a new state religion, it ain1ed at the fonnation of religious toleration. Even though n1any of the Anglo-Scottish Enlightenment thinkers
were religious skeptics, or at n1ost deists, they recognized that organized
religion was a necessary part of con1n1unity life which inculcated moral
habits and obviated the need for governn1ent instruction. The envisioned society of Anglo-Scottish ten1perance was ruled by a lin1ited government, one restrained in power and authority. The success of the
English-speaking Enlightenn1ent was that it did not destroy the old order
but created a new and viable one out of existing institutions: "The
Anglo-Scottish Enlightenn1ent \Vas no le s rationalist than the French,
but it found its appropriate expre sion in a cairn historical sociology
rather than in a fervent political n1essianistn. " 22

French Revolution
The French revolutionarie ·wanted to produce a new n1an through
education, persuasion, and, if required, force and terror. To achieve this
goal with these means, they were willing to destroy all ocial and governmental institution . The history of France at this tin1e is replete with
accounts of revolutionary tribunals dispensing revolutionary justice, a
reign of terror, and bloodthirsty proclan1ations by n1ob before guillotines. As it turned out, the French revolutionaries were n1ore interested
in power than freedom. Rousseau's writings were the feast of the revolutionaries, who pillaged France's guilds, n1onasteries, and econotny in the
name of citizenship. The new sentin1entality denied morality and national boundaries. Rousseau wrote, "Today there are no Frenchn1en,
Germans, Spaniards, or even Englishn1en; there are only Europeans ... .
They are at home wherever there is n1oney to steal or won1en to seduce."23
The French mutiny savagely attacked the patriarchal family, declaring
marriage a civil contract and abolishing the traditionally accepted laws
of paternal authority, primogeniture, and entail. By 1794 the number of
divorces exceeded the nun1ber of n1arriages. Property, a key en1bodi-
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ment of human liberty and freedom for the conservative, was severely
restricted by destroying the relationships between property and community groups, such as family, church, guild, and monastery. The aim of
the revolution was to refashion a people-to destroy their past, alter
their habits, and purify their desires. Why was the French Revolution
like this? "It was perhaps Romanticism," writes Simon Schama in his
book on the period, ''its fondness for the vertiginous and the macabre;
its concept of political energy as, above all, electrical; its obsession with
the heart; its preference for passion over reason, for virtue over peace,
that supplied the crucial ingredient in the mentality of the revolutionary
elite: its association of liberty with wildness. " 24 The result of this social
experimentation was a bloodbath and rapid breakdown of authority culminating in the authoritarian rule of Napoleon Bonaparte.
It was this spectacle which caused Edmund Burke to take up his pen
and state the general principle of English constitutionalism which he had
previously accepted as a part of the natural order of things. For Burke,
and generations of conservatives after him, civilization was the possession not of individuals, but of communities. To conservatives, the civic
culture is all of man's inherited spiritual possessions; its art, moral ideas,
science, and learning are not something to be ransacked by revolutionaries in the name of change. The revolution was in Burke's own words,
both "sublime and terrible." "In England we have not yet been completely embowelled of our natural entrails; we still feel within us, and
we cherish and cultivate, those inbred sentiments which are the faithful
guardians, the active monitors of our duty.' ' 25

Utopian Ideologies
The French Revolution expanded the political and intellectual divisions
in Europe. In the nineteenth century, democracy seemed inevitable,
even in politically backward states with long-standing dynasties like
Russia and Germany. The political virtues of self-government were accorded lip service by autocrats, and gradual experiments in democracy
were tried. However, the twentieth century gave rise to violent revolution and the authoritarian excesses of fascism, Nazism, and con1munism.
Dictatorships in the twentieth century are of three types: (1) the autocratic military ruler; (2) a single individual in a ruling group; and (3) a
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"kind of dictatorship [which] seeks to refashion human society in terms
of some ideology or doctrine. ""'6 The practice of terror, propaganda and
rulership by a single political party has characterized dictatorships in the
twentieth century of both the Right and Left, by the fascists, Nazis,
and conm1unists. The social and technological changes of modem times,
especially the expansion of rad1o and television, have had the effect of
n1aking authoritarian states n1ore powerful.
The rise of totalitarian1sn1 1n the twentieth century has provoked the
surviving den1ocracies to cxatnine their foundations. Conservatives have
benefited fron1 such c;crutiny since their ideals explain past social
achievements. The prin1ary reac;on n1any conc;ervatives oppose having
conservatisn1 labeled an ideology IS that the term-especially in the
twentieth century-is clSSOCI.lted \Vith UtOpian ideas hke COD1muniSITI
and socialisn1. The goal of an tdeology 1s to rernake society and hutnans
in the in1age of son1e ideal. Conservatisn1, on the other hand, teaches
that we should understand soc1etv through experience and learning. Society's behavior should be deten111ned by hnks to the pac;t, not by the
itnposition of an abstract dogtna. Action 1s the n1otif of the ideologue,
reflection is the rnanner of the conservative.
While the conservative chenshe d1vers1ty, the ideologue prizes unifom1ity. The ideologue Vle\VS tnen as instnnnents to be n1an1pulated 1n
the interest of obtaining a untfonntty of practice. By contra t, conservatives value variety, con1plex1ty, subtlety, and nuance. Con1n1unity, the
benchn1ark of hurnan organization for the conservative, is the enlbodiment of those values. The individual learns standards of acceptable behavior n1ore through con1n1unity institutions like the fatnily, church,
neighborhood, and voluntary associations, than through la\VS and standards imposed by govemtnent.
The neoconservative n1ove1nent of the 1980s was triggered by a disillusion with utopian protnises and experin1ents. The experiences of pern1issiveness, poverty, crin1e, Inflation, and n1oral disarray that came to be
associated with liberalism's social and econon1ic agenda since the 1930
led to an increasing an1bivalence about the role of govemtnent in the
life of its citizens. The feeling an1ong neoconservatives was that Washington had tried for too long to do too n1uch and, for the most part,
had done it badly. The adversarial stance toward general culture which
characterized radical thought in the 1960s led to a reaction by those who
wished to protect and defend the fundan1ental values of the free society.
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Conclusion
Without the challenges posed by the Renaissance, the Enlightenment,
the French Revolution, and utopian ideologies, there would be no articulate modern conservatism. The uniform characteristic of all these
movements is a faith in human reason and capacities. In conservative
eyes, the ideal of human association liberated from custom has seldom
brought freedom, and never spawned lasting social improvement. Reaction, then, is a characteristic of modern conservatism. As society began
to adopt the idealism of the Renaissance and incorporate the beliefs of
the Enlightenment, conservatives elaborated the virtues of a wellordered past.
The French Revolution was especially important in the development
of conservative thought. It was Edmund Burke who saw the need to
react to the challenges to order and authority in evidence in the J acobin
excesses. After Burke, much conservative writing has been in response
to threats undermining the values of community and society.
The clearest definition of the premises necessary for a stable society
are found in the writings of classical philosophy. In all classical political
thought is a concern with the good state, justice, and the improvement
of the citizenry. Modern political thought, by contrast, is mainly interested in the accumulation and exercise of power.
The roots of conservative thought follow both Roman Catholicism,
with its unifying thread of church tradition and classical values, and Protestantism, with its emphasis upon the importance of biblical authority.
Conservative scholars like Frances Wilson, Russell Kirk, Frank Meyer,
and Willmoore Kendall were all Roman Catholics. In recent decades,
the Catholic Church's hierarchy in the United States has found itself at
odds with more traditional authorities in Rome and their followers in
the United States. The ink was hardly dry on the American Roman
Catholic Bishop's statement on the economy before conservative American Catholics rebutted it. Conservative Catholic orders of priests and
nuns have been able to attract the young more than the liberal orders.
The liberal Jesuits, for example, have suffered enormous losses from their
ranks, while the conservative Opus Dei and Legionnaires of Christ have
enjoyed extraordinary growth.
In Protestantism, reaction has also been at work. In all major denominations conservatives have responded to the dominant liberal theology
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by forging a counter-revolution to reestablish traditional practices.
Mainline Protestant churches that etnphasize n1aterial and social issues,
ordain won1en to the priesthood and the pastorate, and no longer hold
the Bible as the authoritative Word of God, have seen their memberships
dwindle. Time n1agazine reports that "a preoccupation with political and
social issues at the expense of good old-fashioned faith has alienated
many [mainline] n1en1bers." 27 The fastest growing churches in recent
years have been those offering certainty of doctrine and practice. Such
congregations are les likely to address econon1ic, political, and social
issues except when they feel forced to react to liberal positions on homosexuality, the role of wotnen in society, the prohibition of school prayer,
and other innovations that they believe undennine the historically accepted custon1s and practices of the faith.
Kierkegaard wrote, "Everything that passes for politics today will be
unmasked as religion ton1orrow. " "'R If the saying is accurate it n1ay portend an alliance between Prote->tant and Catholics 1n the future. Conservative Catholics and Protestants alike decry the decadence of society,
the deteriorati on of the public schools, the loss of respect for authority,
and the dependence upon governn1ent rather than personal initiative.
They see these trends as the logical and a\:vfu1 fulfillrnent of the selfcentered pride flowing fron1 the tnoven1ents of the l~enaissance and the
Enlightenment and the confidence in the tnodern political utopias. Such
viewpoints spawned conservative Cathohc groups like the Eagle Forun1,
and conservative Protestant groups like Concerned Won1en of An1erica.
Both conservative Catholi cs and conservative Protestants are reacting
to changes that threaten values which they believe in1portant. In n1ost
instances, they are reacting to the s~11ne things in the political reahn.
Abortion, for instance, h as resulted in lin1ited efforts by conservative
Catholics and Protestants to join together in opposition to threatening
moral changes. However, lingering differences about ultin1ate authority
make their cooperation effective only on specific issues.
Reaction is the foundation of n1odern conservatisn1. Neoconservatism
is the most recent tnanifestation of a n1oven1ent which reappraises
American culture after finding fault with the social experiments of the
1960s. Typically, conservative moven1ents begin in reaction to hostile
moven1ents, ideas, and events. T h e fires of its conten1porary resurgence
are fueled by threats to the accepted customs and traditions of a society
posed by past flirtations with experitnentation.
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CHAPTER FIVE

The Historical Development of
American Conservatism
T11ejuture, as always, is ueiledfrom our l'ision. Butfor the
moment the cotzsen,atiue intellectualmoucmctlt 111 America,
born itz the wilderness a generattoll ago, has wulenicdJ/y
achieved an unprecedented leuel ~f it!f/11cnce and 11nportancc
... to understand this intellectual moiiCIIICIIf and its
aspirations, MIC tnHst rmderstand history.
(.I
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United States," \Vrite~ eyn1our Martin L1pc;et, "n1ay properly claim the title of the first ne\v nation." Th1 designation
means that it was the first country to succe sfully develop ,1n Industrial
econon1y with an integrated social structure and a stable detnocratic polity without disintegrating in the process. 2 But the nation did not pring
from virgin soil without a value yc;ten1 rooted in year of toil and experience. There is a type of spiritual history, \vbat Eric Voegelin calls "paradign1atic" history, which traces the intellectual and cultural developrnent
of a nation. 3 Every person love sotnething, and the e attachn1ents tructure existence in some way. To understand An1erica is ftr t to con1prehend the values which guided the fomution of its institutions in the
early republic. Conservatives focus on a set of values which defined the
"good life" in America at the tirne of its founding. The An1erican economy owed its success to hard, continuous work, frugality, self-disciplined living, and individual initiative. Such values can1e fron1 across
the Atlantic, from notions of individual honesty that grew out of the
Reformation and would later be known as the Protestant work ethic.
More immediately, the political systen1 owed its genesis to the English
Revolution of 1640 and the subsequent transfer of power to Parliarnent
institutionalized by the Glorious Revolution of1688 . In England, parlia-
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mentary democracy replaced royal absolutism, conunercial and industrial
wealth replaced land as the base of economic influence, and the middle
class stamped society with its outlook and morality where once the aristocracy had ruled. The pattern of a peaceful, restructured society was set
a hundred years before the American Revolution.
The absence of a monarchy and an aristocracy made the American
belief in equality and opportunity crucial. The revolutionary leaders in
America quickly turned the experiment into a stable order. Such was
not the case in France, whose revolution began two years after the Constitution of the United States was framed. The Jacobin ideas of liberty,
fraternity, and equality were completely at odds with the limited revolutionary notions in England and the United States.
Edmund Burke wrote that while there were structural reasons for
the French Revolution, such injustices could never justify the complete
dismemberment of society. It was custom, tradition, and membership in
society, far more than reason, that gave quality to human nature. Burke
wrote that the deep-seated historical forces at work in France were less
important in explaining the excesses of the Revolution than the false
doctrines of philosophers captivated by an Enlightenment optimism and
a fanatical atheism. Although designated as the founder of American
conservatism, Edmund Burke's title is somewhat misleading. The
French Revolution was the foil of other prominent writers who surfaced
simultaneously with Burke. 4 While their ideas differed in some ways,
such widespread and similar responses give evidence that basic conservative ideas and values were in evidence before Burke so skillfully articulated and defended them. Burke spoke out forcefully against the collapse
of the moral and social order in France, and identified the principles
causing the societal breakdown: (1) faith in a priori change and human
reason, and (2) a lack of respect for traditional values and property rights.
Unlike the limited American Revolution, the French experience was
a destructive and chaotic break between past and present. Custom, history and tradition were eclipsed in France, where they had been exalted
in America. The American Revolution was a limited one, aimed at
allowing Americans the benefits derived from the experiences of the
English. The Constitution was seen as an extension of the ideas of the
Magna Carta and the English Bill of Rights. The policies of King
George were criticized because they stood in the path of this legacy
which was reserved for free men.
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The developn1ent of the "l~ights of Englishmen" from the Magna
Carta, the Petition of Rights, and the Bill of I~ights were sacred to the
A1nerican colonists. Much of the colonial resistance took the form of
arguing that these rights of fundamental law, which were largely due
process rights, vvere being denied to then1 as colonists. The ordering
documents of the colonies-for exan1ple, the Massachusetts Body of
Liberties-reflected a concern to establish these rights. The populanty
of Coke's Institutes and later Blackstone's Commentaries was a Inanifestation of concern that these due process rights be preserved. All this made
the A1nerican !~evolution quite tan1e; it \Vas a conservative (even reactionary) revolution.
In this chapter, the evolution of An1encan conservatisn1 IS traced from
the founding ideas ofEdrnund 13urke to the recent prescnpt1ons ofRonald Reagan and George Bush. An1encan conservatisn1 has passed
through three distinct periods in the past t\vo hundred years. These are,
first, from colonial tin1es to the Ctvil War; second, frotn the Civil War
to the Ne\v Deal; and th1rd, fron1 the Ne\v l)eal to the present. The
then1e which unites all the~e periods is best articulated by George H.
Nash, author of the landn1.1rk \vork on the conservative intellectual
n1ove1nent since World War II:
If there 1s a smgle phJ.losophical prennse that d1st1ngutshes recent Amencan conservatism, It IS the conviCtiOn that "Ideas have con equences." We
live in a decade in \Vhich, for the first t1me m generations, the ideas of
self-identified conservatives seen1 ascendant-an era In which the argutnents of"acadenuc scnbblers" of the Right are being translated, however
itnperfectly, mto public pohcy. '

For conservatives, fonn precedes content-ideas are the deten1unants of
culture. To understand a nation is to ask questions about its standards
and values. Our purpose here IS not to argue whether Atnerica is conservative or liberal in its heritage, but rather to describe and analyze the
flow of American conservative thought during its life as a nation.

The Early Era: Colonial Times to the Civil War
This era is broken down into a discussion of several themes and time
periods. We identify the intellectual personalities and varieties of censer-
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vative thought in the periods of (1) the colonial and founding period;
(2) the Federalists versus Republicans period; and (3) the pre-Civil War
period, including the writings of John Randolph and John Calhoun.
Conservative thinkers will be discussed individually and in the context
of historical thought.

The Colonial and Founding Period
At the time of the American Revolution about three-quarters of the
North American colonists were of Puritan extraction. 6 Puritans might
have attended a Congregationalist, Presbyterian, Anabaptist, or even
Anglican church, but what united them all was the belief that the official
church of England was not a true Christian church and needed cleansing
from its elaborate ceremonies and forms. Clinton Rossiter, in Conservatism in America, describes this sense of shared values among the colonists
as a conm1on belief in "original sin" and an obligation to law and duty.
Such was the assembly of "visible saints" who gathered in John Winthrop's "Shining City" of Massachusetts to deliberate matters of state.
Winthrop described then1. in his journal as a people who "in all differences and agitations ... continued in brotherly love. " 7
Puritanism was the dominant political and intellectual force in the
new nation through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. John
Winthrop, John Davenport, John Cotton, Nathaniel Ward, John Eliot,
William Stoughton, Samuel Willard, and all the Mathers stamped the
nation with a set of conservative values which emphasized respect for
the established order, leadership by the favored few, the importance of
community, and a preference for gradual change. 8 The Puritans also gave
the nation institutions like a written constitution, regular elections, and
the secret ballot, and principles like the work ethic, the federalist principle, and the separation of church and state. In sun1, the national institutions and values were influenced by Calvinism more than Deism, by the
Reformation more than the Enlightenment, and by the revolution in
England more than the revolution in France.
The Puritans traced their roots not to England, but to Moses. Old
Testament Israel was the source of inspiration for the "New Jerusalem"
in Massachusetts. Russell Kirk writes that in such a heritage, the Christian faith is the principle of modern civilization: its theological and moral
doctrines inform us ''of the nature of God and n1an ... , human dignity
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and the rights and duties ofhun1an persons. "CJ Although in colonial tin1es
there were no argun1ents over the benefits of capitalisn1 as opposed to
socialisn1, or the itnportance of a strong national defense, or any clear
expression of what would later be call ed a conservative philosophy, the
influence of the Bible \vas everywhere apparent. Conservative values
about the nature of tnan and the ln11Its of governn1ent characterized
political debate 1n the colonies fro111 the tune of their settlen1ent to the
An1erican Revolution.
The founding of the An1ctic.1n republic prec;ents a rare opportunity to
observe the authors of a constitution grappling \VIth the fundatnental
problen1s of fon111ng a nc\v govcrmnent. Their actiVIty took place after
a "reluctant revolution," to usc the \\ ords of lrvtng Kn5tol, \vhich protected the social Institutions of society. Unlike the French !~evolution,
the leaders of the An1encan R.evolution lived out the1r hves in peace
after it vvas over. 10 Peter Vtercck says the AnH~ncan !~evolution "reflected England\ heritage of I oH8," noting that Edtnund Burke "£1vored their revolution as dctl-ndmg the trtltbtional nght of freeborn
English1nen against ne\v-(lngkd roy,1l ustuvattons." 11
The victory of con ervative pnnctples Ill fonntng the govemn1ent is
borne out by the f.1shionablc cnttosn1s the fratner5 of the Constitution
have received fron1 revtstonist h1stonans. Charles A. Beard called the
fran1ers " hardfisted con-.erv,ltlvcs" \vho atten1pted to "han1string the
masses." 11 Others cntictzed thcn1 for having an "eighteenth century"
view of n1an as depraved, and for trytng to fn1stratc the \vill of the
majority. Clearly, the Founders created ,l constitutional detnocracy donlinated by "repubhcan tendenues. '' A full-fledged dernocracy \Vould
have relied on n1ajority votes, gtven tronger po\ver to the national govemn1ent to act on behalf of all the people, and provided for a unified
executive to speak on behalf of the nation. But the resulong constitutional republic established a lun1ted governn1ent, restrained by the elements of ch ecks and balances an1ong the branches of the national
government, a division of power bet\veen the national and state authorities, and a requirement of extraordinary n1ajo1itie to an1end the Constitution or to override a veto. The result \vas a systen1 \vhich restrained
action, allowing for gradual change.
The work of the Founders is in large n1easure due to \Vhat Rus ell G.
Fryer calls the ''consensual character of the ideological legacy of the
Revolutionary Constitutional period." Fryer finds three distinctive tra-
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ditions in the political thought and history of the time which contributed to this underlying value consensus. These were the ideas of "natural
law, natural rights and limited governn1ent," which "united the Founders on the key issues of popular sovereignty and the virtues of limited
governn1ent." 13 In large part, these ideas were contained in the common
law tradition in evidence in virtually every colonial ordering document.
The men themselves shared comn1on values; they "were men of the
English and Scottish Enlightenment, not the French . . . [who] were
closer to Hobbes than Rousseau." The Founders were well-educated
men for their time whose "discourse was history ... with no more than
five exceptions (and perhaps no more than three) they were orthodox
members of one of the established Christian communions. " 14 In sum,
the delegates to the Constitutional Convention had substantial political
experience as well as business and property holdings, and they were
determined to draft a document which reflected the English common
law tradition of limited government with a protection for individuals.
The real constitution in America was not the paper document, but the
whole constellation of customs and traditions that had formed in the two
centuries of the colonial settlement and revolutionary experience.
Three personalities, John Dickinson, James Madison, and John Taylor,
are exen1plary of conservative attitudes during the founding period. John
Dickinson (1732-1808), a Philadelphia lawyer who participated in most
of the in1portant events of the time, wrote Letters From a Farmer in Pennsylvania. In his treatise, Dickinson said, "Experience must be our only
guide ... reason may n1islead us." His conservative views held that the
objective of government must be to free men so that they can choose
their own ends, rather than allowing government to select ends for the
populace. 15 J an1es Madison (1751-1836) is often placed outside the conservative tradition by writers. But Madison's conservative instincts are
best illustrated in his strong preference for the separation and balancing
of powers. He is the author of a renowned statement on the subject: "In
framing a government which is to be administered by men over men,
the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to
control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itsel£" 16
Madison's acceptance of the Bill of Rights was born out of the necessity
to compron1ise with the Anti-Federalists, not out of a conscious desire
to plant the doctrine of "natural rights" in the document. John Taylor
of Carolina (1753-1824) was a fierce Anti-Federalist who typified the
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conservative southern planter. Taylor viewed the Constitution as an instrument to protect state power from don1ination by a central government. Ideas of hierarchy, cotnn1unity, custon1, and religion pervade
Taylor's writing. Taylor believed that adn1inistration of law, not the imposition of an abstract vision of social justice, is the chief obligation of
govemn1ent. 17

The Federalists !Jersus Republicans Period
The initial controversy under the Constitution resulted in the fonl1ation of the first Arnerican political partie~. Thon1as Jefferson and jan1es
Madison fom1ed the Den1ocratic-R.epublicans tn the 1790s to oppose
Alexander Han1ilton and John Adan1s, who~e party was known as the
Federalists. The quarrel bet\veen these parties encon1passed a great variety of i sues, but it began \Vith opposition to the financial policies developed by Ha1nilton and heated reactions to the events surrounding the
French Revolution. The con~ervative-liberal debate is characterized by
Russell Kirk: "The I"Z.epubhcans, Jefferson and Madison chief atnong
then1 ... can1e to syrnpatht7e \Vlth French equalitarian theories. The1r
opponents, the Federalists, appealed to the lesson of h1story, the legacy
of British liberties, and the guarantees of pre~cnptive con titutions.'' 18
The conservative ideas c11ne to be identified with the Federalist Party.
John Adan1s (1735-1826), the nation's second president and author of
Defense of Constitutions, was the n1ost significant of the Federalists. Russell Kirk identifies Adan1s a~ the ''founder of tn1e con ervatism in
Atnerica." 19 Ronald Lora qualifies the Adan1s legacy by saying that
Adan1s only agreed \Vith Edn1ltnd Burke on two is ue -the itnportance
of property and hun1an inequality. Adan1s \vas not as firn1 a supporter of
aristocracy as Burke; he favored a conventional balance between aristocracy and democracy. But in his stands on property, constitution , and the
dangers of the French Revolution, Adan1s \vas a true conservative.
Alexander Han1ilton (1757-1804) was a conten1porary of Adams and
an activist in the Federalist Party. Han1ilton's views on religion and order
are strikingly sin1ilar to those of Burke. Han1ilton declared: "The attempt by the rulers of a nation to destroy all religious opinion, and to
pervert a whole nation to atheism, is a phenomenon of profligacy reserved to consun1n1ate the infamy of the unprincipled reformers of
France." He tied this disregard for religion to the breakdown of French
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family ties and all order in that country, manifested in easy divorce,
children testifying against their parents, and the frequent prescription of
murder. 20
Hamiltonian conservatism deserves special attention, however, in that
it differs in several key ways from traditional conservatism (i.e., that
which was expressed by Burke and conforms to the basic views already
discussed). Hamilton announced at a New York Convention in 1788,
"But there is another object, equally important (as liberty), and which
our enthusiasm rendered us (at the formation of our 'confederation')
little capable of regarding ... I mean a principle of strength and stability
in the organization of our government, and of vigor in its operation. " 21
He was, of course, referring to a strong presidency (actually a monarchy)
and a strong central government. Hamilton's economic ideas were also
very different from traditional conservative beliefs in that he wanted
strong government direction of the economy. Kirk calls Hamilton's economic ideas those of mercantilism, a tenet of which was revealed in this
statement by the first Secretary of the Treasury in the new United States,
"to preserve the balance of trade in favor of a nation ought to be a
leading aim of its policy. " 22
Why did Hamilton have such different views on the power of the
state and economic policy? While he held to many traditional conservative beliefs, such as a desire for slow, organic change, the importance of
religion in social life, and a distrust of m~n's abilities to plan, his reasoning branched off in a different direction from traditional conservatism.
Kirk's analysis of Hamilton is that "he believed that salvation from the
consequence of leveling ideas lay in establishing invincible national
authority. . . . (It] seems hardly to have occurred to Hamilton's mind
that a consolidated nation might also be a leveling nation, though he
had the example of Jacobin France before him; and he does not appear
to have reflected upon the possibility that force in government may
be applied to other purposes than the maintenance of a conservative
order.'' 23
Hamilton's brand of conservatism may be properly labeled authoritarian conservatism. While the origin of authoritarian conservatism is generally traced to Joseph de Maistre (1753- 1821), authoritarian thought
existed before Maistre much as traditional conservative beliefs existed
before Burke. It was Maistre, however, who expressed authoritarian
conservatism most clearly in response to the ideas of the Enlightenment
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and the French R. evolution. Maistre favored a strong central governn1ent so fim1ly that he even declared the public executioner the very
cornerstone of proper governn1ental power over the people: "All grandeur, all power, subordination re)tS on the executioner; he is the horror
and the bond of hun1an association. " 2 .J Peter Viereck describes the authoritarian conservative as a "reactionary 'Ottantotist,' " referring to one
who wants to go backward to better days in the past. Viereck considers
authoritarian conservatives extren1e in their etnphasis upon authority as
contrasted with the traditional or Burkean con"ervatives' en1phasis upon
liberties. 25 The prin1acy of political authority and the desire to n1ove
backward in titne are at the heart of the difference between authoritarian
and traditional con ervat1sn1.
These differences are apparent \Vhen the conservatisn1 of Han1ilton is
contrasted with that of Adan1s. Adan1s ·wanted to protect against "tyranny," \Vhatever its cause, \vhether frotn n1onarch or den1ocracy (the
n1ajority infringing upon n11nonty nghts). ""~(, Harnilton, by contrast, did
not trust the people and de\Ired a linuted n1on<1rchy, a titled aric;tocracy,
and govemn1ent direction of the econorny. He wanted to go back to the
central authority of England. Fisher An1es, another Federalist leader,
went so far in his indictn1ent of dernocracy to say, ''Our disease is den1ocracy. It is not the skin that festers-our very bones are carrions, and
their tnarrow blackens \vith gangrene. What rogues shall be fir t, IS of
no n1on1ent-our republican1sn1 n1ust die and I'rn sorry for it. " 2.,
An1es believed that the ''detnocracy" of the French R. evolution was
an ideological threat to the ordered liberty 111 the United State . He
believed that only an anstocracy of talent could sustain the ideal set
forth in the Constitution. Though not \vell known today a a conservative leader, Fisher Arnes was the leader of the Federalists in the first four
sessions of Congress and was instrun1ental in shaping the language of the
First Amendment. His writings resonate \Vith great feeling about the
principles of conservatism. 28
The Pre- Civil War Period

The election of Andrew Jackson to the presidency in 1828 marked
the first major decline in conservative influence in American politics.
While the previous contests between Federalists and Republicans witnessed the election of tnen with liberal views, such as Thomas Jefferson,
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the period was marked by a consensus on basic ideas. Jefferson himself
saw the danger in "frequent and untried change," and believed in the
importance of a natural aristocracy aware of the bad side of human nature.29Jacksonian democracy, by contrast, came to symbolize the growing sway of social and political equality in the United States. Jackson was
from Tennessee (all previous presidents of the United States had been
from Virginia or Massachusetts), and brought with him all the passions
and impulses of frontier individualism. Gone were the aristocratic habits
and traditions of the east; in their place were those of planters, farmers,
mechanics, and laborers.
This change of emphasis was not merely due to Jackson. His predecessor, John Quincy Adams, whose conservative credentials were impeccable, had come to believe that man could be improved by the workings
of democracy. Jackson's party built victory from the bottom up rather
than, as during the nation's founding period, from the top down. Jackson vetoed acts of Congress and declared himself a "Tribune of the
People" whose responsibilities were superior to those ofCongress. 30 The
popular mood undermined conservative values of elite rule and traditional values.
Still, there were important conservative thinkers during this decline
of conservative thought. John Randolph (1773-1833) was one of the
more important voices opposing the new egalitarianism. He thought
Jackson's election meant that "the country is ruined past redemption ...
it is ruined in the spirit and character of the people. " 31 While Randolph's
words sound antidemocratic in retrospect, it was tyranny and government "innovation" which he feared more than the policies of the new
administration. 32 In a speech to the Virginia Constitutional Convention
(1829-1830), Randolph spoke out against this tyranny, which he called
"King Numbers." He felt that the Virginia Constitution did not need
to be changed, particularly in the direction of expanding the electorate
and majority rule. He stated that were he a young man who would have
to live under the Constitution for a long time, he "would not live under
King Numbers." 33
In his same speech at the Virginia Constitutional Convention, Randolph spoke out against governmental social programs. His argument
was that such programs benefited their administrators more than the
poor, and he said that he had several friends who had "amassed opulent
fortunes: as administrators." Randolph spoke out against the prevailing
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idea that "all things must be done for then1 [the people] by the government. " 14 The need for Randolph to take such stands against n1ajoritarian
power and increased goverruncnt shows the clear decline of conservative
influence in goven1n1ent.
It is fashionable an1ong historians to indict John C. Calhoun (17821851) and his "doctrine of nullification" (which held that states could
ignore or nullify an act of the central governn1ent) as a contnbuting
factor to the breakdov1n of order before the Civil War. But Calhoun
knew that tn1e nationali 111 sprang frotn a love of one's own regton.
Calhoun \Vanted to preserve the southern heritage, but he feared the
expansion of central govemn1ent as a threat to all areas of the nation.
Both Peter Viereck and Russell Kuk attnbute great in1portance to Calhoun in the developn1ent of Atnencan conservatisn1 ..,.,
Calhoun stood fin11ly in f.:1vor of checks on n1ajorities and the 1dea of
"concurrent tnajorities,'' as set up by the Constitution, to protect against
the rnajoritarian tyranny that R.andolph, Adan1s, and other had feared.
He recognized the fallacy that n1le b) ~itnple n1Jjonty \Vas rule by the
people, and believed that the 11nportant question \vas ho\v to "vest the
powers of the Governn1ent 1n the \\hole- tht? entire people-to n1ake
it in truth and reality the Governtnent of the people Instead of Governrnent of a dotninant over a subject part." His O\vn ans\ver \vas that thi
could be accon1plished "by judicious and wise division and organization
of the Governn1ent and cotnn1unity ... and the concurrence of all as
the voice of the whole." '<> Calhoun stood for the republican re traints of
the Constitution upon dernocracy as estabh hed by the Founders at a
tin1e when nujority rule enjoyed strong support. He saw that tyranny of
the rnajority could be just as iniquitous as tyranny of the 1ninority.
The Civil War created a discrepancy .1pparent to Calhoun and other
thinkers already discussed. Southern society was a stronghold of the conservative values of the i1nportance of fa1nily and con1n1unity, distrust of
rapid change, and the importance of religious beliefs. Yet the South
disrupted the national order by ren1oving itself fron1. the national government's authority in order to support the institution of slavery. This
discrepancy causes some confusion about the conservative versus liberal
leadership of that era. Although President Abraham Lincoln expanded
presidential power (generally considered a liberal act), such an expansion
was used to preserve the Union, an objective consistent with conserva-
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tive traditions. Once a stronger national power was in place, the nature
of the Union was permanently changed.

Conservative Literature and Jurists
Some of the major conservative thinkers of this era were writers,
rather than politicians or political philosophers. Orestes Brownson
(1803-1876) personally symbolized the paradox of the Civil War. He
supported the Union, but preferred southern society to the "gospel of
material success" and "radical notions of human progress" prevalent in
the North. He identified the Civil War as a struggle between "just authority and anarchic impulses," not a battle of" democratic ideologues"
against a "conservative society. " 37
Brownson's religious past included association with Congregationalism, Presbyterianism, Universalism, socialism, atheism, and Unitarianism, and culminated in Roman Catholicism. The logic of his seemingly
convoluted path was a desire to locate religious authority with absolutes
that required obedience. For Brownson, the belief in such absolutes was
the foundation for a stable society. Should the nation obey the moral
authority of the Roman Catholic Church, he believed, it would be free
to pursue the common good rather than be divided by the fickleness of
public opinion and the caprice of individual judgment. Brownson became not only the leading cultural defender of Roman Catholicism in
America during the 1800s, he also foreshadowed what would happen in
the 1900s. Many prominent American conservatives since 1945 have
been Roman Catholics or converts to Roman Catholicism. They have
in common the conservative emphasis on religious order and social stability.
Nathaniel Hawthorne (1804-1864) shared Brownson's skepticism
about the claims of progress. According to Russell Kirk, Hawthorne
"dwells almost wholly upon sin, its reality, nature, and consequences;
the contemplation of sin is his obsession, his vocation, almost his life.
Here he becomes a major preceptor of conservatives." Hawthorne distrusted man's nature and believed in the importance of traditional values.
He stood out against the transcendentalist view of the essential goodness
of man, and he looked with affection on the past, with its conserving
and molding forces. To Kirk, Hawthorne's writings develop a close relationship between the spiritual and the material:
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Whenever n1an tries to ignore sin ... progress n1aterial and spiritual collapses, and the reality of evil is i1npressed upon 111en's minds by terror and
suffering. Only one species of refon11 really is worth attempting: reform
of conscience. 38

Jan1es Fenimore Cooper (1789-1851) was another writer who championed the freedom and dignity of den1ocracy while at the sarne time
warning that abstract ideals of equality and liberty were not attainable.
In The American Democrat, Cooper en1phasizes the guiding role culture
and continuity play in society, and the corresponding weaknesses of
public opinion as a n1eans to control government excesses. Property
rights, another conservative tenet, were very in1portant to Cooper. He
believed that a dernocracy could only flourish if its leaders were gentlen1en; such designations were defined not prin1arily by wealth but by
public spiritedness and prudence.
The two leading jurists of the era, Jan1es Kent (1763-1847) and Joseph Story (1779-1845), were conservatives whose influence extended
through a generation of lawyers. Kent strongly defended such conservative legal tenets as con1n1on lavv, with its en1phasi on precedents:
The reports of judicial decisiOns conta1n the most certain evidence, and
the most authoritative and precise application of the n1les of con1mon
law. . . . The evils resulting frorn an indigestible heap of laws, and legal
authorities, are great and manifest. They destroy the certainty of the law,
and promote litigation, delay and subtilty.... It would therefore be extremely inconvenient to the public, if precedents were not duly regarded
and pretty irnplicitly followed. It is by the notoriety and stability of such
rules, that professional men can give safe advice to those who consult
them. 39

Also holding strongly to the common law tradition was Justice Joseph
Story, an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court from 1811 to 1845.
Story wrote the textbook of the day for America's legal profession, Commentaries on the Constitution. Common law, to Story, "comprehends natural theology, moral philosophy, and political philosophy . . . man's
duties to God, to himself, to other men, and as a member of political
society." Story rejected John Locke's theory of natural rights, a principal
basis for claims by liberals for changes in the law. 40
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Conclusion: Colonial Times to the Civil War

It is clear from this discussion of early American conservatism that
there are different types of conservatism. Religious conservatism was
especially prevalent in the colonial period among the Puritans. Political
conservatism made important contributions to the Constitutional Convention and was in evidence in the general culture. Authoritarian conservatism manifested itself in the ideas of Alexander Hamilton, while
social conservatism was characteristic of the American South. Of course,
the traditional conservatism of Edmund Burke contained the tenets of
religious, political and social conservatism in evidence elsewhere.
The line of demarcation between conservatism and liberal thought is
not always clear. For example, Thomas Jefferson held to some important
conservative tenets even though he is considered a founder of liberal
American thought. Similarly, James Madison has been labeled as a liberal,
but careful analysis of his views reflects a significant strain of thought
consistent with political conservatism, especially as it relates to ideas of
republican government which restrict rapid change. Likewise, differences among conservatives are sometimes unclear. John Adams is considered the direct heir to Burkean conservatism, although, with respect to
the importance of the aristocracy, Adams was in disagreement with
Burke. Alexander Hamilton's authoritarian conservatism included a solid
foundation in traditional conservatism's religious, political and social values. The conservative position on the Civil War was divided between
southern conservatives who supported the South and northern conservatives who saw the responsibility of preserving the Union.
It is clear from this discussion that conservatism is more than political
writings or stands on issues of public policy. The constellation of culture
involves all the ideas, habits, values, prejudices and institutions which
make up a society. The ideas of conservatism pervade much of literature.
Works by Hawthorne, Cooper, Brownson, and many others emphasized
the values of community, the legacy of the past and the individual's
circumstances before God as important determinants of life. Conservatism had a significant impact on American law through the influence of
conservative jurists like Kent and Story. In their view, law had a religious
and moral foundation which should conform to the heritage of custom
and tradition embodied in common law. Christian religious values are
central to the definition of conservatism. Roman Catholic converts have
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been prominent an1ong spokesn1en for the movement as have conservative Protestants who stand in the tradition of the Puritans. Southern
conservatism found expression in the writings of Taylor, Randolph and
Calhoun.
Conservatisn1 suffered a reversal during the Jacksonian era as the importance of public opinion, an expanded electorate, and social equality
grew. The decline in traditional attitudes was so severe that some conservatives lamented the very passing of conservatisn1 as a belief systen1. At
the end of the Civil War, southern conservatives believed their conservative crusade for state and con1n1unity rights was at an end.

The Middle Era: The Civil War to the New Deal
The Civil War left a searing scar on the pohtical system. Those who
supported the Union becan1e, for generations, Republicans; those who
supported the Confederacy, or who had opposed the war, became Denlocrars. Conservatives in both parties caine to see the constant growth of
the central govern1nent as a threat to the whole society. Millions of
Europeans emigrated to the United States between 1880 and World War
I, bringing with then1 different ideas such as Darwinisn1 and Marxisn1,
and a variety of religious and political convictions. Catholics fron1 Poland, Italy, and Ireland, and Jews fron1 Russia and Eastern Europe sought
a new start on An1erican shore . Their differing religious and social values were not easily accepted by established groups in American society.
Liberalism, as a doctrine en1phasizing the full developn1ent of the individual free from the restraints of government, religion, and social conventions, beca1ne a donunant force for action during these decades. The
labor movement, advocates of the "Social Gospel," rnuckrakers, and
progressive intellectuals all campaigned for social restructuring during
this tin1e. Mainline Protestant denonunations, colleges, universities, and
seminaries began to turn to the liberal theologies popular in Europe,
while politically liberal presidents like Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson n1ade a major impact on American government and society.41
With change came an expansion in governn1ent power; this prompted
a strong reaction in the writings of various conservatives. Russell Kirk
said that he saw during this era "how easily an abstraction like capitalisn1
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might succumb to another abstraction called Communism. " 42 The conservative temper of the times was one of reaction against the tide of alien
ideas which threatened American institutions. After 1900, opposition to
socialism became a benchmark belief among conservatives. Conservatives do not like the abstract political and social philosophies of either
the left or the right. In this section we examine the thinkers who stood
against the support for expanded government. These writers are classified as follows: (1) critics of democracy; (2) New Humanists; (3) critics
of progress; (4) Libertarians; and (5) miscellaneous critics.

Critics

of Democracy

Both Henry Adams (1838-1918) and Brooks Adams (1848-1927) saw
a danger in placing too much faith in the judgment of the common man.
In this belief they echoed their ancestor, John Quincy Adams, whose
suspicions of democracy were fueled by the admission of new states on
the frontier. Henry Adams wrote in The Degradation of the Democratic
Dogma (1920) that "at this particular juncture of human affairs the tendency is very strong throughout the world to deify the democratic
dogma, and to look to democracy to accomplish pretty promptly some
approach to a millennium among men. " 43 His book Democracy (1908)
is described by Russell Kirk as showing a "contempt for democratic
corruption. '' 44
Brooks Adams's sense of fear of the overconfidence in democracy
came from his conservative view of man. He stated that the country was
in a "social war" because it "tried to ignore certain fundamental facts
which are stronger than democratic theories." The nation should not
expect too much from democracy because "the strongest of human passions are fear and greed. " 45 Some conservatives have discounted the
Adams brothers because they grew virtually reactionary in their pessimism about the world, in contrast to the guarded optimism and joy of
accomplishment which characterizes traditional conservatism. Ronald
Lora writes that Brooks Adams eventually came to believe the world was
in complete chaos, while Henry Adams, based on his work of applying
scientific ideas to philosophy, concluded that the world would end in
inertia due to the Second Law of Thern1.odynamics. 46
The increased confidence in democracy and in expanding the role of
government (possibly leading to socialism) was also the concern of E. L.
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Godkin (1831-1902). Godkin was the editor of The Nation, which is
one of today's n1ost liberal n1agazines but at that time was a fountainhead
of conservative capitalistic notions. Godkin believed that the basic probletn of socialistn was its failure to consider costs. Improvements in society were laudable, but the question was who would pay for then1. He
compared socialisn1 to a n1an who decides to n1ove fron1 his "sn1all flat
to a house on Fifth Avenue, for the good of the fan1ily; but, he had
received no raise in his incorne. " 47 Godkin was uneasy about the degradation of detnocracy and conden1ned "yellow journalism," which he
believed fueled the ftan1e of tnass sentin1ent and unden11ined considered
judgrnent.
The New Humanists

Two very in1portant conservative \Vriters of the tniddle era \Vere Irving Babbitt (1865-1933) and Paul Eln1er More (1867-1937). They
called their beliefs "hun1anist," but it was not the hun1anisn1 of liberalisn1 and the Humanist A!an{{esto, \Vh1ch both vigorou ly opposed. As
Babbitt describes it, "The hurnan1st exercise the \vill to refrain, but the
end he has in view IS not the renunciation of the expansive desires but
the subduing of thetn to the la\V of n1easure." He sa\v hurnanist belief a
a third possible attitude to,vard life between a "pure traditionalist'' religious view and that of a "rnere tnodernist" like Rous eau. While Babbitt
praised the virtues of religion, he sa\v hun1anist virtues as i1nilar but
"n1ore accessible" than those of "the saint. " 4 H Babbitt's idea of hurnanism was not to deny the clain1s of religion in its own sphere; what he
disputed was the necessity of deriving the non11s of justice solely frorn
revelation. 4 9
Babbitt's beliefs were those of the traditional conservative in ahnost
every area. He blan1ed Rousseau for the n1yth that tnan is good, a n1yth
which conservatives agree has had serious consequences in the n1odern
world. Babbitt also associated Rousseau with the utilitarian "glorification of man's increasing control over the forces of nature under the
name of progress. " 50 He praised Edn1und Burke's "realism" and "humility" (in submission to God), as opposed to Rousseau's nonunalisn1 and
pride. 51 He also en1phasized the in1portance of duties that con1e with
rights, as opposed to natural rights. 52
Perhaps Irving Babbitt's greatest interest was in the area of education.
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He said the educational system was heavily influenced by Rousseau,
whose book Emile argues for the natural development of a child without
societal barriers. As a result, the educational system viewed anything that
set "bounds" as "prejudiced." Babbitt argued that what was needed was
more, not less, discipline in schooling. He urged a "classical education"
to teach people to live by standards, and he praised the order of classicism
as opposed to romanticism. 53 Though a scholar and a Harvard professor,
Babbitt scorned the ivory tower and the intellectual treason of professors
who were lured by the muses of ideology away from the precincts of
reality. 54
Paul Elmer More, like Irving Babbitt, was an advocate of "classical
education. " 55 More had a conservative view of man and warned of those
who would change the institutions of government to "adapt them to
the nature of man as he should be" and "relax the rigor of the law, in
pity for the degree of injustice inherent in earthly life. " 56 He stood
against the mood of economic equality of the time. In an essay dealing
with the United Mine Workers' strike against John D. Rockefeller, he
was angered that while the rights of the mine workers were voiced by
journalists everywhere, Rockefeller's personal rights and property rights
were voiced by no one. 57 More feared the results of insecure property,
and said that it was "safer ... to err on the side of natural inequality
than on the side of ideal justice. " 58
In the eyes of Francis G. Wilson and Russell Kirk, More should be
considered "the greatest of our intellectual conservatives" and the
"greatest of American Critics." More's humanism gradually evolved
until he converted to Christianity and became an orthodox Anglican.
As an editor, an historian and a literary critic, he argued democracy, to
be successful, had to be leavened with aristocracy; that private property
is essential to national stability; and that our understanding of God and
man depends upon our knowledge of the Incarnation. 59

Critics of Progress
The Progressive Movement began in America during the 1890s and
continued un61 World War I. Most historians agree that it was a movement of the urban middle-class to curb the worst excesses of industrialisn1, achieve humanitarian reforms, and democratize politics. But not
everyone agreed with the critique of An1erican society in evidence
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a1nong the progressives. George Santayana (1863-1952) said that the
"ideal liberal" would say progress is "continued change for the better"
in '\vhatever direction" a n1an wants to go. He notes, however, that the
liberal would be displeased if people did not go toward "vast numbers,
n1aterial complexity, 1noral unifonnity, and econo1nic interdependence"
and he himself tried to turn the111 in that direction. 60 Santayana contended that the liberal becon1es the refom1er who believes he knows
what is best and right and allows no other authority to challenge him.
The paradox of conten1porary liberalisn1, as foreseen by Santayana, is
that it professes a faith in a "Will" which cannot allow any other source
of authority, but at the san1e tirne denies the legiti1nacy of traditional
institutions and beliefs in society. That is, the liberal is content with
pluralisn1 so long as it does not challenge \.vhat he believes IS best and
right. In the liberal scherne, the Institutions of society are usually the
culprits inhibiting the just society.
Santayana, a Harvard University professor of philosophy, said that a
knowledge of the past, the arts, and hu1nan lin1itations were essential
to produce proper individualisn1. The ind1vidualisn1 of n1ass society, he
argued, is a false individuahsn1 ba()ed only upon economic incentives.
Despite Santayana' critique of hberalisn1, he stood against many traditional values associated with conservatisn1. He criticized conservatives
for "quashing free love" under linuts of ''vo\V " or "age" or "sex." He
was also an atheist In religious belief. 61
The Progressive Moven1ent \.Vas urban and n1iddle-class; the traditions
and values of rural and snull-to\vn An1erica vvere scorned as backward
and antiden1ocratic. In the n11ddle of all this "progress" a number of
southerners vigorously defended their region. These included the selfstyled "Agrarians," an1ong then1 Allen Tate, Robert Penn Warren, and
John Crowe Ranson1. The Agrarians, several of whon1 taught at Vanderbilt University, denounced the corrosive effects of technology and modernism on the South. In I'll Take My Stand (1930) they asked their fellow
southerners to take pride in the past and reject the onslaught of industrialism. The wellsprings of culture they argued, were local, and they resented "culture poured in from the top. " 62

The Libertarians
Both Albert J. Nock (1870- 1945) and H. L. Mencken (1880-1956)
contributed to conservative thought in An1erica. Mencken had what
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Ronald Lora calls a conservative "view of history." He did not trust man
in "engineering a society compatible with human welfare." 63 Mencken
was critical of small-town values, and his philosophical base was more
libertarian than conservative. Likewise Nock feared the threat of the
state to the exercise of liberty. His book, Our Enemy the State, was a
biting critique of the growth of government. "If we look beneath the
surface of our public affairs," he maintained, "we can discern one fundamental fact, namely: a great redistribution of power between society
and the State. " 64 Nock was an individualist who rejected any right of
government to direct human affairs.
While Nock and Mencken held conservative views about government power, being wary of state planning, and desiring laissez-faire economics, they clearly differed from traditional conservatism on important
basic beliefs. Nock opposed the traditional conservative desire for order
and held views of individual rights at odds with conservative views about
responsibility to society. Mencken hated small-town, rural America, and
once declared that the farmer did not belong to the human race and the
South was ruled by "Baptist and Methodist barbarism. " 65
What explains the glaring differences in the thought of these two men
from that of traditional conservatism? Authoritarian conservatism begins
with basic conservative beliefs-order, distrust of change, belief in traditional values-and branches in the direction of favoring state power to
protect these beliefs. Libertarianism has an entirely different set of core
beliefs which are based upon nineteenth-century liberalism. Those beliefs subordinate the order of a community to the desire for individuality
and stress personal rights over personal responsibilities. Libertarians
move away from state power to secure maximum liberty for the individual. Authoritarian conservatives are like traditional conservatives in their
belief in established values, while libertarians are like traditional conservatives in their desire for limited government. Traditional conservatives
and libertarians, however, differ in the degree of their belief in limited
government. Libertarians are extreme in their opposition to state power
while traditional conservatives are more moderate in their opposition.
Traditional conservatives are much more likely to accept some state
power than are libertarians.
Russell Kirk, in an article entitled "Libertarians: Chirping Sectaries,"
identifies practical areas where the libertarians' basic beliefs are opposed
by traditional conservatives. He notes that libertarians want to reduce
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the power of the state in all areas, including defense and police power. 66
Because of their belief in "moral freedom" for the individual, libertarians
see no problem with abortion. A true libertarian is not genuinely a conservative, as Kirk writes, although some conservatives n1ay use the name
libertarian without full knowledge of its n1eaning. Indeed, libertarians
see man as basically good-he needs to be free to achieve his goodnesswhich is a belief of Rousseau and con1pletely contrary to traditional
conservative canons. 67

Miscellaneous Conservatit;e Critics
The profound accornplishn1ents ofWestem civilization are the then1e
of Agnes Repplier (1855-1950). Few writers could n1atch her insight
into the nature of the differences between liberalistn and conservatisn1. A
writer and critic over several decades, Reppher observed, "The sanguine
assurance that n1en and nations can be legislated into goodness, that pressure from without is equivalent to 1noral change frorn \Vithin, needs a
strong backing of inexpenence. " 68 Repplier was not in1pressed with the
hopes of the new century and <>aw the protnises of socialisrn as ernpty.
Willian1 Graha1n Sun1ner (1840- 191 0) \Vas a contributor to the conservative cause who defied easy classification. Sun1ner was a disciple of
Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer. Spencer had introduced the concept of evolution into political and social speculations, and held that the
same basic law of growth and evolution pervaded the physical, anin1al
and hun1an worlds. For hi1n , the state should not promote religion, regulate trade and commerce, encourage colonization, aid the poor, or enforce sanitary conditions. Sun1ner defended the free n1arket from the
perspective of individual liberty. He opposed interference by the government in the economy. He liked neither the welfare state nor the
elitist state controlled by large corporations. 69

Conclusion: The Middle Era
The Progressive Moven1ent, with its en1phasis on governmental reform and pluralis1n, represents a nadir for conservative thought. Particularly in the early years of the century, urbanization and immigration
issues minimized the appeal of conservative solutions. Yet, there were
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some noteworthy changes occurred in this rime period that are still being
felt today.
First, the era produced two new typec; of conservatives, the hun1anists,
who accepted imperfect ideals, and the libertarians, who embraced individualisnl. Second, the rise of libertarian thought Increased the tension
between traditional conservatives and libertarians. Thtrd, the era produced some first-rate, 1flonely, voicec; In defense of conservatisn1. More,
Godkin, Mencken and Babbitt \Vere ~1ble to conunand the attention
of intellectuals and ebtec; Interested In dtfferent c;olut1ons to Arnerican
problen1s. Fourth, rnuch of the wnting of the era was a reaction to the
ascendance of bberahsn1 and progre stve tdeac;. The Adan1s brother and
Godkin, to take just t\vo exan1ples, \Vere clearly \Vntlng as critics of the
new values In society- ec;peCially the value of accepting governn1ent
solutions to social problernc;.

The Modern Era: The New Deal to the Present
Industrialization follo\vtng the Civil War brought a n1ajor change in
American conservarisn1. Conservatives etnbraced Lusc;ez-faire econonlics, believing that an econon11c systen1 that operated free of government
control was the only suitable alternative for Arnenca. In short, conservatism became the ideology of the ncltlon's business clas ' and its views
were dominant during the 1920s. But the Great l)epre s1on of the 1930s
ended America's romance With conservatistn. It brought about the election of Franklin Roosevelt and the beginning of the Nevv Deal with its
numerous state welfare progran1s.
Conservative values becarne inappropriate as the support for government intervention in society increased through the New Deal, Fair Deal,
New Frontier and Great Society. As the national government began to
intervene in n1any areas previously left to local con1n1unities and as liberalism became an accepted part of An1erican life, conservatives responded
with ideas critical of government policies. Gradually, as cracks appeared
in the liberal assumptions guiding government expansion, conservative
writers gained a wider and, by 1980, very substantial audience. The
principal voices came from five types of conservatives: (1) traditionalists;
(2) economic conservatives; (3) anticon1n1unist conservatives; (4) neoconservatives; and (5) classical conservatives.
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Traditional Consen,ati11es
The best known and n1ost Influential of the traditionalists are Russell
Kirk and Peter Viereck, who pioneered the ree1nergence of traditional
conservative thought. Kirk IS one of the 1nost, 1f not the n1ost, prolific
writers of the 111oden1 era. Much of the kno\vledge of conservative
thought is traceable to his pen. l-Ie IS the author of son1e t\vent:y books,
several edited JOUrnals, and nun1erou" JOUrnal arttcleli. Trad1t1onal conservatisn1 as defined by Ktrk bknch econotntc, pohttcal, rehg:tous, and
social conservattlinL
George H. Na<:..h sav<:.. of Ktrk's The Consematiuc .\!111d that "here, at
long last, vvas ;l geneologv of good n1en and valuable thoughts. " 70 The
in1portance of Kirk's book LHH10t be overestirnated; It 15 no\v in its
seventh edition and ha.., ..,en ed a.., a gut de for nuxnerous con<:..ervative
writers and co1nn1entators. One of the n1a1n task. f.1ci ng con ... en·.lti:-;n1 's
adherents dunng the decline of con..,erv.ltive thought \Va to den1onstr.1te
a viable tradttion in An1enc.1n poltttcll histol) .1 . . an alternative vi -ion to
a cendant hberal 1de.1s. Ktrk dtd tht.., 111 .1 convmCing way. 7 1
I~ussell Kirk IS a true traditiorul con.serv.1ttve. He tr.1ce.s the root.., of
con ervative thought to Ednnmd Burkt: and generally agrees \\ tth Burke
on the fundan1entals of con<:..en'.ltisnL I nduded .1n1ong hts tenets .ue opposition to pohncal centrahz.1t1on, the bchef th.lt d1 v1ne Intent rule\ society, a distn1st of change, and the defcn5e of pnvate property. .,
Peter Viereck, although not agreetng \Vlth Ktrk on all pomts, mu ... t
generally be classtfied as a trachnonah t .1s \vdl. H1s de\Jre tor tr.1d1tton.1l
values, en1phas1 on the need for education to "lin11t the 1nsnncts of
behavior," and trong anticon1I11UI1I\t ..,t.1nd tn,nk hin1 \Ylth the traditiOnalist label. 71 Viereck's Conscruatism Rer,zsited (1949) \Va one of the t\\ o
or three n1ost 1n1portant consen'atlve books that <:..parked rene\ved Interest in conservat1sn1.
Where son1e conservatives part con1pany \Vith VIereck 1s 1n his attitude toward liberalisn1. While son1e conservatives would vie\v liberal
thought as dangerously near con1n1unisn1, Viereck believe that conservatives and liberals should unite, despite their in1portant difference ,
against radicalisn1-defined as con1n1unisn1 and fascisn1. 7 1 Mutual selfprotection and a co1nn1on agreen1ent on the principles and procedures
of American governn1ent pron1pt this proffered alliance.
Viereck also leans toward the liberal view of governn1ent social action
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and speaks harshly of laissez-faire econon1ics. He contends there is "no
substantial n1oral objection'' to being against laissez-faire economics; he
believes that hun1an co1npassion is a higher goal than the preference of
n1ore to less. The problen1, as Viereck sees it, con1es when "reforms
cross a line beyond vvh1ch \velfare lavvs are inflated into the welfare
superstate. " 75 His acceptance of aspects of the \velf:1re state has resulted
in criticisn1 ofViereck by son1e conservatives, but his ideas have had an
important in1pact on postvvar con ervatisn1. A conten1porary writer who
shares Viereck's ideas about the \velfare state is George F. Will. In Statecraft as Soulcrajt Will argues that a certain an1ount of welfare is necessary
for creating and 1naintaining social ham1ony and social stability. 76
Perhaps Viereck's crittque of 1nodem conscrvatisn1 is his most interesting contribution, or at least the one that sparkc; the n1ost resistance. In
an additional section of the 1962 edition of Conscn,atism Revisited, he
clain1s that the n1ajor problen1 of the conten1porary conservative movement is a "rootless nostalgJa for roots," and a "drean1 of aristocratic,
agrarian restoration." Modern conservatives. he argue·, have "stereotyped" rather than "organically gro\vn '' values. He also blasts "Old
Guard Republicans" as well as Russell Kirk and Barry Goldwater. Viereck is angered by conservatives who n1ake people "feel ashan1ed of generous social in1pulses"; he is critical of Kirk for failing to oppose
McCarthyisn1 and judges Gold\vater as an "enen1y of social reform. " 78
The National Review, founded by Williaxn F. Buckley, Jr., has published articles over the years by abnost every leading conservative regardless of type, including son1e with libertarian econon1ic tendencies, such
as Frank Meyer and Frank Chodorov. While Buckley n1ay be more
properly classified as a traditional conservative, his n1agazine has served
the interests of trying to unite traditional, economic (including libertarian), and anticomn1unist conservatives. Frank Meyer probably became
the leading proponent of such an alliance when he published his book
The Conservative Mainstream in 1969.
As for Buckley himself, he has written on an array of conservative
subjects that cross the traditionalist, economic, and anticommunist tendencies. For example, upon graduation from Yale he wrote God and Man
at Yale: The Superstitutions of Academic Freedom (1951). He said the "philosophy of free enterprise, private property, and limited government"
was "dying at Yale, and without a fight." Buckley also lamented the loss
of Yale's original concern with religious beliefs, as evidenced by the
1
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book's title. This, his first book, set the c;tage for n1ost of his long list of
books on conservatisn1. 79
Buckley has becon1e a fixture on television and the An1erican cultural
landscape through hts artJcles tn the National R£ t iew and his weekly television show "Firing Line." Hts greatest serv1Ce to con<;crvatisn1 has been
orchestrating a ntnnber of bnllant but diverse n11nds 1nto a coherent
chorus of pohtlcal Ideas: "Through the force of his personality and his
ability to find a \vorkablc center, Buckley helped to hold the n1ovctnent
together and \Veld It into .1 fonnidablc 1nAuence in the national debate. "~ 0

Economrc Conseruati11cs
Since pubbcat1on of r=nednch A. von Hayek's The Road to crfdonr
(1944), econon11c con~erv,lt!ves have also lud Internal disagreetnent-;.
Although pubhshed u1 Great Britain, Hayek's book received little attention because the "question of frccdo1n versus planning" \Vas already
resolved there. Uut 1n the United tares, it :-~p.1rked t,rre. t interest s1nce
enthusiasn1 for govcn1n1ent interventiOn in the econon1v \\ J\ the centr.1l
issue of pohttcal thsc.our;e. I-hs thesis that "pbnning leads to dictatorship" stirred tnuch Intere t and .1rouscd con~:~tderable ~:~upport in the
United States."
Hayek 1s one of a host of economist.;, a...,so<.i.1ted \Vith the "Au . . tnan
School" of econotnic thought. Proponents of this school of thought
usually c1te Lud\vlg von fv1I.;es (1 H81-l973) .1 .... a prophetic figure in their
thinking. The Austrian\ hold that the econorny is not .1 n1achine \Vith
predictable n1ov1ng parts, but a host of Ind1v1du.lls rnaking choices in
n1arkets of uncertainty. They critique Keynesian econonnc by arguing
that no centralized governnH?nt bureaucracy can h<n·e sufficient kno\vledge to regulate the econon1y. Mt"e" \vas also a finn proponent of the
gold standard and a stable n1oney supplv.
Whether or not Hayek \Vas a hbertarian, like n1any in the Austrian
School, is still debated, but the n1ove1nent h1s writing helped start could
not avoid the debate about ho\v f..1r the conservative econon1ic position
should be taken. The n1ore n1oder.1te conservative economic posttion i
illustrated in the writings of such individuals as Milton Friedtnan and
George Gilder. 82 Unlike the n1ore radical libertarians, Friedn1an and
Gilder do not advocate the general cessation of govemrnent Involve~
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ment in the econon1y. l~ather, their argutnents concern the types of
progran1s and policies that should be tnaintained. Friedrnan and the Chicago School of econotnists are n1onetansts in econotnic policy. While
they oppose tnany governtnent progran1s, their opposition is not necessarily to governn1ent progran1s per se.
The libertarian n1ove1nent O\ves sotne post\var respectability to Murray Rothbard, \vho criticized traditional conservatives for thetr rnoderate
stands on con1n1unisn1. l~othbard advocated radical libertarian positions
like private police departn1ents and a pnv,lte national defense as well as
legalization of tnarijuana and abolition of VICt11nle"'s cnn1es. Rothbard
took the position that "the U m ted States \vas )Olely at f.1ult In the Cold
War, and R.uss1a \Vas the aggriev~d partY. "H

Atzticommunisr Conscrua t iucs
Anticon1n1unist conscrvatisn1 deserves tnention here becau e of the
significant role it played 1r1 the revival of conservative thought in the
early 1980s. Many of the anticon1n1untst conservatives had actually been
comn1un1sts or con1111Unist-syn1patluzcr\, but turned frotn con1n1unisrn
when it produced the terror of Joscph Stalin tnstead of a more perfect
society. For exan1ple, Jllnes Bun1han1 broke \VIth the Trotskyites and
wrote The StrHc.(!J!.Ie for the f,Vorld (1954), 'Tire Comin.R Defeat of Communism
(1950), and Containment or Libcratio11 (1953).
One of the n1ost itnportant anttcon1n1un1st conservatives \vas Whittaker Chatnbers, who was an editor \Vith Time n1agaztne. Chan1bers had
dropped out of Colutnbia University before graduating to becon1e a
radical, so1netin1es ron1antic social refonner. He joined the Comn1unist
Party and becarne an underground agent. When news of the Stalin
purges surfaced, Chan1bers turned Into ,1 governn1ent witness to nan1e
comn1unist spies. His test1n1ony that State l)epartnlent official Alger Hiss
was a comn1unist helped lead to the conviction of Hiss and the polarization of the nation as to the extent of con1n1unist involvernent in Atnerican affairs. President Trun1an and Secretary of State Dean Acheson
supported Hiss, while an array of conservatives supported Chatnbers.
Chambers's book Witness (1952) becarne the principal rallying cry of
anticon1munist conservatives. Peter Viereck also contributed to the
anticommunist literature with his Shame and Glory of Intellectuals (1953),
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which indicted pron1inent thinkers for recogniztng the Nazi danger but
ignoring the con1n1unist threat.
The Senate con1111ittee hearings chaired by Joseph McCarthy greatly
affected conservatisn1, In son1e ways polariztng the n1oven1ent with reference to different values. Wil1ian1 F. Buckley, Jr. and L. Brent Bozell
supported McCarthy tn 1\fcCarthy and Hi~ Enemie5 (1954), but Peter
Viereck satd McCarthy atdcd con1n1untsn1 by the n1anner of his attacks.
Wilhan1 A. l~usher said the liberals used McCarthy as the target of a
counterattack for the Htss case, but Will Herberg asserted that McCarthy's actions vvere those of "trre~ponstble tnass-den1occ1cy. " 8 ' Despite
McCarthy and the diVISIOn he c1used, n1ost conservatives generally
united in thetr oppos1t1on to con1tnumsn1 and its associated fon11s of
socialist policy.

Neoconscn,atism
The baste charactensttc of those \Vho br.1nd then1selves as neoconservatives IS thctr e,1rher belief in ltber.1l policies and even their support for
con1n1untsn1. Daniel Patrick Movnihan. ,1 neoconservative, stated in a
speech before the nation.1l board of Atnericans for Den1ocr.1tic Action
in 1967 that "Ltberals n1ust see n1ore cle.1rlv' that thetr essential Interest
is in the stability of the social order" and n1U'\t "divest then1seh-es of the
notion that the natton ... cu1 be run fron1 agenCie~ In Washtngton. "H:,
Other neoconservcltlves Include D.lniel Bell. Nathan Glazer. Jan1es Q.
Wilson, and Ed\vard Banfield. Perh.1ps the best-kno\vn neocon~ervat1ve
is Irving Knstol. \vho, \Vlth Daniel Uell. founded the highly regarded
neoconservative JOurnal, The P11hl/( Interest.
Russell Kirk considers neocon'-lervattvel\ to be conserv.lttves, but tnany
neoconservatives reject the bbel. While they have trachnonal con~erva
tive values, son1e neoconservatives still have old liberal ties. lrvtng Kri tol, to take the best-kno\vn exatnple, supports censorship to n1a1ntain
the quality of life in society. 8 (' He praises the laissez-faire idea of the
Wealth of Nations because with the necessity of property ownership, "hberty [is] practically inevitable. " 87 Knstol also criticizes the State l)epartment for not placing a prin1ary itnportance upon protecting the national
interest and speaks against the way the United States has allowed itself
to be "blackmailed" by other countries. 88 The neoconservatives have
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given a distinct and in1portant critique of Arnerican intellectual and social life.

Classical Conservatives
Although they hold n1any of the sarne beliefs as traditional conservatives, classical conservative' look to a chfferent traditton as the fountainhead of Western culture. Leo Strauss (1 899-1973) \vas the best-known
proponent of c1assical conservatisn1, finc:l tng the values for culture in the
writings of Plato and Anstotle. At the Urnverc;tty of Chicago Strauss
taught n1any students the classical or ':>trausstan fonn of conservat1sn1.
Strauss's affection for classical Gret: k pohncal phdosophy \vas the distinctive characteric;t1c of hrs \vork. The \Vritings of the anctents always
sought to discover the right \vay of life. 1 he search for the good or best
society based on tndtvidual character, "on rnent, on hun1an excellence,
on 'virtue' " \Vas the n1ost laudable a<.;pcc t of Plato's \vriting. 8') Unlike
the modern phtlosophtes of Marxisrn and even hberahsn1, classical philosophy never accepted that evtl could be eradicated fron1 the face of
the earth, so its n1ood \\aS one of an acceptance of reality as it pre ented
itself.
Eric Voegelin (1901-19H5) \Vas another stgruficant figure \vho found
serious problems with the way pobtrcs \Va~ betng studted at the end of
the twentieth century. In his cla sic \VOrk The [\leu' cience of Policies,
Voegelin showed the inadequacy of the positivtst doctrines of the discipline.90 He presented an alternative vte\v of the study of politics in his
multivolume work Order a11d Histoty 'Jl
Voegelin develops a theory of n1an as transcendental, that is, n1an 's
humanity is defined by a love of and loyalty to transcendental values.
For Voegelin, man's fundan1ental existence n1ay be known fron1 within.
Any atten1pt to confine knowledge to an externaliztng perspective-to
step outside existence and conten1plate it with neutrality as n1odern political science atte1npts- falsifies both knowledge and the reality known.
Man is inevitably a limited knower and he can never know things with
certainty; his only confidence con1es from faith-the trust that reality
as a whole is transcendentally ordered. Voegelin's constant appeal is to
experience, because hun1an experience is the only sure reality.
In Voegelin's writings human beings constantly long for what they
cannot have, something beyond the finite: "This is the experience that
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Voegehn c.1lls the tenston of existence, a state of tending or longing
tovv.1rd \Vhat ltes be) ond all the itnperfections of lirnited existence, beyond knowledge of p.lrtic ulars to\vard the tn1e a~ such, beyond particular
enjoytnents toward the good ,1s such. " 9 ., M.1n 's desire for certainty is
understandable, but his .lttr.lC t1on to utoptas which offer certainty or
even a calculable probability of certainty ts dangerous. In Voegelin 's
thought, f.11th, hope, and love are as basic to kno\ving as reason . The
<;ean h for kno\vledge is really an t: nrichn1ent of the soul as it surrenders
and h11ves Itself to the love of God.
The n1~lJOr unport.ulCe of Voegelin's contribution is hi~ articulation of
theoretical pnncipks .1nd his fr.llllC\Vork for ~ tudying politics. In 1nany
\vay\ he defie" political classific.Hion \till, his attraction to order. transcendence, and the li1nits of 111,111 1nake him .1 futH.i:11nental con. ervative
scholar.

Conclusion: The 1\ lodcm

E111

In a book-len~th biblio~raphy of t\tneric.1n con~erv.lttve thought.
Gresron
Wolfe li~t fiftv con~trvatives of the n1odern c.:r.1. 93 \ . hile cero
tatnlv not an exhaustive list. Wolfe s is .u1 instructive list. ontent analvs1s of Wolfe\ verv brief biogr.1phical statt: tnenc c1bout the fifty
conservatl\ es ) tdds the tollo\ving conclu ion"
Ftr)t, tracbtlotul conservatives constitute b\ t~1r the large...,t bloc \Vith
t\Vellty-etght proponent" Econotnic con~ervatives con...,tttute the next
large...,t bloc \\ tth ten. Anttcon1n1unist conservatt\ e" ,ue next \Vith \IX.
Neocon~ervattves and cl.bstcal con~erv.lttves ntunber three each. Of
the~e fift\, alinost all have etther an .1c.1den11c or a JOUnl.lh\tlC background. Within thetr acadetnic backgroutH.h. the dt\CiplirH~..., represented
are econon11cs, Engh . . h. ht...,torv, philo...,ophv. political science, Jnd sonology. T\velve tnetnbers of the list .1re fanner conlnHHltsts. "ocialt...,h. or
strong syn1path1zers \Vlth a leftist c1use
The ideas of tradttton and continuit\' ,1s \vdl .1s rehgtous .luthont\ are
in1portant to all these \Vnters. ~c.lttered .1n1ong the ltst are a stgn1ficant
nun1ber of H..on1an Catholics: Ore"te\ Bro\vnson, \vho \Vas a pron11nent
conservative trl the years before the Ctvil War, and rnore recent tl11nkers
like R.ussdl Kirk, Frank Meyer, and Willtnoore Kendall. There are .1ho
a nun1ber of protninent Jews assoct,lted \Vtth conservat1sn1, espeCially
atnong the neoconservatives, \Vlth Irving Kristol, Nathan Glazer and
J

,

J
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Norman Podhoretz being perhap the best-known examples. Three individuals on the list represent the southern tradition. Generally omitted
from Wolfe's biographical sun11naries are persons of the evangelical or
conservative Protestant background. This is understandable, since only
in recent years has n1uch effort been nude to articulate a conservative
political position an1ong this group of Protestants.
Second, of the five groups of conservatives we have discussed in the
n1odem era, three repre<;ent ne\v additions to the evolution of conservative thought. They are the antlcon1n1unist, classical, and neoconservative
categories. Such additions reflect the f:1ct that conservatisn1 is not a stagnant body of beliefs, divorced fron1 culture and the infusion of new
blood. The triun1ph of conservative pohncians In the 1980s shows that
the past ren1ains a v1 brant guide to the future.
Third, conservatisn1, like n1ost n1oven1ent , produces ten ions. In the
tnodem era, there have been )everal 1111portant clashes: ( 1) whether libertarianisn1 or son1e part of It n1:1y rightfully be considered as a legitimate
part of the Atnerican conservative tradition: (2) \Vhether Senator McCarthy's tactics should be defended by the conservative rnovement; (3)
whether neoconservatisn1 should be mcorporated Into the conservative
tradition; and (4) \vhether sotne portion of the \velf:1re tate should be
justified on the grounds that it enhances octal hannony and societal
stability even though it also Increases the role of govemtnent in society.
Fourth, within the tnodern conservative tradition, it i. probably safe
to say that the anticon1n1un1 t elernent is no longer as strong as it once
was, and that the evangelical and conservative Protestant cornponent is
not as strong as it will becon1e. In recent years, there has emerged a
populist conservatisrn of Protestants and Cathohcs united in their views
of n1orality, school prayer, and abortion. The n1ore radical libertarian
mode of conservatisn1 has n1oved outside the nuinstrean1 of conservatism, while the 1nore n1oderate libertarians have ren1ained within it.
Conservatisn1 began outside the n1ainstrean1 of An1erican thought
during the modern era. While it very successfully penetrated public consciousness in the political reahn, it still remains outside the mainstream
of academic and scholarly thought. Conservatisn1 has developed its own
publishing houses, magazines, and scholarly journals to compensate for
being left out of mainstrean1 publications. Gregory Wolfe lists sixty conservative journals and periodicals, most of which have come into existence during the modern era. 94
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Conclusion
Conservatisn1 played a major role during the founding period of the
country. The Federalist en1phasis on the sanctity of private property and
distn1st of unchecked popular rule gave rise to the two-party systein.
With the expansion of the frontier and the adn1ission of new states to the
union, strong den1ocratic and populist forces resulted 1n an expandtng
electorate which, in tun1, led to a retreat fron1 conc;,ervative tdeals.
The Civil War divorced southen1 tradtttonahsts fron1 the tnainc;trearn
of American intellectual life , but the 1ndustnal revolution gave nse to
the popularity of conservative tdcas like latc;scz-f:un: econotnics, indtvtdualism, and social Darwinio;n1. Conservatives tdenttfied \Vith the govemn1ent role to promote a he<1lthy econon11c environxnent for n1arket
exchanges during the tin1e of \Vl'St\vard expansion. Urban in1n1igranon
gave rise to a growing hberal n1oven1ent of soC1al and economic refonn
known as progres ivisrn. Progressive ..,upported goven11nent progran1s
to ease the problen1s of mdustn.lhzatton, while conservatives fc1vored a
restricted role for governtnent.
Progressives achieved their IlltlJOr succe.:;ses 111 the early part of the
twentieth century. Laisscz-f:·ure econon11cs \\as aga1n don11nant dunng
the 1920s, but the Great Depresston ended the dorninJnce of con ... ervatism. Roosevelt's Ne\v De.1l took the concerns of populists and probrre5sives a tep further than they had ever unag1ned. In the post\var era
conservatisn1 was characterized more by it anncon1n1un1st rhetoric than
its economic agenda. The ratnpant inflation of the 1970s led to a d1stn1 t
of established liberal solutions. R.onald R.eJgan \V,l\ the first genuinely
conservative president since the 1920s.
The conservatisn1 of the recent era 1s no longer u<;piciou of the
masses. It accepts son1e governn1ent role 111 the econorny a· inevitable,
but it still stresses private solutions and a <;trong defense policy. Con ervatives believe there should be reduced govemn1ent spending on sooal
programs, revamped tax policies to encourage econon1ic growth, and
limited action by govemn1ent to redress racial and gender inequalitie .
The stress of conservatistn is the creation, not redistribution, of wealth.
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SIX

The CompetinC Conservative
Traditions 1n America
All at Otla', nothitl<{! seemed certain i11 the mot•cmcnt,· c~( the
spl1crcs. . . At the hcS;?innin.c.? cif the 1920s the belief h<:s;m1
to rirmlatc, fiH tlzcjirst wnc at a populm let cl, tl11lt there were
no lotl.{?Cr flll}' absolutes: c?.f time and spare, t{{!ood and cr11"/.
of knowlcl{(!c, abot•e all cift•tzlllc.
Pt\Ul JC II

T

SON

he begtnning of t\\ cntieth-century thinking, according to Paul
Johnson in hi-; book 1\!odcm Ti111cs, i~ found in the phra~e "everything IS relative and there are no absolutes." Albert Einstein's principle
of relativity held that "the tot<1lity of phy . . t<..ll pheno1nena 1~ of such a
character that 1t gtve'\ no ba\1\ for the Introduction of the concept of
'absolute n1ot1on'; or, c;,horter but lee;.., pn..·u . . e: There Is no absolute rnotion. " 2 Frotn Einstein\ prenu . . e It \\ .1s .1rgucd tlut good .1nd ev1L nght
and \vrong, and trad1t1on.ll nottons ot n1oral beh.1v1or ''ere a, rebtive
and subject to Interpret.ltiOn a'\ the expan . . e of the physicll umverse.
While Ein tein hunselfbeheYed pass1on.1teh m ab . . olute nght and \\Tong
an d detested the n1oral relatn I\111 .lttnbuted to his theory, the legacy
of his scientific research \va-; that "alue should ch.1nge to fit cultural
conventions. 3
Soon the ideals of relativity becan1e a part of everyday life. Popularizers mistakenly took the "relat1v1ty" of space, tirne and length 111 the
natural realm, for "relativisn1" in n1oral la\V. The nineteenth century
witnessed the clin1ax of the Judeo-Chn tian philo ophy of per anal resp o nsibility-that each individual vva accountable for their action . In
the twentieth century the individual conscience \vas eared; existential
angst and personal despair characterized thinktng and the state began to
swallow up the independence of the person.
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The earlier confidence in tnan vanished on twentieth-century battlefields. Barbara Tuchn1an, in her book The Grms ~f August, describes a
poet in Belgiun1 who, before 1914, vVa<; a dedicated socialist and humanitarian, one whose artistic work ain1ed at erasing national differences in
Europe. After witnessing the carnage of \Varin his native land, he prefaced his next volun1e of ver<;e \Vith the<ie '\VOrds: "He '\vho writes this
book in which hate IS not htdden \Va~ fonnerly a pacifist ... for hin1 no
disillusionn1ent was ever greater or n1ore sudden ... he dedicates these
pages with en1otion, to the n1an he used to be.'' 1 The poignant testinlony of this poet capture<; the n1ood of an ent1re generation, vvho witnessed conferences on universal dtsann ~unent only to later see nations
rnobilize n1ore than 58 tnillion troops for battle. T\ventieth-century
hopelessnes could be dedic,lted- like the verse of the Belgian poet-to
the ideals that used to be.
With the en1ergence of n1ass destntction, the role of politiCs and behavior by the state exp.1nded, and a corresponding ~lith in the Individual
diminic;;hed. In the t\ventieth century the follo\ving beliefs gatned n1uch
currency: (1) that n1an evolved fron1 aninlals through natural processes;
(2) that there IS no God; (3) that governtnental authonty nuy in1pose its
will on the Individual; and (4) that there is no absolute nght and wrong.
Alexander Solzhenitsyn in hts Harvard University conu11encen1ent address said, "The West kept advanct ng sooally In accordance with its
proclaimed intentions. And all of a sudden It found itself in its present
state of weakness." The past was ignored, and the n1ention of ab clute
values stamped one as uninfon11ed about the n1odern sttuation. Solzhenitsyn attributed the new thtnktng to the liberal ethtc, with its faith in
reason and change. He tndtcted It for undennin1ng proven traditional
values in three significant ways.
First, an excess of freedon1 that has led to hutnan decadence and irresponsibility, Including pornography and violence, is undennining such
institutions as the family, home, school, neighborhood, and conu11unity
upon which a democratic society depends for stability. Second, Solzhenitsyn argued, the demise of An1erican den1ocracy has occurred gradually;
reformers and government officials erroneously think that refonning
economic, political, and social systen1s and governn1ent policies will
stem the tide of decay. Third, the early den1ocracies, such as An1erica,
were based upon a religious value-n1an's accountability and responsibility to God-which has been largely forgotten in recent years. 6
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The unbounded den1ands of welfare-state liberahsn1 led to a freedom
fron1 the restraints of con1n1un1ty, a halhnark of conservat1ve society and
the glue that held assoCiatiOn<; together through fatnlly, neighborhood,
and church. Western culture began \Vlth the tdea that each Individual
in the society \vould lunit hi<; own behavior through the understood
convention<; and restraint<; of conunun1ty. The law alone dtd not restrain
people; rather, nlcinber..,htp in society n1eant that all understood \vhat
could and could not be done. But \Vith the loss of a serious tnoral basis
for society, the en1phas1s shtfted to a preoccupation with nghts and a
dirn1nutton of responstbtlit1es
Again<;t the thtnkmg of the ne\v age, conservatives call for an intin1ate
kno\vledge of the past. The tradition of conservat1sn1 ts a re1ninder that
the roots of a soe1ery nourish it~ vision of the future. Ko nation can
retain a sen<.e of direction or kno\v ho\v ~u along the road tt has traveled
\Vithout ren1etnbenng \Vhere it h,l<; been. The conflict in the West today
ts bet\veen the tr.1ditional Judco-Christian heritage and the secular
po\ver of the nc\v t~1ith in sciL·n ·e .1nd n1aterialtsn1. between a beltef in
God and one 1n nwn. The schisn1 toda\ ts bet\veen t\vo Irreconcilable
'
conception" of n1an ,1s a creature n1.1dc: in the 11nage of hi\ Crc:ator or an
independent per"'onality tr.1pped 111 ti1ne ,1nd "Pclce; bct\\·cen unity and
reason In the costnos and chaos ruled by chance; and bet\veen a governn1ent ruled by establt,hed values or one in J constant state of revtston to
fit changing tunes.
No better exan1ple of the clash bet\veen liberal tde.lh n1 and the conservative tradition t\ to be found than in the .1bortton debate, \Vhich
galvanized the nation in the dec.1de of the 1980s. Liberals tnatntatned
that the freedon1 and right of th~ n1other to choose \vhether or not to
have an abortion ts fundatnental. I:teason, advance In n1ed1cal science,
and the prospect of utoptan £u11ily planntng underbe their ca e for Individual choice. Conservatives, rooted tn the rehgiou tradit1ons of the
past, decry what they constder to be the casual approach to exuahty and
the disregard for hutnan hfe in1plicit in the abortion decision. The li1nits
of social planning and the acceptance of a dtvine order to things are the
basis of their argutnents against abortion. All the utopian ideals and real
world difficulties of 1nodern liberalisn1 are in evidence in the abortion
discussion. For conservatives, an increase in child abuse, a deterioration
in family stability, and the spread of disease are the legacy of the ne-vv
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sexual license, a calan1ity created in the nan1e of in1proving family relations.
In this chapter we revie\v the evidence for the conservative commitnlent to absolutes in the Inidst of relative thinking. The religious, political, and econornic traditions of conser-vatl n1 are exan1ined. Con1mon to
all of these traditions is a con1n1itn1ent to truth<; about n1an's condition
and nature, be it the picture of 1nan as revealed 1n Scriptures or the
desire of nun for 1natenal ga1n a) seen 1n classical econotnic texts.

The Conservative Political Tradition
Christian 1deas about n1an. c;ocH~ ty, and divnH~ Intent are basic for conservative thought. Con ervatives behev<..'. \Vith the Founders, that govemn1ent is at best a neces ary ev1l- and one rH~cessarily restrained by the
Constitution. But the vle\v of 1ninirnal )t~1te Interference presupposes
that n1en are elf-controlling, n1or.1l betnt,7$. In the t\ventieth century
self-restraint has been in short supply. In 1ts ~1xtieth ann1vcrsary issue, the
editors of Time n1agaz1nc charact<..'nzcd the years )ince its founding in
1923 in ten11s of one value, frcedo1n: "An1cnca \Vas not 1nerely free; it
was freed, unshackled . . . to be free \V.l\ to be n1odern~ to be modem
was to take chances ... behind n1ost of these events lay the assun1ption,
aln1ost a rnoraltn1perat1ve, that \vhat \Vac; not free ought to be free, that
limits were intrinsic.11ly cvtl. " ~
Accon1panying this expenincntation \vas a great politicization of
thinking. Higher truths and traditional authonties over n1en decreased
in i1nportance, and in their place political questions were increasingly
resolved by governn1ental bodies. Today, An1ericans are inundated by
politics; hardly a news iten1 appears that is not subject to government
inquiry. When every problen1 becon1es political, the state is the only
body available to find solutions. Conservatives always point out that
An1erica was founded on a desire to litnit centralized political power.
The colonists fought for their independence fron1 onerous taxes and
government interference under the banner "Don't Tread on Me." In
their view, politics was a problen1, not a solution.
There is a direct parentage between the American religious tradition
and the conservative political legacy. First, a biblical view of the nature
of man helped determine the type of govemtnent the Founders estab-
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lished, one litnited by the checks and balancec; of power an1ong the
several branches of governn1ent and one that protected the individual
fron1 the capnnous exerCise of governn1ental po\ver through the Bill of
Rights. Their dtstnist of rnan 's nature led to the creation of a governI11ent in which the people d1rectly elected only the n1en1bers of the
House ofReprcsentat1ves, \\itth the Serute, the courts, and the president
being indirectly selected by other bodtes. Sun1n1an71ng this relationship
between a conservative religious tr.1d1tion and the functioning of Anlerican governn1ent, Alexts de Tocqucvtllc sa1d:
The greatest part of British Amenc.1 wc~s peopled by men. who having
<;haken off the .Iuthority of the Pope. acknowledged no other religious
supremacy. They brought wtth them into the
ew World a fonn of
ChnstJamty \\ hich I cannot better describe than by ~ryling it a democratic
and republt<..an rdigion . 9

The strong en1phas1s on "the Fall of n1,1n" underscored the fact that
every person \vas tndeed a sinner, .1nd th.H check. and balance \vere
needed to restrau1 those in po\ver.
Second, l.n\ and legal precedents \Ver<..' r<..'quired to be in .1ccordance
with the rules gtven in criptures. In the I eclarJtion of Independence,
the phrase ''the la\VIi of nature" \V,1S not .1 reference to the untver\e but
to the d1vine Lnv of God. In eighteenth-century England and An1enc.1,
this phrase enjoyed a cle.u .1nd consistent n1l'.1ning. It referred to the
n1ajesry and \\Ill of God .1s reve.1led 1r1 the natural order of creation.
Even John Locke, often ctted bY hber.1ls .1s a key philosopher for the
An1erican expenence, decl.lrcd in h1"' ,cwnd Trcnttse on Gouem111e11t:
"Thus the law of nature st.uH.h ,1\ an eternal rule of alln1en, legt l.1tors as
well as others. The rule" that they rnake for other n1en 's actions, n1ust
... be confonnable to the law of nature, t.l'., to the \Vlll of God ... . " 1
In 1695, Locke \Vrote 1n h1s treatise The Rubolwhlencs_, of Chn.stinnity as
Defmed in Tize Scriptures that "As Chnstians \Ve h,1ve J e us the Mes tah
for our king, and are under the hnv revealed by Hin1 in the Gospel.'' 11
William Blackstone, author of Commentaries on the Lati'S of Englmzd,
which was the single n1ost popular influence on the foundation of the
American legal systen1 and required reading by all student of the la\v
throughout n1uch of American history, said: ''As nnn depends absolutely
upon his Maker for everything, it is necessary that he should at all points
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confonn to his Maker'c; \vill." Blackstone carefully differentiated natural
law fron1 the la\v of nature by stattng, "The revealed law is of inftnitely
n1ore authority than \vhat \Ve gener~dly call the nclturallaw. Because one
is the la\v of nature, expre\sly declared to be by God hin1self; the other
is only what, by the ,lc;c;istancc of hun1an rcac;on. \Ve inugine to be that
1a\v. "I">In writing the I)cclaration of Independence, Jefferc;on and others forn1ulated their ca e on tnithc;, \VhH:h \Vcn: unch,lngtng and in1n1utable
because they can1e fron1 the CrcJtor h1111\clf: "We hold these truths to
be self-evtdent that Jll n1cn .1re cre.1ted equaL that they are endo\ved by
thetr CreJtor \Vith certain inalienable rights . . . . " Man\ nghtc; do not
con1e fro1n n1an. but tron1 Cod, and they are unchangeable. Man does
not depend upon goven1n1ent for the staten1ent of rights, but for securing then1. Tht:> purpose of goYcn1n1ent, fron1 a conc;ervative point of
\·ie\V, 1\ to protect God's ordained right . ri hts IS rd1ected in the l)eclaratiOn 'c; c;tatctnent, ''That to ecurc thec;e rights govcrmnent~ are Instituted
an1ong rnen .... " The rights of n1an are pritnary, and the govern1nents
instituted to ~ec ure those rights are -..ecorH.bry.
Third, the tdea of CO\ enant, borrowed fron1 the con ervanve religious
tradition, figured pron11nently in the role ot \Vntten la\V\ and agreetnents
binding n1en together 111 solen1n J\\en1bh·. The Mayflo\ver Con1pact,
for exatnple, reads: "We ... do by Pre-..ents, sole1nnly and n1utually In
the Presence of God and one another, covenant and cotnbine ourselves
together Into a ctvil Uody Politick.'' Go\·erntnent\ were to en1body the
concept of a people covenanting under God to estabhsh a govemn1ent
answerable to God and Hts la\v. Political scienn t l)aniel Elazar has concluded that:
1

The consotut10ns of the Ainerican states m the founding era were perhaps
the greatest products of the A1nencan covenant traditlOn .... The creation
of new states, even new towns, across the Umted tates throughout the
19th century reflected the covenantmg impulse.
For An1encans, covenant provided a means for a free people to fonn
political con1Inunit1es without sacnftcing their essential freedom and
without tnaking energetic government possible. 13

In the J udeo-Christian tradition a constitution was a solemn agreement between parties, a reflection of the divine covenant God made
with his people throughout history.
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Fourth, the Constitution created a fon11 of governn1ent that moderates the rate of change. The conservative beheves that n1eaningful
change is only possible Within the bounds of extsttng tnstttutions. Edn1und Burke wrote, "A state \Vithout the tneans of on1e change is without the n1eans of its conservation." 11 Change is necessary to conserve
the essence of soctety's tradtttons and foundations, but raptd change or
change which occurs outside of established tnstitutions threatens stability
and the continuity of trad1t1on.
The fact that change 1s not easy under the provisions of the Axnencan
Constitution is one of the rea~ons hberals are fntstrated by tt. Rexford
Guy Tugwell, a Ne\v l)eal econonust and prc<ildenttal advtser, once satd,
"The intention of the etghteenth- and nmeteenth-century la\v \Vas to
install and protect the pnnctple of conAict." Tu~vcll suggested 111 the
1930s that large-scale bus1 ness enterpnses be federally mcorporated and
directed by a tnpartite bod\' ofbustness, l.lbor. and consun1ers. He \\·ould
later say of the delay 1n achtevtng hts econon11c refon11 th.lt "Organization for these purposes \VJs \cry ineffiCient because they \Vere not ackno-vvledged Intentions. Much of the L1gbring reluctance \Vas O\ved to
the constantly reiterated tntentton that \Vhat \vas betng done \\as tn pursuit of the anns of the Constltutton." l (J
For econon1ic, pohncal, and sOCic1l change to be tnade \Vlthtn the
boundaries of the Constttunon, nun1erous hurdles n1ust be elect red. The
decision-n1ak1ng rules 1n the docUinent protect nunonties at n1any
points by creating a con1pltcated set of restr~11nts on quiCk .tenon by the
majority. For exan1ple, a n11nonty of one-third plus one c.an prevent an
a1nendn1ent frotn being proposed tn etther hou~;,e of the Congres and a
n1inority of one-fourth plus one can prevent the necessary three-fourths
of the states fron1 ratifying a constitutional <11nendn1ent. Only one of
four units of the national governtnent- House. Senate, Supretne Court,
and President-was a popularly elected body or person tn the original
draft of the Constitution. Even no\v, \Vlth d1rect popular election of
both the House and Senate, the doctrine of ·eparation of po\vers effectively precludes quick action on n1ost legi lation.
The doctrine of clivi ion of powers and It cotnplex allocation of povvers between the national and state governtnents allo\vs for the national
government to exercise son1e powers exclusively, the states to retain
some exclusively, and both to retain son1e con1n1only. Throughout
American political history, a heated debate has occurred bet\veen nation-
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alists and states rightists about the boundary line between the respective
powers of the national and state govemtnents.
Collectively, these constitutional doctnnes and concepts of govemn1ent lead to two central conclusiOn\ about econon1ic, political, and
c;ocial change: (1) coinplexity and diver<;Ity 111 the dee1sion-n1aking process make it difficult to achieve change quickly: and (2) a n1ultiplicity of
decision-n1akers at the n,1t1onal and state levels of governn1ent, including
local govemn1ent, ditnintsh opportunities for humed change. Hi<>torically, incren1entalisn1 or graduahsn1 is the pattern of An1erican econoinic, pohncal, and soctal change.
The pohttcal landsc1pe ts littered \Vith the debris of popular cn1sades
that \Vere unable to con1plete the obstacle cour'e of po\ver In the Arnerican polittcal sy\ten1. The Equal H. tghts AnH~ndn1ent \Vas quickly proposed by ovef\vheln11ng In:l_)ontJe~ in both houses of Congre s and
appeared to be heading tor qUJck r.ltification bv three-fourths of the state
legislatures. but 1t \\'as stytnied by one-fourth of the state legtslatures,
which fa1led to ratify. President Franklin J). R.OO\evdt chafed under the
checks the Suprerne Court placed on the centerpieces of his Ne\v Deal
prograrns. President l~onald I~eagan proposed legislation and constitutional an1endn1ents that never a\v the light of day becauc;e of the ntunerous congressional checks that preclude ha\ty action. Ironically, his
conservative social and econotnic .1gencb had to be filtered through a
conservative systern of restraint and entn:nched Interests that led to defeat at n1any points along the \vay.
Change under a systen1 of dtvided governn1ent ts difficult to achieve.
During his tenure In Washington, R.cxford G. Tugvvell helped devise
an indirect way of speeding up the process; his proposal allowed for
constitutional reinterpretation \Vithout arnending the Constitution.
Conservatives opposed such revisrons, holding that It is Incun1bent upon
the Supren1e Court to detennine the onginal intent of the Founders
with regard to an issue. Failure to do so n1eans that there is no constitution in the true sense, since new n1eanings are constantly being poured
into the tnold of old words, creating new powers and new rights. San1
Ervin, fom1er senator fron1 North Carolina, once said, "Everyone will
concede that the Constitution is written in words. If these words have
no fixed n1eaning, they n1ake the Constitution confom1 to Mark
Twain's description of the dictionary ... 'a wonderful vocabulary, but
no plot., , 17
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The n1ajor change in redefining the n1eaning of the Constitution
began during the New Deal. Justice Felix Frankfurter, for exan1ple, said
that words in the Constitution are "so restricted by their intrinsic n1eaning or by their history or by tradition or by pnor decisions that they
leave the individual justice free, if indeed they do not con1pel him, to
gather n1eaning not fro1n reading the Constitution but fron1 reading
life. " 18 Justice Oliver Wendell Holn1es said n1uch the same thing:
"When we are deahng \Vith words that also are a constituent act, like
the Constitution of the United tates, we n1ust realize that they have
called into life a being the developn1ent of \vhich could not have been
foreseen by the n1ost gifted of begetters." 1' 1 Thts reasomng led to substantial changes In con tltutional interpretation, altering or revising the
national govemtnent to foster more rapid econonuc, politicaL and social
change.
Gradually the tenns 111 the onc;;tttution assun1ed a relative n1eaning
characteristic of tvventJeth-centuf) thought. In 1936, the upren1e
Court declared that the "general \\ clf:1re '' clause of Arncle I, Section 8
pennitted Congress to .1ppropnate funds for JUst about any purpose It
chose ·without regard to lu111tattons on Congress found 111 the Constltution.20 In 1937, ''interstate con1n1erce" 111 Article I. ection 8 \Vas redefined a anything that substantially arTect~ the Ao\v of inter tate business,
regardless of \Vhether it cros">e"' state line'\ . ., 1 In 1942, the Court held that
the national govermnent could regulJte a product even if the producer
did not intend to sell 1t, becau">e the product could st1ll affect interstate
con1n1erce. 22 More recently, the cbuses of the 14th A1nendn1ent guaranteeing ''equal protection of the la\v~" and "due proces of la\v" have
been used to establish national regul.ltlon m n1atters dealing \Vith education and crin1inal la\v. For over one hundred ~eventy-five year , the)e
subjects were within the jurisdiction of the states, but through the actions of the court, without constitutional an1endn1ent, and through reinterpretation of the clauses, the national governrnent acquired significant
power over these issues.
The fear that a powerful national governn1ent would don1inate constituent state governtnents and increase its pov.,rer relative to them -vvas
apparent in The Federalist Papers. J a1nes Madison wrote:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. The fanner will be exercised principally on
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external objeCt'\, as war, peace, negotiation, and foretgn corntnerce, with
which last the po·w er of taxatwn will, for the n1ost part, be connected.
The powers resetTed to the several states will extend to all the objects
wh1ch, m the ordinary cour<~e of aft:1Ir5, concen1 the ltvec;;, hbert1es, and
properties of the people and the mten1al order, 1mprove1nent, and prospenty of the state . .,,

Madison's assurances not\vithstanding, the po\ver of the national governn1ent has outstnpped the ongtnal n1old established tn the Constitution. The Intention~ of the Founders have been reinterpreted.
Structurally. An1encan govt:rntnent retains n1ost of tts cono;,ervative features and tendenCJes that ob. truct r.1pid change. Conceptually, ho\vever,
key constitutional doctrint:s ha\ e bet:n reinterpreted \Vtthout constitutional atnendtnent: the subsequent change<; have been dran1atic. The
conservative political tradJ tton 1s rooted in mdtYtdual responsibility, best
sun1n1arized by Sanutel Eliot Morison:
Puritanism was a cutting edge which hewed liberty. democracy, hlllnanitarianism. and univers. 1 educ.uion our of the black forest of feudal Europe
and the American wildernes .
Puritan doctrine taught each person to constder himself a signtficant, if
smful, unit to whom God has givt:n .1 partie ular place and duty, and that
he must help h1s fellow n1en .
Puntamsm IS an An1l.·rican heritage to be grateful for and not to be
sneered at because 1t requ1red everyone to attend dtvme worship and
rnamtamed a stnct code of mor.ll ethtcs .., ,

The conservative political tradition relies on a .;;et of fixed rules written in the Constitutlon and on the hearts of its c1t1zens. The pohtical
institutions operate w1th1n fixed para1neters: the ten11s of the original
agreement cannot be altered to suit changing circun1stances.

The Conservative Economic Tradition
The conservative econon1ic thought of today was known in the last
century as either "laissez-faire" econon1ics, classical econon1ics or economic liberalisrn. Its central pren1ise, which was an innovation in a time
of powerful nation-states, was a bias against the state. The publication of
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John Locke's Second Treatise if Civil Government in 1690 introduced a
theory of the state whtch substituted constitutionalisin and lin1ited governinent for absolute n1le and arbitrary po\ver. In Locke's state of nature,
individuals were endo\ved With rights that denve frotn natural law; collectively these rights were called "property" rights. The Lockean definition of property exceeds the purely econon1ic 11phere, and extends to
the whole orbit of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." It is to
enjoy this "property" that people Inutually contract to Institute a govemn1ent.
For Locke, the legitin1ate po\vers of governn1ent \Vere derived fron1
that portion of a c1ti1en 's natural right" \vhich \verl' l'ntru\ted to Jt<; care,
and its functions \Vere regulated by the rights retained by the cittzens.
The scope of state actiVIty 11hould be confined to the hn11t~ set by the
con1n1unity; if the state pas~e~~ out of bounds it becon1cs an Invader of a
dotnain vvhere It has no nght to enter. In Locke·~ treatise, only the
people have ngbts: ''The governn1cnt as tru tee has only dunes, \Vh1ch
are defined by the tntcn~sts of the trustor .1nd beneficiary, (i.e .. the people) and not by those of the tn1o;,tee (i.e., the goven1111ent). " 2 "
The next step in the proce s of ec..onotnic thought and lin11ted goven1ment was taken by a French o;,chool c.1lled the: "Phystocrats." Their philosophy advocated econon11c and polit1c.1l govc:rnance "u1 keeping \vlth
the laws 1n1planted 1n Nature by Prov1dence." The Phy)tocrat \vere
influential in France dunng the 1760 ,1nd 1770.... For then1 the prosperity of agriculture \Vas the pnn1c Indicator of national \\'ealth, and the
interests of lando\vners overrode tho-,e of tnerchants. The chool'11 key
postulate was that only the product1vc cla-.s culnvanng the bnd produced
a net product: "Expansion of the econotny .1nd the population therefore
depended upon expansion of the expenditure of the productive class and
the resultant expansion of the net product," (i.e., prosperity in agriculture). 26 The Physiocrats \Van ted to curb the influence of the tate and
limit it within boundanes that left the agranan ccono1ny to the operation
of "nature." Their specific cry of protest to the state was ''Laissezfaire''-leave us alone.
The final flowering of classical econon1ic principle took place in Britain and the United States in the last quarter of the eighteenth century
and the early part of the nineteenth century. Adan1 Srnith's ~Vealth of
Nations, published in 1776, set in n1otion a generation of work by English writers and econon1ists like David Ricardo (Principles of Political
I
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Economy (1917)) and T.

l~. Malthus. The pem1anent contribution of this

cholarship \va to be found In Its general picture of ho\v a social order
can best function.
What \vas thi picture? The classical econon1Ic n1odel depicted the
individual as the tnH~ unit, and society a<.; the arnfietal aggregate of individuals In .1SSOCiation. If all Indivtdu.lls des1re their self-Interest and each
per on 1s the best judge of the rneans .1ppropnate to the goal of n1aterial
enrichtnent, It follo\vS that the larger the sphere of action left to the
initiative of pnvatc per\Ons the better. Indivtduals pursuing rnaterial ennchinent reap the be'lt re\\ :trds for then1selves and for society as a \Vhole.
If the econon1IC sy ten1 \\'ere left to oper:tte on Its O\Vn, the Interplay
of con1pkx, hun1an exchange forces \Vould be 111 .1ccordance \VIth et,
hannontous natur.1l Lnvs. Certain of these \Vere based on psychological
assun1pt1ons of univer :tl hunun egotsnl .1nd the operation of physical
factors rooted in nature. The anah sis of the11e la\V'I \VIth their absolute
'
Inferences about huinan behavior fonned the subst:tnce of econon1ic
sc1ence.
Where cbd the state fit into thi.., order of thinking? CLlssical econon1ic
theory :tssuined a dichototny bet\veen nature, \Vith tts O\Vn la\VS of supply and den1and, and the artificial or rnan-rnade la\\.., of the state. Natural
la\VS \Verc good; h lllnan Ia\\' '"ere hannful. The only beneftcial state
policy \vas one that enlarged the sphere of pnvate enterprise, which \vas
alwaY'.; deeincd supenor to the pu bite enterprise. In tlCt, classical theory
placed on the ~tate the onus of pro\lng that its functions \Vere justified.
There \vas a distinct bias against the state.
Though the classical cconon1Ists asptred to be \Clcnttfic and Independent of the particular soetal and pohtical circun1st.1nces of their tin1e,
serious depressions in the English econon1y had the practical effect of
discrediting their assutnptions. The behef that the natural order was inherently sin1ple, harn1ontous, benefiCient, and devoid of ethical attributes was challenged by evtdence of social and class tensions. Behind the
wall of "leave us alone," laisse7-faire industrialists in Btitain and the
United States during the nineteenth century used underpaid, overworked, and underfed n1anpower in f.1ctones, n1ines, railroads, and other
workplaces. This fact did not escape the notice of Karl Marx, who criticized capitabsn1 and the industrialized econon1ies for their en1phasis on
surplus accun1ulation over consun1ption and n1isallocation of wealth.
The critique of Marxist economics and state interference in the econ-
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on1y was acco1nplished by a group of Gennan econon1ist<; who collectively becan1e known as the " Austnan School." They expanded upon
the classical assu1nptions to n1ake then1 appropnate for industnal capitalisnl. The Austrians analyzed the origtn and usefulness of 1noney, concluding that its value is in hclpmg to detern1me the d1stnbut1on of scarce
goods an1ong con1pet1ng uses. unply put, people use n1oney to n1ake
choice about \vhat thev \V,lnt. Spnng1ng fron1 this analysis in the 1870s
i the logic of cho1ce , or the "econon11c calculus" of 1nodern econon1ic
theory.
It was just su ch a theory \vhich proved that Marxist econonues could
not calculate econon1icallv, lacking as they d1d ,1 true price systen1 based
on private owner h1p of produced goods. " It follO\\"S that sociahsn1 cannot successfully plan and ope r.lte a n1odern industnal econon1y," \vrote
Ludwig von Mt se<~ 1n h1s 1922 cnt1que of 'IOC1Jhsn1 entitled ocialis111:
An Ecotzomic and ono/ogtca! Jl naly.\1-' . l'vhses\ Insights and theones \VerL'
gradually used to articulate a consi'Itent vte\v of political econonry \vhich
held that nothing \vas to be g.11ned fron1 variou" types of govemznent
intervention m the econon1y. In opposition to the doctrine<:.. of l3ntish
econotnist John Maynard Keyne . \vho .1rgued that 1t \V,lS necessary for
social and poht1cal reasons tor governnKnt to n1aintain full e1nployn1ent
and preve nt extren1e fluctuations in the business cycle. M1'-~es held th,lt
such interventiOn \vas un\\ ork.1ble. The disuplc" of the Austnan school
emerged in the t\ventieth century J'\ the n1ost c.on~ 1 tent, uncon1pron11sing defenders of la1 sez-f.11re.
In the United tclte the art-,rtlnlent for n1inin1al go\·ermnent interference in the econozny 1s ea rn ed b) the "public choice" school, of \vhonl
1986 Nobel Prize winner jan1es Buch,1nan 1s a lead1ng proponent. Thts
theory sees econonuc cho ices 111 the context of politics, \Vtth speclcll
interest groups donunating the legJ.Idative process of the \\·elf.1re state and
politicians responding to their reque ts \Vtth accon1n1od.1t1ng legislation.
Since the 1930s, the n1odern detnocratic state ha h,1d an egalitanan
impulse. Politicians seek reelection by n1akmg political calculations in
accordance with a set of preferences destgned to grant f.1vors to so1ne
groups while denying special treattnent to others.
Central to conservative econon1ic theory s1nce the eighteenth century
is the value of the individual in the n1arketplace. Such an actor n1akes
consistent choices to b etter hin1self; such a person behaves rationally
within a consistent value systen1. In econon1ic parlance, other things
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being equal, people ahvays prefer n1ore to less. The conservative economic position is that the state should not interfere \Vith individual freedom to n1ake decisions.

The Conservative Religious Tradition
Political scientist Kenneth W. Thon1pson has \Vntten that central to
An1erica's founding and history IS a reltgiou<; tradition:
At the core of [America\] foundin~ .md history is <l moral and pohttcal
trad1t1on representing \\hat W,lltt:r Lippm.mn h,1s called "the forgotten
foundat10ns of democracy." But if the tt1undations have been forgotten,
they have never been lost ... as tht: brilliant columnist James Reston has
pomted out, ''The hbt:rties which Jll the spokt:-..men ... talk about defendmg today, after all. were est.1blished by that rt:markable group of eighteenth century An1erican political leader-; who took their con(epnon of
man fi·om the central religious tradition of Western civtbzauon. " '

Fron1 the colonial period to the recent past, the Christian faith \vas
the greatest single influence on Atnerican public In\tltutlons and daily
life. Sociologist I~obert N. Bellah ha, \vntten, "The Btble \vas the one
book that literate Anu~ncans in the 17th, 1Hth, and 19th centuries could
be expected to know \veil. . . . Bibhc.1l 11nagery provided the basic
fraine\vork for iinaginative thought In An1enca up until quite recent
tin1es and, unconsCiously, Its control Is \ttll fon111d.1ble. " 2s
No\vhere was the grip of Chnst1an 111orahty n1ore apparent than in
the conception of the nature of n1an held by the original founders of the
American republic. After acknowledging that religion had a pervasive
influence on the Constitution, Atnencan political historian Richard
Hofstadter concludes that the Founderc; adhered to the conservative notion that n1an's nature was essentially evil:
To them a human being was an atom of self-interest. They did not believe
in man, but they did believe in the power of a good poli6cal constitution
to control hitn . . . . Fron1 a humanistic standpoint there is a serious dilemma in the philosophy of the Fathers, which denves fron1 their conception of tnan. They thought 1nan was a creature of rapacious self-interest,
yet they wanted him to be free-free, 1n essence, to contend to engage in
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an urnptred 'itnfe. . . They had no hope and they offered none for any
ultunate orgamc change 111 the way men conduct themselvec;. The result
wa that while they thought self-interest the most dangerous and unbreakable qualtty of man, they necec;sanly underwrote it in trying to control it. 2 '~

Hofc;tadter's concluc;ton" are substantiated b¥ an e.xatnination of the
vie\vs of hll!nan nature held by the founders. Junes Madison spoke of
the "degree of depravtt) in mankind \vhich requ1rec; a certain degree of
c1rcun1spectton and distrust," the "cap nee and \Vtckedness of n1an," and
the "1nfinn1tH.~~ and depr.1vitics ofhlllnan character. " 30 John Jay sa1d tnan
\Vas goven1ed by "d1ct.1tes of per~on.1l interest," \vhile Alexander Hanlilton c;poke of the "follv and \Vickedness of tnankind. '' 3 1 Even Thonns
Jefferson bcheYed 111 the nether stde of htunan nature \vhcn he \vrote.
"Free governtnent is founded on Jealousy. not in confidence; 1t 1s Jealousy and not confidence \vhich prescribes litnited constitutions, to b1nd
tho~e \Ye clre oblig.lted to trust \Vith pO\Ver. In questtOT1\ of po\ver, let
no n1ore be he.1rd of conticknce in nun but bmd hnn do\vn to rnischief
by the chau1" of the constitution. " "' 2
The Judeo-Chnsnan conception of n1an 1-.. that he is a creature \Vith a
dual nature, part bea"t .1nd part angel. J'vt1n \\a\ cast bY God 1n Hts
itnage, yet fell into sm 111 the rebel how. \Vish to be ".l~ God." As a re\ult
rnan wa estranged fr0111 the ( reator .1nd forever destmed. to be ton1
bet\veen the dO\VIl\\ ard pull of hi-.. n1atenah\ttc, self-Indulgent, an1n1alself and his elev.1ted, creattve. and divine inuge. The object of education
was to in1prove n1an by extolling the value\ central to h1s better nature.
Michael Novak po1nts out that Harvard College, founded In 1636 to
tra1n n1inisters, adopted as one of the rule\ and precepts for students that
"everyone shall consider the n1a111 end of hts life and studies to kno\v
God and Jesus Chn t, ,,,. hich 1s eternal hfe." " Yale \V,lS constituted 1n
1701 in recognition of the f:1ct that the colonies had been establi hed
"both to plant and under the Divine Blessing to propagate in this wilderness, the blessed refom1ed Protestant religion, in the purity of its order
and worship, not only to their posterity, but also to the barbarous natives. " 34
The Christian influence pervaded early education, and its object was
the improven1ent of n1an. Alexis de Tocqueville, concluding that this
tradition was don1inant in Atnerican society, said, ''Religion exercises
J
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little influence upon the la\vs and upon the details of public opinion; but
it directs the custon1s of the con1n1unity, and by regulating don1estic life,
it regulates the state." h The ethic of the ti1ne e1nphasized service to a
higher end, a desire to give God your best and enrich the society as a
byproduct of such allegiance. De Tocqueville un1s up the experience
this vvay:
It was religion that ga\'C birth to the Fngh<~h colomes in Amenca. One
n1ust never forget that. In the Umted <)r.tte'l rchgwn ts nungled w1th all
the nanonal customs and all those feelmgs \\ hich the \\ ord evokes. For
that reason 1t h,1s pecu!J.u power.... Christianity ha" kept a strong hold
O\'er the minds of Americ.tns, .1nd . .. Its power 1s not Just that of a
ph1losophy which has been ex:muncd , nd .lcceptcd, but that of a rehgion
behe\'ed in without discussion. . . ( hnstl,Ultty itself is an cstabhshed and
1rrestst1ble fact which seeks not to .1tuck or dcfcnd. 36

The Founding

of a .\.arion

No\vhere 1~ the religiou~ in1perative cle,lrer than in the n1otivations of
those \Vho first founded the countrv and "let it . . \·tston for the future.r
'
Beginning \Vtth Queen Isabella's con1Ini"l"ltOn to Colun1bu , and continuing over sever,1l centurit:s, the evidence reinforces the religious basis
for colonization and exploration. Colun1bus recorded 1n his diary that
his purpose in finL"hng "undtscovered \Vorld~" \Vas to "bring the Gospel
of jesus Christ to the heathens.'' He \Vrote, ''It \Vas the Lord who put
into tny n11nd ... the f:1ct that it \Vould be possible to sail fron1 here to
the Indies ... I an1 the n1ost un\vorthy inner but I have cried out to
the Lord of grace and 111ercy, tlnd they have covered n1e con1pletely ...
no one should fear to undertake any task in the nan1e of the Saviour, if
it is just and if the intention is purely for H1s holy service. " 38
What follows is a recitation of dates and docu1nents which are largely,
if not entirely, ignored in rnodern scholarship and textbook writingbut which bear in11neasurably upon the establishn1ent of a conservative
religious heritage in An1erica. 19
1606. Kingjames I in the Virginia Charter dedicates the founding of
the colony "to the glory ofhis divine Majesty, in propagating the Christian religion to such people as yet live in ignorance of the true knowledge and worship of God .... ''
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1609. The second charter granted to Vtrginia states that "the pnnCipal
effect which \Ve can expect or destre of thts action is the conversion and
reduction of the people 111 those parts unto the tnte \vorshtp of God and
the Christian reltgton."
1620. The MayAO\\ er Con1p.1ct records the covenant "for the glory
of God and the advancen1cnt of the Christian fatth."
1629. The Ftr'>t Charter of M,l-;sachusetts states its intention that the
citizens ''nuie \\·ynn and incite thL' N.1tives of Countv to the Kno\vledg
and Obedience of the on lie true God ,1nd ~.1\'ior of M.1nkinde, and the
Christian Fayth .... "
1629. The tnlubitant.s o Exeter. Nt\V } Lllnpshire, "In the nan1e of
Chnst and 111 the stght of ,od, cotnbine ourselves together to erect and
set up atnong U"> ">llch goven1n1ent as sh.dl be, to our best dt\Ccrning.
agreeable to the \Vtll of God."
1638. The f-undan1ental Orders of onnecticut decl,ues that the peo-

ple entered ''u1to C01nbin.1tion .1nd Confeder.Hion togathcr to tnayntayne tlnd pn.'">l'.li'Vl' the liberty clnd purity of the Gospell of our Lord
Jesus, \Vhlch \\l' tJO\V profcsse ......
1644. The ch.1rter ot ~L·\v l-bven colony specifies " . . . that the
JUdiCial la\\s of God. as they \Vert delivered by !\ 1osL's ... be a n1le to
all the court'l 111 th1s jurisdiction .... "
1649. The M.1ryl.1nd Tolcr.uion Act .1nnounces th.1t .. o per~on or
persons \Vh.ltsoever \ ithin this province .. profe'>"ln~ to believe 111
J ec;us Chnst shall . . . hencl'forth be .111) \Vays troubled, rnole\ted (or
dic;approved of) . . . in respect of hi.s or her religion nor 111 the free
exerctse thereof ... "
1689. The Gre.lt L,l\\ of Pennsylv.1nia procL1in1'1, "Whereas the glory
of Aln1ighty God .1nd the good of n1ankind is the re.1son .1nd the end of
government ... therefore goven11nent Itself is a venerable orchnance of
God .... "
1752. Inscribed on the Ltberty Bell in Philadelphia are these \Vord
fron1 Leviticus 25:1 0, "Proclaun liberty through all the Llnd and to all
the inhabitants thereof."
1774. Meeting in Phtladelph1a, the Continental Congt·es authonzes
payn1ents to chaplains to open Its sessions \Vtth prayer.
177 6. In appointing a day of fc1st1ng and prayer, the Congress in1plores
that they might "by sincere repentance and an1endn1ent of life, appease
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God's righteous displeasure, and through the merits and mediation of
Jesus Christ, obtain His pardon and forgiveness."
1776. The Virginia Bill of Right() asserts that "It is the n1utual duty
of all to practice Chri tian forbearance, love and dignity towards each
other."
1777. T'venty thouc;and copie() of the Bible are authorized for purcha e by the Continental Congress because the don1estic supply was
short; the Congre s al o authonzes chaplains for the Continental Army.
17 82. The Congress recon1n1ends to the people "the Holy Bible as
printed by R.obert Aiken of Phdaddph1a' · as "a neat edition of the Holy
Scriptures for the use of '\Chools."
1 ~86. The VIrginia Statute of R.ehg1ou" Liberty declares that "Altnighty God hath created the n1ind free: that all atten1pts to influence it
by ten1poral pun1shn1ents or burckn\, or by civil incapacitations ... are
a departure fron1 the plan of the I Ioly Author of our relig1on .... "
17 87. The Northv.,·est Ordinance state\ that "No person, den1eaning
hirnself In a peaceable and orderly 1nanner, shall ever be Inolested on
account of h1s In ode of 'vorsh1pp1ng or rehgtous sentin1ents .... Religion, n1orahty, and kno,vledge betng nece()sary to good government and
the happiness of nunktnd, -.,chooh and the rne,1ns of education shall be
forever encouraged.''
17 88. Writing in Tlze Fedemli~t Papcn, Jatnes Madi on proclain1s that
"We have staked the future ... upon the capacity of each and all of us
to govern ourselves, to sustain ourselves, according to the Ten Cotntnandments of God."
1821. John Quincy Adan1s n1a1ntatns that "The highest glory of the
American Revolution \vas tlus: it connected, in one indissoluble bond,
the principles of civil governrnent with the principles of Christianity."
Adan1s also said, "Fron1 the day of the l)eclaration ... they (the Atnerican people) were bound by the laws of God, which they all, and by the
laws of The Gospel, which they nearly all, acknowledged as the rules of
their conduct."
1828. The first edition ofWebster's dictionary contains a large nun!ber of biblical definitions. Webster would subsequently write that "the
religion which has introduced civil liberty, is the religion of Christ and
his apostles . . . this is genuine Christianity, and to this we owe our
free constitutions of governn1ent ... the moral principles and precepts
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contained in the Scriptures ought to fonn the basis of all of our civil
constitutions and laws."
1836. In the fore\vord to the first edition of !'vfcGtiffey's Reader, wh1ch
sold 122 n1illion copies betvveen 1836 and 1920, McGuffey says, "The
Christian religion IS the reltgton of our country. Fron1 it are derived our
prevalent notions of the Character of God, the great n1oral governor of
the universe. On It doctrines are founded the peculiant1es of our free
.
.
.
,,
tnstltuttons.
1841. Alex1s de Tocquevdle \Vntes 111 Dc111ocracy in America that "J n
the United States of An1cnca the sovereign authonty 1s religious.'' He
also notes that "there IS no countrv, 1n the \vorld In \Vhich the Chn':Jtian
religion retains a greater influence over the souls of 1nen than in
An1erica."
1851. In hts Colltii!Cntanc<~ on the Constitutwn ~( tlzc United tate5, Supren1e Court Justtce Joseph ~ton st.ltes: "Probably ,lt the t1n1e of the
adoption of the Consntutton. and of the first atnendn1ent to It ... the
general if not the untver\,11 sentin1ent in Amenca \vac;, that Chnstlantty
ought to receive encouragetnent b) the state c;o f..1r as \Vas not mcon1patible with the pnvate nghts of consuence ,1nd the fi-eedon1 of religious
\vorship. Any atten1pt to level ,1l1 rehgtons . •1nd to n1.1ke It a n1atter of
state policy to hold all1n utter inditTerence, \VOtild have created un1ver-;al
disapprobation, If not univers,lltndignatton. ''
1892. In Church ~(the Holy Tn111ty u. {_ 1/ttcd tate5, the upre1ne Court
decides: "Our la\vS and our In ·tttutlon~ tnust necessanlv be based upon
and embody the teach1ngs of the R.edeen1er of tnankmd. It IS in1po s1ble
that it should be othenv1se; and 1n tht\ <;ense and to thtc; extent our
civilizat1on and our 1nstitut1ons are en1pluttc.1lly Chn t1.1n." The court
continues by saytng that "This is a religious people. This is hi toncally
true. From the discovery of this continent to the pre ent hour, there IS a
single voice tnaking this affin11at1on . .. \Ve find evef)'\vhere a clear
recognition of the satne truth ... th1s is a Chnstian natton."
This chronology of a Christian heritage, \vith its attendant absolute
moral code, reveals two things. First, the original cultural values en1phasized self-regulation and n1oral responsibilities rather than govemtnent
rights and freedon1s. There \Vas not, and could never be, a barrier between the Christian religious heritage and the practice of den1ocracy.
Instead, the founding of the new nation and its political institutions were
largely a result of the religious enterprise. Cultural practices stressed
1
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n1oral values in education, n1anner<i, and social behavior as being more
in1portant than governn1ental activity.
Christianity gave Atnencan culture the concept of the exalted individual, en1phasizing ahnost lunttless respect for hun1an beings but vvariness of society. The dignity and value of people was ensured by their
destiny, \vhich \Vas bestO\\ ed 111 creation and restored and refon11ed in
Christ. A Glenn Tinder has "ntten, "The nobthty granted in Christianity to even the n1ost degraded Inchviduah \\"Ould have been incomprehen Ible to the anoent Greeks," who ~nv the aun of all relationships
as the cultivation and sharing
.. of a virtuous life. The cultural value of the
exalted Individual n1eans that governn1ent n1ust treat people \Vith care.
13ecau e of the f.'lllen hutnan condition, the "just society" envisioned by
Plato and ~ubsequent philosopher~ is not realizable. Ideal utopias are
itnpossible, and "To pursue the H.-leal of perfect justice Is to Ignore our
fallenness .. , Chrisnantty. therefore, taught a sub tttute less pure but more
attamable _-tJ
Second. by past and present stand,lrd , the Christian culture \Vas exceptionally tolerant of 1ninorities and <.h sent. Countless unn1igrants
found a freedon1 fro111 per ecution on An1enc,1r1 shores \Vhich \vas unkno\vn in Europe. To be sure, there \Vas racial oppre'i ton and overt
discrin1ination. StilL the Christian consCience conden1ned the excesses
of slavery and \Vas responsibk for n1oderating and eventually elin1inating
that institution. In the con1n1unittes of the ne\V An1erica, fundan1ental
property and Citizenship nghts were available to all free Inen. The values
of Chnstian love and forebearance had a sooal reahty \Vhich often tolerated even the n1ost odious outrage.
Wnnng on this point, l:tabb1 Joshua 0. Habennan, fonner senior
rabbi of the Washington Hebrcvv Congregation of refon11ed J udaisn1 and
later vis1t1ng professor at Washington Theological Unton, offers several
conclusions rooted in the prenuse that An1erica's conservative religious
tradition is, and was, a safeguard fron1 the totalitarian1sn1 which he experienced as a young Jew in Vienna:
The suspension of the Bible's tnoral "barriers" has n1ade possible all the
atrocities of Hitler, Stalin and other totalitarian n1lers.
The veneration of the Scnptures as supren1e law, superior to the laws
of kings, potentates, or 111ag1strates, was the gen11 of the all-important
political philosophy- the very heart of our den1ocracy- which recognizes "a government of laws and not of n1en."

l'HE COMPETING CONShRVATIVE TRADITIONS

137

The B1ble 'gave our n.1tion its moral vision And todav, ' America's Bible
belt 1s ou1 safety belt, the enduring gu.1r.mtee of fundament.d rights and
fi·eedoms. ~~

The contribution Christianitv
, 1nade to the culture \Vas to set an absolute \t,lndard, a\Ide fron1 the den1ocratic nl;tiority, by \vhich the rights
and \"\TOnb" of govermnent could be judged. As R.abbi H,1bennan points
out, the buhvark ag.1inst tot.1lit.1ri:1nism i the absolute standards given in
the B1ble. While tnanv of tho e involved in the founding and developInent of the United ~tltts \Vere not believing Christians, they \Vere still
operating on the consensu
hri ti.1nity g,1ve to cultural values. The
effect of thetr \Vork \Vas to cre,ltc institutions \vhich reflected that conc;;en\U'\.
The tOI1'\ervative tradition cn1ph.1sizes ,1nd seeks to tnaintain this con\en\U"i Conservatives nl,l)' not .1grce .1bout ~pecitic religious doctrines,
but the\ \vould agree
that lnun.111 n.lture i constant and A.nvcd. There
.
are certain funda1nent.1l ,1spccts )f ,1 hunt, n being th,H .1re unchanging
and unch.u1ge.1bk rcg.1rdless of tin1e or pL1 c. Iv1odcrn 11\c:ln h.1 1nuch to
learn about hin1 elf fi-on1 the \Vritings of Plato. the confe sions of Augu'\tlne. and the values of hurchill. Bec.nt e conservatives belitve there
111 .1n objective n1oral or kr of re.1l, in1n1utable. and etern, 1 truths by
\Vl11c.h 111.111 nntst n1easure hi conduct. they oppose la\vs \Vhich lin1it or
rec;tnc.t the practice of the ... hristianity. 2

American Political 71u•olo.gy
The dtn1en'\tOn\ of liber.llis111 ~1nd conservatisn1 along ideolot,ric.ll and
theologtcal ltnes are '\hO\VIl in Figure n-1. The rebtionship bt.:t\Veen
rehgtous con\ Ic.tlon and political ideology is clearly seen in George MeGovern·~~ autobtographtcal book Cm~~roof.\:
The study of the'le men (Hegd .md M 1r.x) forced me to think senousl]
about the politJc,ll process, but neithe1 of them captured mv interest \\ 1th
anythmg approachmg the enthusi,lsm I e"Xpenenced 111 dtsCO\ enng "the
sonal gospel." Thts effort to find in the Ne\\ Testament and the Hebre\\
prophets an ethical tmperative for a just soual order strongly .1ppe.1led to
tne. To kno\v that long year" of £11nilianty \\ 1th the Btble .lnd the tde.lhsm
nurtured m my pubhc chool ye.1r" \\ere resources that I could dtrect to
hmnane pohttcal and economic ends \\as a satlsfytng dtsco\·en. Rebgwn
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\vas rnore than a search for personal s.1lvatton, more than an instantaneous
expresswn of God's grace; rt could be the esc;ennal moral underpinnmg
for a life devoted to the serYICe of one'c; tune. Indeed, one's own salvatron
depended upon servtce to others. 1 '

Figure 6-1 sho\vs ho\\ so1neone like fon11er enator Barry Goldwater
and Senator Robert l)ole could both be considered Ideologically conservative, but theologJ.cally liberal. Both con1e fron1 hberal, 1nainstrean1
Protestant backgrounds tn the Eptscop.ll and Methodist church es, respectively. Gold\vater openly oppo,ed the pohcy agenda of religious
groups \Vho so zealou<;ly supported R.onald R.eagan. Dole's 1988 can1paign for the R.epubhcan presidential non1tnat1on \\',lS dan1aged because
he did not cha1npton con'lervatlve religJOU'\ causes. George l3ush, unlike
his son George W. Bush, \vas out11ide the conservative religious orbit
until pragnntlc pohtlcll con~Iderations led hun to rnake peace w1th religiou conservatiVe'~ skeptical ofhis allegiance to their cause.
To develop Figure 6-1. each political per'lonality's background and
beliefs \vere con1pared to the liberal and conservative tde,ls in Figure
FIGLRJ.: 6-1
Theological and Political.t Ideological Relationships
Liberal
ldeolog)

Bill Clinton
Tom Daschlc
AI Gore
Jesse Jackson
Edward Kennedy
John F Kerry

John Anderson
Richard Gcphardt
Jo->cph I Lieberman
John Edward~
Mark Hatfield

Liberal
Theology

Conservative
Theology

George I I. W Bush
Dick Cheney
Robert Dole
Barry Goldwater
John McCain

John Ashcroft
William F. Buckley
George W. Bush
Ronald Reagan

Conservative
Ideology
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2-1 in Chapter Two. Personalities like Bill Clinton, Ton1 l)aschle, and
Al Gore cotne fron1 liberal backgrounds, both ideologically and theologically. Ed,vard M. Kennedy and Willian1 F. Buckley, Jr., illustrate the
contrast between R.otnan Catholics of liberal and conservative persuasions, both ideologically and theologtcally. Fon11er Senator Mark
Hatfield and 1980 presidential candidate John Anderson reflect a theologically conservative but tdeologically liberal perspective. Hatfield and
Anderson have advocated nun1erous liberal policy Initiatives in both donlestic and foreign affairs; Anderson even left the Republican Party m
1980 to run for president as an Independent, recetv1ng n1uch ofh1s support fron1 ideological hberal11, espeCially m the Je\vtsh con1n1umty. Yet
both of these n1en claitncd to be orthodox theologtcal conservatives.
Other politicians like John Ashcroft, George W. Bush, and Ronald
Reagan are con<;erv,ltlvc 1Tl both .1n tdcolog1cal and theologtcal enc;e.
One of President Jinllll)
Jrter\ prob1en1\ \vas h1s app.uent \vaffitng
atnong the quadrants on Ftgure 6-1. At one t11ne or another, he could
have been das Ified 1n all four quadrants. He catnpatgned for the nonlination as an ideolotPcal and theologtcal con crvanve, profes<;ing to be
"born agatn" and oppo ed to b1g govern111ent in Washington. But during his ad1nin1 tr.1t1on he pennitted liberal intere t groups acces to
power, lost public support \Vlth h1" tgtung of the PanJnla Canal treaty,
and failed to curtail the expan~1on of \vorld\vtde ov1et rnrlitary po\ver.
George Herbert Walker Bush ts in n1any \vay the eprton1e of con ervative nobles e oblige. Born of a Brahn11n t11ndy on the Ea t Coa t, he
attended the best schools and ~1tt,uned early \Vealth in the high-stake oil
business. His public ~ervice has been n1arked by a concern for results and
an unspoken acceptance of traditional value . In the 1988 presidential
election Bush \Vas e1nbanassed by the con tant que tioning of his religious beliefs. His political theology is classically liberal Epi copalian, but
in the crisis of the Iraq War Bush asked Billy Grahan1 to accon1pany hitn
to Can1p David for a prayer service. His conservative theology is reflected in his call for a Day of Prayer on the Sunday before Operation
Desert Storn1 was concluded.
So often the n1.istake is 1nade of looking at great events, n1oven1ents,
or personalities in isolation, failing to see then1 in context. Just as in a
symphony the prelude announces the 1nain 1noven1ent, so too in politics
religious debates foreshadow major events. Franklin D. Roosevelt's New
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Deal \Vas not ne\v, 1t only stated the pnnc1ples vvh1ch had been discussed,
debated, and decided everal decade" before the 1932 can1paign. The
Methodic;t Social Creed of 1908, for ex~unple, etnbodted n1any of the
Ne\v Deal's public policy pnnCiplec;, and 1t \Vas drafted when Roosevelt's
n1uch older nan1e<;ake \Vas '>tlll pre<;H.i ent. in1tlarly, R.onald Reagan's
conservatin~ agenda \\a' not ne\\, It n1erdy reflected the htc;torical developnlent of con en anve tde.ls, n1any of \Vhtch \Vere rooted In the
debates of Chnc;t1an denon1Inanonc; dunng the 1960 and 1970s.

Conclusion
In 1959 John Steinbeck \Vrotc a letter to Adlat Stevenson in \Vhich he
said that Anu~ncans \Vt: re str.1ngdy afflicted. "havtng too n1any things
they <;pend their hour' and n1oney on the couch \Carching for a soul. " 44
The essence of the An1encan conservative tradttton 1s that the soul is the
key to a redt\CO\Tf\' of An1crican uniqut nc..,c;. The nan on has a pecial
tradition \Vlth econornic, politicaL and n:li6'10US root\.
These tnparttte traditions do not conflict \VIth one another. The Bible
teaches a f.1llen n1an; econo1nic theory hold, that such a per on c;eeks
n1atenal gain \vhenever po,sible; and the poltttc.1l trad1non holds that
governn1ental po\ver should be divtded to protect agatnst the exploitation of the people by those in authority. Each of these conservative
pren1Ises substantiates the other t\vo , but the Ideas of rehg~on are n1ost
in1portant in defining the texture of a culture.
These traditions have been overlooked by 111ainstrean1 acaden1ia. 71ze
Tinus Literary SHpplement once latnented the entrusting of the GrecoRon1an, Judea-Christian inheritance to Intellectuals, because they were
prone to appeal to inlaginary utopias. "The survival of intellectual, indeed of sp1ntual and ethtcal activity IS dependent on a refusal to accept
political slogans that are not tested by the touchstone of historic experience. " 45 Paul Johnson is more pointed In his critique: "One of the principal lessons of our tragic century, which has seen so n1any n1illions
of innocent lives sacrificed in schen1es to itnprove the lot of humanity
is-beware [of] intellectuals. Not n1erely should they be kept well away
fron1 the levers of power, they should also be objects of particular suspicion when they seek to offer collective advice. " 46 It con1es as no surprise
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to discover that the ideas of conservatisn1 are disn1issed as unimportant
in n1uch of the acaden1i c literature.
While the conservative trad1t1on rernatns strong, its strength has been
weakened through efforts, beginning 1n the New J)eal , to dismiss the
religious base of the social order as unin1portant, redefine the meaning of
the Constitution, and assert that governn1ent guidance of the econon1y is
a desirable thing. Conservative soluti o ns to the dilen1n1as of n1odern
n1an tend to be anchored 111 absolute values and pnnCiples, and their
view of the future lacks the co1npelhng VISIOn of bberal rhetonc. Instead,
conservatives offer the past a<;, prologue to future problen1s and solutions.
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The Directions of Contemporary
American Conservatism
achicl'c_(rt!l cmpiO)'IIl<'llf and ,i!rcatcr economic
,(?Y<ltl 1tlt-if II 'C lwue c/tte ofgold a11ti alabaster-but ow
d11ldrcn ht11'C not /cawed ht>lll ft> fllalk i11 goodness.justicc awl
mere}'. then the American expclime11t, 110 mattct how gilded,
will hat •c_{cliled.
£(we
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I

n epternber of 1863 Abr.1h.1111 incoln dL·dicated a cen1etery in Gett)-..burg. Penns rlv.1nia, clnd .l ·ked: ,, .H1 thi-; llcltion, or clll)' nation so
conceived .tnd so dedicated. long endure?" Que tions .1bout the n:1tional
ch.1r.1cter lie at the he.lrt of the future ot the Arnerican e'\.perirnent.
Today, In any ob..,ervers believe that the nation's gre.Hest \Ve.lkneo.;se"\ are
1n the civic. cultural. .1nd n1or.d don1.1in \Vhere govermnent Is often
defiCient and un\vork.1ble. Jack Kemp has \VrittL'n: "A -..ociety that I'\
indifferent to its n1oral .1nd spiritu.1llife is indit1"l·rent to tts future. " 2
Wilhan1 Bennett, under the .ntspiCL's of the Heritage Foundation, releac;ed an "in de" of le.lthng
.. cui tural indicators," in 1993 It "\hO\'- ed that
Since 1960 there had been c1 5()() percent increa-;L' in VIolent crune, a
n1ore than 400 per(ent incre.1o.;e 111 illegitin1.1te birth.;,, a qu.1dn1pltng of
divorces, a tnphng of the percent.lgL' of children hnng 111 -..mgle-parent
hon1es, a rnore tlun 200 percent tncreao.;e In the teeruge suicide r.1te, and
a drop of seventy-five potnts tn the AT '\COre-.. of htgh school 'tudent .
The statiStic<; sho"\ved that 30 percent of all btrthc; n1 the Untted tatec;,
and 68 percent of Black births, \Vere In f.1therless hotnes.'
Public opinion confinns the cultural concerns sun1n1anzed by Bennett, with tnuch of the blatne attnbuted to governtnent. hartly before
the 1994 election .1 Tunec; Mtrror Center poll found that only 33 percent
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of the public believed that elected officials care about their beliefs, and
only -+ 1 percent believe govemn1ent benefits all of the people. Nearly
70 percent said that deahng \Vlth the federal bureaucracy wasn't worth
the trouble, and only 41 percent said govemtnent should help the
needy.·1 Paradoxes abound. The pubhc \Vants their fellow citizens to live
n1ore respon<\ibly but finds that the publtc <\chools f.-ul to teach children
right frotn \Vrong. ociety \ ant<; to stop the sptral of 11legitin1ate births
but recoils on leanung that school citspenc;,e condon1s n1ore than n1oral
advice. Polls sho\v An1encans \\'.111t la\\ and order, but the crin1inal justice systen1 regular!) releases violent cnn11nals to the streets.
What An1encans c;,een1 to \vant .1bove all el<\e IS CIVIC revitalization
grounded 1n the precept" of Inoraliry. A cultural n.?na1ssance n1ust con1e
fron1 local con1n1Unities, \Vhose strengths rest upon the pillars of f.1n1ily,
neighborhood, church, and synagogue. for conservatives the "tripod of
character, con1n1unttY .1nd culture'' ,1re central btnlding blocks of the
conservative \vorldvie\v. 5
Con ervatives behevc that governn1ent has It\ lin1itation and that
there are tnany thin~ in life n1ore unportant than politiC , an1ong then1
"religion, art, study, f.1tnily, fnends, tnus1c, fun, duty."& In the eyes of
An1erican conservatives, the,e Intennedt.1I) Institutions, which stand bet\veen the Citizen and h1. governn1ent, are the \VOtnb of culture. Government should leave \vell enough .1lone and let these institutions
nourish society.
Conservatisn1 suffered n1ass1ve defeats during the 1960s and 1970s
when governrnent progran1s began to Interfere \VIth the pillars of society's strength, dan1aging the coherence and cohesion of con1n1unity.
Events on public school and college can1puse dratnatically illustrate the
impact on these intennedtary institutions.
In 1983 a blue-ribbon govemn1ent cornn1iss1on studying the educational systen1 of the United States declared the country to be "a nation
at risk." At a tin1e when conservative values were acceptable on can1pus,
students were not studying the right subjects, working hard enough, or
learning enough. Schools suffered fron1 slack and uneven standards, with
teachers ill-prepared to teach even if their classroon1 n1aterials were adequate-and n1ost were not. "If an unfriendly foreign power had atten1pted to in1pose on An1erica the n1ediocre educational perfonnance
that exists today," the panel said, "we n1ight well have viewed it as an
act of war.' ' 7
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Campus unrest was not a response to conservative principles: they
were practically nonexistent atnong college faculties. Instead, the revolt
was a reaction to the fntstrated a<ipirations of New l)ealliberalisn1. Allan
Bloon1 \vrote about catnpus tum1otl that "universities were offering
then1 [students] every concession other than education .... They [were]
unified only in thetr relatiVISni and thetr allegtance to equality. "R The
traditional en1phas1s in Atnerican education on values and n1oral knowledge had din1inishcd to the vamc;hing point.
In the 1980 the situation \vas the reverse: studentc; exchanged political activisn1 and protest for c1 bucnness suit of estabhshn1ent values. No
alienation was greater m college clas~roon1s than that between leftist
faculty n1en1bers and conservative students.
Why has education £nled In the United tates? In 1852 John Henry
Cardinal Newn1an analyzed the problen1 111 a ren1arkably prescient essay
entitled "On the cope and Nature of University Education." Arguing
that what was n11%1ng \Vas the umty bct\veen kno\vledge and religious
conviction, Ne\vn1an asked, "1\ It logi ally consistent In a seat ofleaming
to exclude theology fron1 the nutnber of 1ts studtes?" Theology, Newn1an aid, "tneets us \Vlth a profc,ston and a proffer of the htghest truths
of which the htunan 1111nd IS c1pable," and only a <;uperftctal approach
to education could ignore the ethic.1l and religious foundations of culture.9 At the root of the educational cn~1s, say n1any con ervative critics,
is the appalling loss of tradtoonal value\ In the cumculun1.
Conservatives carefully point out that the problen1 of learning in
schools is but a by-product of the dratnatic change 1n Arnerican f~11nily
life and values. The baste ties of the f.1nuly are the heart of c;ociety, they
argue, and the very nursery of nvic vtrtue. 1nce the 1960 divorce has
been breaking up fan1ihes n1ore rapidly than death did in the early years
of the twentieth century. An arttcle 1n Current Problems in Pediatn·cs concluded that "the An1erican fanuly is in a period of crisi and transition." 10
The alarm over education is but an aftershock of the dissolution of stability in the hon1e. In the first study on the effects of divorce on 111en,
women, and children a decade after divorce, the authors conclude that
America is now "a world in which n1arriage is freely ten11inable at any
time ... [and] we lack the psychological theory that we need to predict
the consequences." 11 The evidence points to fewer n1arriages and more
children unwilling or unable to make lasting con11nitments to one another. The children of divorced parents and the parents of divorced
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children often look to the state to supply baste needs such as housing,
child care, education supplen1ents, and econonuc ,lsststance.
For rnuch of their historv, Ainericans could count on other An1ericans
'
\Vho shared snnilar values, stand,1rds. and prinuples, but today soc1al
Institution-; possess a (hvindli ng core of con11nonly accepted cultural values. lin possible to overlook in the tnodern lexicon of social research are
such \vords as disot~S!cmizarion, disint£)!nltion, decline, insecurity, breakdown,
i11stalnlrty, and dy~jimctio11al. The intrusion of governtnent progran1s and
po\ver interfered \Vith tht: con1n1unity' intennediary institutions, leading to the collapse of tht tnoral order. ''The t~1111ily, religious association,
and local cotnnlunity- these, the conservatives insist, cannot be regarded as the exterrul products of tnan 's thought and behavior; they are
essential prior to the individu.1l and tht: indispt nsable supports of belief
and conduct." 12
Traditionally. relisrion provided the core value . syn1bols, stones, and
language tor the lebritin1ation of the soci, 1 order. In Atnerica the JudeoChristian tradition \Va ~ the source of n1or.1l values in the souety; vanous
legal concepts, accepted belieh about f:unily and educatton, and govemtnental ideas about shared po,ver and the naturt• of tnan \Vere all rooted
in this heritage. There i~ a venl:'rable pedihrree for this idea of a "ctvil
religion., \vhich \Va best sun1n1ed up by R.obt rt Bellah in the 1960s. 1'
The legacy of this broad religious tradition is seen in the use of God on
the nation's coinage and invocations to the Altnighty in the last line of
political spt:eches. Approxitnately 96 percent of the Atnencan people
continue to believe in God, 72 percent believe in heaven, and 53 percent believe in hdl. 14
In the late 1980s, R.obert Wuthno\v of Princeton University argued
that this underlying consensus for A1nerican uvil ltfe \Vas raptdly disintegrating.1 5 The post\var expansion of the state into every corner of the
society resulted, said Wuthno\v, in a liberal and conservative realignn1ent
of religious con1n1unities \Vithout reg,ud to denonHnational distinctions.
Two opposing can1ps have en1erged, whtch jan1cs Hunter called the
"orthodox" and the "progressive," each gtvtng follo\vers the assurance
that they represent the cause of authentic bibhcal rehgion. 16
What is worrison1e tn any ptcture of the national future is that such
issues as illegitin1ate btrths, abortion, prayer tn the public schools, and
the regard given the syn1bols of An1encan culture such as the flag are
really a battle over conflicting constructions of reality. In dispute are the
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meaning of the world and God's relationship to it, the definition of
hun1an nature, the basts of n1oral judgn1ents, and the dtvine purpose of
history. Unfortunately, the ten11s liberal and co115ervative often fail to capture the depth of the differences between the two can1ps. What is sure,
however, 1s the depth of dtsstnHlanty between the worldvtews of those
who oppose one another on these cultural tssues.
"Perhaps the n1ost rcinark.1ble non-event of n1oden1 tin1es," writes
Paul Johnson, "is the f~1ilure of religious behe~ to disappear." 1 Governor John Winthrop of Massachusetts descnbed the original VISion of
Atnerica In biblic.ll \VOrds ,1s a "ctty upon a hill, [\vith) the eyes of all
people upon us. " 1 Even the Atnerican R.evolution \V,lS, In the tninds of
son1e, little n1ore than ,1 pohttcal expresqon of the religious revivals of
the Great A\v,1kening. In the t\vcntteth century the secular \Vtnds of
atheisn1 and agnosttctstn \vhich gradu::llly ren1oved the Refon11ation's
heritage fron1 Europe .1re sweeptng Arnenca, .1nd replae1ng the notion
of a transcendent personal god \\ rth one n1ade m the iznage of n1.1n. This
cns1s, n1ore than .1ny other. ts causing the deep divi~tons \Vithin the
nation.
The prospect that su( h .1 ~ecubr legacy ha~ no\v split the nation into
feudtng £1ct1on wtth alternative explan,Hions of re.1hty t\ not cotnfomng
to conservatives fan1iliar \Vith the crvic culture that gutded the earlier
An1encan expenence. They worry tlut the loss of guidtng values \Vtll
pron1ote the grO\\th of governn1ent pO\\ ~r. What all this n1eans IS that
diverse religious Gllnps \vill continue to \\'Jg~ \Var \Vtth one another for
the spiritual soul of Arnenc111 hfe, \vhde the culture slides Into relattvi 111.
The dark side of Arnenc.1n culture Is that 1t IS deodedly n1atenalistic.
While church attendance ren1a1ns htgh, there has been a liberalizing
trend in theology, wtth ProtestJnt clergyn1en fundtng revolut1onaf)' terrorist groups and Cathohcs .ld\·ocanng hberatton theology vvhtle attempting a dialogue wtth Marxist-Leninist rebels. Michael Novak states
that any such behavior 1s a betr.1yal of the very foundations of Christianity and endangers the church by 1naking it a political actor. 19 Glenn
Tinder argued in the Atlrwtic !v!ontlzly that Christianity has played an
important part in the defin1t1on of Western detnocracies: "The absorption of Americans in the pleasures of buying and consun1ing, of tnass
entertainn1ent and sports, suggest [an] erosion of the grounds of political
health and in1paim1ent of personal being." The Western religious belief
in the provisions of God and the reliance of n1an on hin1 are being
\l
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replaced by a materialistic philosophy that makes xnan an evolutionary
pawn buffeted by forces of a history and society that he can neither
understand nor change. Tinder concluded, "If we tum away from transcendence, froxn God, what will deliver us frotn a politically fatal fear
and faintheartedness?" 20
Conservatives fear that the ways of thinking, living, and behaving
have now changed the nation to the point where 1t has little of its original comn1unity spirit and purpose. They argue that there n1ust be sotne
concept of "the sacred" because the greatest of hutnan duties is "Thy
will be done." It is in1p0<\sible to dil\cuss political and social duty unless
there is an awarenes' of so1ne tnith to \Vhtch one is selfless and loyal.
America possesses a great and w1dely dtstnbuted \vealth, as well as social
n1obility and education on an unprecedented <;cale. For the tnost part,
the \:vorld is at peace 1n ~;,p1te of deep pass1ons: yet, there can be no
radiance or happiness until individual~\ and C\OCiety realize their purposes
and duties.
The conservative n1essage is that the deepest longtng of the hun1an
heart is for transcendent tnith, to be able to gt ve oneself to a cause larger
than the mornent. What the nation needs 1s sornething 1t has lost: a sense
of the good and an a\:varenes of the pennanent things. Until this need
is satisfied, any discussion of nghts, duties, and the hun1an spirit is pointless. Is it possible in the tvventy-first century to recapture lost spiritual
anchors? Or n1ust we say, with Lewis Carroll, that "all the king's horses
and all the king's rnen couldn't put Hurnpty Dun1pty together again?"

Rekindling the Democratic Spirit
The renewal of den1ocracy begins with a realization that religious faith
is more fundatnental to the good society than government action. As
long as people are told that there are no absolutes and that they are not
responsible for their own behavior, they will rely on the government to
define what is wholesome and good. There has never been a case in
history in which a society survived for long without a strong moral code,
and that code has always been informed by a religious truth.
In such books as Mere Christianity and The Abolitio11 of Man, the twentieth-century British Christian apologist C. S. Lewis refuted Immanuel
Kant and other secular writers who had worked to ren1ove God from
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public dt<\course. Ht\ essay "Men Wtthout Chests" drew an analogy
bet\veen the spiritual hfe and the body, \vhich he used to cnttque the
rattonaltsnl of the Enlightemnent and the soul of Christianity. Lewis
argues that the head of reason cannot control the stornach of pa<\sion
without the chest -\vhich \Vas spirit- to restrain the base appetites of
hutnan ben1~. ~on1n1enting on a society that had no sense of the spiritual, Lewts \Vrote: "We tnake tnen \Vithout chests and \Ve expect of
thern VIrtue and entervrise. w~ l.1ugh at honor and "\Ve are shocked to
find traitors tn our tnidst. " 2 1
A fir(\t pnnciple of national rene\v.ll tkrnands a ren1ernbrance of past
Atnencan valut!\. Forl'I110St cllllOilg such recollection is the realization
that ft1ith. self:.control .1nd lirnited government undt:rgird dernocracy.
The French Revolution in 17~<. sought not only libtrty. but also equaltty and fraternity. The J.lCobins esteetned human re.1son and equality.
The french I eclar. tion of the Right of l'vLln and
tttzen asserted
R.ousse.lu·. b,lsic cl.Xiorn th.lt .lll Jlll'rl \Vere born equ.ll c nd held been separated fron1 th.lt n,ltur,ll equ.1lity by ' ',trbitr.lry socializing institutions that
were tn\"ested with arbitr,H"\', force . " 22
The An1cnc.1n Revolution stood. in contr.1st to the French. for values
rebrul.lted by thL~ rule o la\v. A tnt ric.1n colonists \V.Hlted to protect the
traditional liberties th.lt \Vere theirs .1s Briti. h subjt:cts. Those libertte'>
Included thl' rights to bring leg:1l c.1ses before tntly independent judge'\
rather than OI1l'\ ~;,ubordinate to the king: to be free of h.1ving Bnttsh
troops quartt:red tn their hotnes; to engage in trade \Vtthout burden'\otne
restnctions; and not to p.1y t.1xcs voted by the British p.1rltan1ent tn
\vhich they had no representation. In stun, the bberttes for whiCh the
colonists fought \vere based on treedon1 frotn .lrbttr,uy control by ,1 governtnent tn \vluc h thev, h.H.i no voice.
These ltberttes \Vere \videly utH.i erstood ..HH.i there was .1gree1nent ,1'\
to the concept of equality. When the I·oundef\ satd "alltnen are created
equal," they \Vere tnaking a staten1ent .1bout equahty of opportunity. not
equality of result~. The An1enc.1n conLept chtfered frotn the French: the
pride of colontal liberty \V,ls to .1llO\Y treedon1 \VIthtn the bounds ofla\v.
Conservative thought holds that the essence of tlus ongtn.ll vision for
the nation was a lin11ted, representative governtnent restrcuned by la\VS
that were difficult to alter and nulhfy. A nation forged tn reactton to
tyranny and arbitrary pov.;er wrote a Constitution to secure for its people
every right wrested froin autocratic ktngs. pnest , and nobles in Europe.
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History taught that a governtnent oflaws was the only insurance against
arbitrary, uncertain and inconstant wtlls of in1patient tnen hungry for
power.
The conservative legacy etnphastze~ that the Founding Fathers framed
and ratified a docutnent intended to last for the ages; they recognized
and applied a truth derived fron1 years of European htstory. Sin1ply put,
that rule "\vas: ''Freedon1 I\ political po\ver dtvtded tnto stnall fragrnents. " 2 ' The Atnencc1n tnterpretation of that n1ax1n1 \Vas separation of
po,ver~ an1ong the three branches of goven11nent and federalis1n, the
division of po\ver bet"\vccn the ~;,tate and national governn1ents. In contrast to England and n1ost European state , \\here political authority was
centralized 111 the national go\·en1n1ent, the Atnencan systen1 diffused
power.
Avotding the concentration of po\ver is J centerpiece of conservative
thought. The pnnCiplec:; of sep.uatton .1nd thvt~ton of po\ver;, the use of
judtCial revte\v, and the hnntation' on governtnent authonty are fundan1ental to con~ervatlves. Dtsperston of goven11nental po\ver enables the
tntennediarv tnstttutton~ to flourish .
'
Stnce the adoption of the onstitution, the\e pnnctple have been the
object of debate over ho\v they should be unproved. The early part of
this century found Atnerica heir to the cultural legacy ofBrita1n and the
Western den1ocraC1es. 1 he bfe\tyle and v.1lues of the United States were
exported abroad, and European tdea<; and nntnigrants flooded An1erican
shores. Today the opposite ts the case. Higher education curricula emphastze n1ulttculturabsn1 and dtverstty, detnandtng the reduction and
elimination of Eurocentric and patnarchal btases in the An1erican political systen1. Limited representattve governn1ent retards participation by
ethnic tninonttes, say 1nodern refon11er . They de1nand that there be less
separation of powers, that the central governn1ent be given n1ore authority at the expense of local govern1nents, and that judicial activistn be
adopted as a remedy for con1pelling social problems.
America, dorninated by Western European ancestry and culture, will
be challenged in the twenty- first century when white Atnericans tnay
becon1e a minority group. The question already asked is whether it is
good to esteem such a history. At the college level the traditional canon
of Greek, Latin, and Western European hun1anities has been challenged.
Books once seen as classics of culture are now scorned as examples of
racial in1perialism and ethnic oppression.
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Conservatives argue that every society needs a set of universally accepted values and that in11nigrants should be willing to adopt then1. Such
was the case until recent yearc;. Without thec;e traditional values and
institutions to n1oderate and shape the dyndnnc energy of democratic
govemn1ent, society tnay degenerate into tyranny. The n1odern emphasis, however, is on the rac1c;n1 and c;ex1sn1 of the past, tn contrast to the
self-evident virtues of An1encan plurahsn1. A balkantzed society of cultural groups, each objecting to the other and agreeing on no central
values, will characterize the future unless the custon1s and traditions of
America's pa t rektndle the den1ocratic sptnt.

Restoring the Economic Spirit
The Arnerican econon11c experin1cnt IS the n1ost glittering, n1ost astonishing, n1ost mvent1ve, 1110\t orgamzed, and greatest \Vealth-producing
enterprise the world has ever kno\vn. In n1atenal tcnns, cap1tahsrn \vorks
well for n1ost people rnost of the tinu~. Year after year, individuals go
into the tnarketplace and end up ncher at the end of the year than \vhen
they began. Billions of pnvate deustons bv Ind1v1dudls and by finns to
buy, sell, save, store, tnve\t, or c;crap gu1de the Invisible hand that Adan1
Smith lauded t\vo centunes ago.
The rough and tun1ble of the c.1p1t(1hst rnarketplace IS the best way for
lifting a country's population out of poverty, yet as the Western dernocracies head into the t\vent) -fi~t century, persistent questions plague the
conservative defense of unfettered free rnarkets. The conflict between
econon1ic growth and environnu~ntal health i the tnost itnportant issue
facing capitalisn1 in the next century. More and n1ore evidence sho·w
that today's sn1oke and flllne will lead to cataclysn1ic ecological problems in the future. Conservatives, devoted f:1ns of free markets and unbridled capitalistic expansion, are often een as opposed to
environn1ental controls. The ecologtcal crisis could tan1e the dynanusn1
of capitalism and open the door for govemrnent regulation of the
economy.
The sheer size of the problen1 presents a challenge to any economic
theory. In 1800 one billion hutnan beings lived on the planet; that number doubled by 1930 and doubled again by 1975. If current birthrates
hold, the world's present population will double again shortly after the
L
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tum of the centuty. 24 The Third World is envious of Western affluence,
and the prospects of terroris1n for food increase as the gulf between rich
and poor widens. Technological advances have upset nature's equilibrium. Sn1okestacks have disgorged gases into the atn1osphere, factories
have dumped toxic wastes into rivers and strean1s, and automobiles have
guzzled irreplaceable fos'lil fuels and fouled the air with their exhausts.
Forests have been denuded, lakes poisoned, and pesticides dispensed
without n1uch thought of the future. The fault for n1uch of this is laid at
the doorsteps of the defenders of cap1talisn1.
Conservatives argue that the nlclrket n1echani5n1s that stin1ulated capitalisn1 can be u5ed to n1ake ure prices reflect the c;ocial costs of energy
and waste. They contend that governn1ent should enforce taxes and
pem1its instead oflegt laong quotas and bans on production. 25 Conservative solution~ en1phas17e free-tnarket econon11e5 for health care and education; it is reasonable to think that such n1arket devices could also
ensure that econon1ic developtnent \vould be both clean and order1y. 26
Newt G1ngnch finnly believe\ that the lessons of An1erican history
are the key to \Olving future challenges. We tern civilization is in the
nudst of a transfonl1atiOI1, say5 Gtngnch, quoong \UCh futurists as Alvin
and Heidi Toffier, fron1 an Induc;tnal Age to an Infon11ation Age. An1erican innovation, a renev.;ed con1n11tn1ent to quality, and capitalistic freedom are the bt.11lding blocks for the next century. In the fi.1ture Gingrich
sees political power devolving to citizens who are the building blocks of
a new "semi-direct den1ocracy," Innovating on the local level and passing infon11ation around. The next century will see government connected to citizens through the traditional n1ec1ns of political parties,
voting, and the n1edia but also utilizing technology to tap resources on
other planets and in cyberspace. 27
The assun1ption is that govemn1ent should play a smaller role in the
lives of citizens. Despite the intuitive appeal and proven record of accomplishment inherent in market alternatives, in the last half of the
twentieth century such options have taken a backseat to calls for federal
regulation and intervention. Polls regularly show that 1nost Americans
want government to address a problem rather than allow the private
market to offer a solution. As a result, growth in the public sector has
been the rule during the past three decades. Public spending in the seven
largest Western nations rose from 29 percent of the gross national product in 1960 to about 39 percent in 1990.28 During much of this time,
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especially the decade of the 1980s, these developed nations were led by
conservative govemn1ents.
Govemn1ent interference in free n1arkets quashes individual creativity
and discovery. The spint of Invention and discovery that characterized
An1erican capttahsrn has been rendered itnpotent by federal rules and
regulations. 29 Cotnpared to its pre-1932 htstory, the An1encan national
govemrnent has n1uch tnore po\ver In nun1erous areas of An1erican life,
including increased influence over the aff.'lirs of Indtvidual entrepreneurs.
Over tirne, the nationalization of politics found conservatives generally accepting an enlarged federal govemrnent With n11ntn1al protest as
long as the governrnent ent1tlen1ents beneftted all classe of people. The
higher incon1e people, \Vho n11ght have been expected to support conservative causes tn oppo\Itton to enlarged ~oCial \velf.1re n1easures, were
thernselves coopted by prograrns -;uch as Medtcare, Medicaid, and the
fann substdv, ,11locatton that nude thern benefiCianes. Mtddle- and
upper-class people found that they hked thetr entitlen1ents to the national govemn1ent's l.1rgesse altno.;.t .1s n1uch a lower-clac;s people do.
What 1111ght have been .1 natural con.;.ervatlYe con tituency In opposition
to these entit1etnents dtd not emerge unt1l the entire )tructure faced
bankruptcy.
A fundan1ental hun1an dc-;trc for )Ccuritv enabled the natlonal govemn1ent to expand and provtde progran1s to tneet social needs. Health,
safety, retiren1ent 1ncon1e, and savtngs protection spa\vned tnany other
prograrns, reveahng that conservati 111 IS easter to o.,upport In the abstract
than in the concrete. Ph!losophtcally, rnuch of today's bustne s elite i
more con1fortable \vith wdf.'lre- tate liberahsn1 than \Vith the con1petitive rawness of econon1tc free n1arket .
The great den1ocranzation of Atnencan pohttcs that accon1panied the
New Deal, Fair l)eal, New Frontier, and Great Sooety trengthened the
role of the national govemn1ent in don1estic affair . The federal programs created an upper-class as well as a lo\ver-cla. s constituency, making it difficult for elected leaders to resist public opinion. The result of
these forces is that conservatives have generally accepted the social welfare programs, even speaking at tirnes of a public policy of social welfare
conservatism. Son1e conservatives were critical of the Reagan presidency
for precisely this reason: despite rhetoric to the contrary, there was no
shrinkage of the size and scope of government in any real sense. Robert
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Nisbet charged that Reagan (1) had a n1ottvat10n n1ore tn keeping with
the New Deal liberal l)etnocrat expenence than a.ny genuine conservative Republican era stnce he spoke frequently of revolution and quoted
hberal l)en1ocrats, such as Fra.nkhn l). H. oosevelt and John F. Kennedy,
as precedents for ht<; acnons rnore th.1n he dtd conservative presidents;
(2) had a. passion for crusades both dorneo;tH. and International, which led
to a larger and n1ore po\\terful goven11nent; and (3) retained, rather than
abohshed, the l)eparttnents of Education a.nd Energy and the National
Endo\\rnents for the Arts and Hurnanities, a.ll e ·tablished under liberal
l)en1ocratic presidents. ' 0
By 1994 the chon1s for cha.nge at the national lcvt 1 gre\v into a ho\vl,
but no consensus etncrged as to \Vhat should be elitninated. Efforts to
shnnk the stze and scope of govermnent \Vere nH:t by entrenched constituenCies decrytng the inhtunanity of cutting school lunch progran1s
and reduong federa.l expenditures for the poor and elderly. After the
election, the halls of ongress filled \Vith lobbyists, la\vyers, and career
offici.1ls defending their pro~rr:uns against the threa.t of a federal carnng
knife.
The presence and popularity of social \vel fare con. ervat1sn1 rneans a.n
acceptance of governn1ent intervention in the econornv even \vhen the
canons of conservatisn1 argue othenvisc. Gtven the \Vide . . pread f.-uniliartty and acceptance of greater public spending, another challenge for conservati'ill1 1s to balance econon11c b'TO\\ th \Vith a reduction of soctal
progran1s to help those displaced by penodic econonuc reahgntnents.
Unen1ployed steel \Vorkers, the hornelcss in urban settings, and racial
mtnorities beset wtth poverty rnake regular detnands on the econonuc
and political systern.
In such an envtronrnent, conservatisn1 has proven to be both strong
and weak. Its strength rests In the Ideas that even Its opponents accept as
necesc;ary tf society 1s to be stable: re\pect for authonty, a reduced role
for governn1ent, and a htgh regard for tradition. It.) weakness rests in the
dtfficulty of populari71ng tdeas whose very existence dentes the pron1ises
of econon1ic, political, and soCial progress en1bod1ed In the New l)eal,
Fair l)eal, New Frontier, and Great Soctety. The fundatnental in1pulse
of conservatism is toward restraint, even when cutting the size of establishment government. By contrast, hberahstn n1oves toward action. The
needs of the urban poor and the unen1ployed are readily addressed by
liberalism, where conservative solutions appear cold and aloof The lib-
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eral hour in An1erican politics can1c during the Great Depression, after
President Hoover's conservative retnedies failed to provide the type and
level of action people detnanded. Conservatives find their moment at
the end of the century, as they f:1cc the fa1led solutions of central govemnlent.

Conclusion
"In Atnerica," \Vntes R.obert He1nen1an, "conservative thought has
been a n1uch 111Isunder-;tood and heavily stereotyped fonn of intellectual
activity.'' \I Even In tnurnph, conscrvatJSnl never ach1eved \Vtdespread
popular support until the late 1970s and 1980s; yet, n1any of Its Ideas
significantly influenced Arncrican societv throughout Its history. It has
exercised this Influence becau e conservatn:c leader; found arenas of politics In \Vhtch to battle for the clChicvernent of their goals. Thts accon1plishn1ent is n1ore itnportant than the f:1ct that conservatisn1 \Vas
n1isunderstood and never enjoyed \\ tdc ,lCceptance throughout society.
The recent populanty of conscrvatt"tn ac; an econon11c, pohttcal, religious, and soci.1l n1oven1ent \V.ls rnadc posstblc by society's reaction to
liberalisn1 n1orc than by .u1 undytng allegwnce to the conservative
banner.
While the breadth of conscn ati\111 1nay cncon1p.1ss differing chools
of thought, that strength ts also a \Vcakness \vhen it cornes to nutntaining
balance an1ong Its tdea and respect arnong Its advocates. These differences affect how the vanou advocates VIC\V the role of govemn1ent,
religion, and speech. On the one hand, an econon11c conservative, especially one with hbertanan tendencies, \vants to have a very sn1all government that interferes as bttle as pos tble in the lives of An1ericans; but
such a person is unlikely to upport religious freedon1s. A traditional
or religious conservative, on the other hand, n1ay appreciate a larger
govemn1ent in order to protect n1oral values as the nom1 of societal
behavior. Such differences are seen in the disagreen1ent between conservative columnist Willian1 F. Buckley, Jr., and fon11er secretary of education and drug czar Willian1 Bennett over solutions to the drug crisis in
American cities. Buckley favors the libertarian solution of legalization,
while Bennett advocates the more traditionally conservative argument
of stiffer sentences and better enforcement. Both of these conservative
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spokesn1en have impeccable ideological credentials, yet they see the solution to the problen1 differently.
The Republican Party of the 1990s reveals these divisions. Younger
conservatives in their twenttes, attracted to the Republican Party in the
years of the l{.eagan presidency, are Interested in the econon1ic aspects
of conservat1sn1 and favor the tdeas of n11nin1al govemtnental restraints
on the achieven1ent of econonuc \Uccess. Another strong group in the
Republican Party con1pnses the reiigJous conservatives, who argue that
governrnent tnuc;t stop abort1on and restore prayer and Bible reading in
the pubhc schools. Mtd\vestern conservatives, uch as the late senators
Robert Taft and Everett M. Dirk\en, fonner president Gerald Ford, and
Senator Robert Dole, are pragn1atH. conservanves. Unlike those who
adhere to econon1ic and rehgiou" con.;;ervansn1, they are not sorely bothered by either governn1ent regulation or n1orality questions. Their pragnlatic positiOn seeks to prevent exces\e\ of governn1ent regulation and
the gro\vth of govemn1er1t.
Sttll another dtvtsion occurs \Vith the idea of the tnilitary and n1ilitary
servJCe. hould n1ilitary service be \'Oluntary or conscnpttve? Ho\v large
should the n1ilitary be? Staunch conservatives argue that the ftrst responsibility of governn1cnt 1 the . . afety of unzens and that the rnihtary should
be large 1n order to protect the nan on\ poltncal and econonuc interests
around the \Vorld. This po..,ition rneanc; a larger goven1n1ent, tnore taxes,
and higher spending. Conservclttves \vho value individual freedon1 oppose conscription while other strongly p.Hnotic conservatives do not.
There are n1any vanetie.., of conservatives \vho collectively identify
with the election and pre 1dency of H..onald I~eagan and the subsequent
triun1ph of conservative pohctes tn the early 1990s. Son1e of these loyalists were motivated by the soCial and tnoral agenda of the religious right;
others were moved by the convJCtlon that American foreign policy had
weakened and foundered In the 1970s; still others can1e to the "Reagan
Revolution" because they shared a passion to cut taxes and reduce the
powers of the federal governn1ent. In the 1990s these refom1ers found
themselves in power and at odds with one another. For n1uch of its
history American conservatisn1 has been on the outside looking in; its
viable policies were developed in opposition to liberal policies. Now the
ideological shoe is on the other foot.
The resolution of tensions within the ranks of conservatism is important because conservatism has been prone to factionalism throughout its
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history. After dominating presidential politics for most of the decades
since 1950, the conservative n1ono hth cracked following the election of
George Bush in 1988. The return of a liberal to the White House in
1992 signaled the end of the co nc:;ervative resurgence to son1e. The basic
division within the rnoven1cnt retn ains between two strains: the mostly
urban, ethnic, and econ o tnic frce-n1arket neoconservatives and the traditional, sn1all-town, agranan conservatives w ho stress cultural values
over econornics. The fonner group was tnfluenttal 1n popularizing the
econon1ic agenda of conc:;ervatt'\111 e.1rly 1n the Reagan adn1in1c:;tratton.
The latter group, alanned by the secu lar drift of soCiety away frorn the
native values of religi on and con1n1unity, worked for the defeat ofhberal
ideas tn the 1994 n11dten11 ckcn on.
The Bush preside ncy \VJll be ren1etnbered as an exan1ple of pragn1atisn1 over ideology. Irving Kn)tol \varned m the beginntng of the last
decade of the twentieth century that "the Republican Party [\vas] a defective vehicle for the n1obd17atton ot con)ervattve cnergtec:; and the forrnulation of even a rntn1n1ally coherent conservattve agenda." ' 2 He \vas
right, and the future of conscn'tltlsn1 \Vii] hang on the ability of adherents
to n1obihze and persuade thctr peers, absent parties and electtons.
Western culture IS prcc:;ently gotng through a n1onun1ental change. A
the world enter; the t\venty -fir;t centurv a ne\Y poc:;ttnodcn1 worldvte\v
is gaining dorntnance tn Atnencan un1verstt1e and culture. Thtc:; unpulse
en1phasizes Jndetenninacy, chance, arurchy, and the silence of tneamng
and knowledge in the \vorld. Postn1odern1 t base thctr ne\v relativi 111
on the view that all n1ean1ng 1s socwlly constructed on a particular conviction of language, so \Vo rdc:; c.1nnot render truth about the \vorld in
any coherent way. n
During the twentieth century Wec:;tern civilization h.1d to survive
powerful assaults fron1 Without: c:;oCiahc:; Jn , fa cisn1, and ecular nihilisn1.
In the next century the threat \Vtll con1e fron1 the very people who
render the values and virtue to a free people. The postn1odem ethic is
regnant in the n1edia and e ntertainrnent industries. In his acceptance
speech of the Teznpleton Prize in 1994, Michael Novak described thi
threat of postmodemisn1 as the n1ost " Insidious and invidious attack
from within: There is no such thing as truth. . .. Truth is bondage,
believe what seen1s right to you, there are as n1any truths as there are
individuals. Follow your feelings, do as you please, get in touch with
yourself [and] do what feels coznfortable. " 34
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In the next century the belief in truth will be equated to acceptance
of authoritarian control. The Amen can iinpulse is internal, for self-government, self-esteem, and self-actualized individuals with personal peace
and affluence. In such an environn1ent no individual wants to bend to
the dictates of church, con1n1unity, or tradition, especially when it cannot be known if anything IS true.
The future of conservattsn1 is tied to ho\v significant cultural values
are related to the propagat1on of a poltttcal idea. Traditional conservatives believe that religious and con1n1un1ty values are the bedrock of
societal stability, arguing that there 1s a cau\al relationship between traditional Western, Judeo-Chnstlan values and the poht1cal order. Snll other
conservatives einphasize the 1deas of econorn1c stability and pragmatic
opposition to foretgn threats as be1ng n1ore 1111portant than native values.
In the next century the 1norahty of a free soCiety will deten111ne its
future.
Conservat1 In's dtvergent factions allo\V it to reach to n1ore people,
but such differences nuke the achteven1ent of con1n1on goals difficult.
The conservative moven1ent n1ust luve tension to be successful, but
respect needs to be n1a1nta1ned bet\veen Its con1pettng t~lCttons. Will the
future find conservatisn1 broadening 1ts base of support or splintering
into divergent factions In the stn1ggle to rule? To llnprove the nlarketability of conservatisn1, It will need to attract Blacks and other rninorities.
Roman Catholics and the South will also be cnJCial to the continued
viability of the n1oven1ent.
The values of the fan1ily, church, and neighborhood school are the
major issues of political debate in the decade ahead. The !~eagan administration left a legacy of conservative concern for such institutions that
was embraced by the new conservative tnajority 1n the nineties, but it
remains to be seen whether cultural values will restore conservatism to
its past glory.
To sustain power in An1erica, an 1ndictn1ent of liberalisn1 is not
enough. In the final analysis, regnant conservatisn1 requires those very
qualities of the Western tradition that 1nake civilization possible. The
American Revolution, unlike the French, stood for values rooted in the
biblical experience. History teaches us that an age wrong about God is
almost certain to be wrong about man. The French Revolution of 1789
sought not only liberty, but also equality and fraternity. The French
Revolution believed Rousseau's basic axion1 that men were born free
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and everywhere they were in chains. By the end of the century dictatorship crushed den1ocracy in France and much of Europe paid the price.
The R ussian }~evolution in 1917 and the Chinese Revolution of 1949
echoed the quest for equahty with the san1e result: the expansion of
central govemn1ent power and the extinction of the Individual.
Walter Lippn1ann recounts an evening in the days before America's
entry into World War II, when the U.S. atnbassador to Bntain, Joseph
P. Kennedy, opined that if \.Var catne, the Enghsh would be defeated.
Such a prognosts stirred Winston Churchill to nugnificent oration, "I
for one would willingly lay down n1y life In combat, rather than, in fear
of defeat, surrender to the n1enaces of these n1ost sinister men." Churchill went on to constder the posstbihty of the unthinkable, a world without British Influence: "It will then be for you, for the American<;, to
preserve and n1a1nta1n the great hentage of the Enghsh-speaking peoples." 15 Ainenca catne Into the t\.ventteth century as the youngest prodigy in the gro\.vn-up \vorld of Western culture: It ends it as the heir
apparent to that lineage. The constant stn1ggle of free societtes IS to
n1aintain three freedon1s: econonuc, poht1cal, and cultural. Of these
three, the cultural stn1gglc, long neglected in the United States, 1s the
place where the fate of free soCietH~S \Vtll rest 1n the t\.venty-first century.
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Rhetorical Conservatism
and Postmodernism
vVhen words lose their mcat~in._e, peoples lose their liberty.
-CO NF UC I US

A

n1ericans revere the po\ver of the pen. The I)ecl,lration of Independence, the Constitution, the Gettysburg Address, and other
landmark documents, \Vhich capture the n1ean1ng of Amcnca, occupy
exalted space in the An1encan pantheon of literary greatness. Th1s An1erican reverence for the po\ver of the pen stands not alone, but as part
of the flow of historical respect for great \Vntings. Fonvard frorn the
manuscripts ofPlato and Anstotle, the pen has changed the contours and
currents of hi tory. But today, the po\ver of the pen 1s 1n question, and
with it, the future of ociety.

Democracy's Downslide
Language slides down a slippery slope in den1ocraoe a public op1nion
and political realities destabilize the tneaning of words. 1 Over tin1e,
words lose consistent and coherent rneantng, no longer erving as dependable points of reference or anchor of stability. In 1948 Arnold
Toynbee concluded in the ten volutnes of A Study of History that civilizations rarely collapse from conquest or invasion, but rather they con1nut
cultural suicide, abandoning previous beliefs and casually accepting anything new. 2 In 1987 Allan Bloom put it this way in Tiu Closing of tlze
American Mind: "In politics, in entertainment, in religion, everywhere,
we find the language connected with Nietzsche's value revolution, a
language necessitated by a new perspective on the things of n1ost con-
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cern to us. Word' '\UC h as rlzmisma, /if('- ·ryle, r(H/lmitmcnt, identity, and
1nany other,, all of \vh1ch c.u1 ea ily be traced to
ll't'l.schl', are no\v
pr.1cncall) AtnL'ncan sl.1ng. "~ ultur.1ll ' nothing i n1ore i1nportant than
\VOrds, \Vhich provi(k coherl.'nce and ohesion to s( ~iety. Words relatl'
to one .lnothl'r, colkctivl·ly ~duping the i )"niti ~.1ncc of rL·ality .1nd defining the n1e.1ning of life.
H. . d1ecting upon the ilnpott..ll1( e l r l.lll u.u~c Ill i\menc.lll denlOCracy
dunng the e.1rly 181 Os. Alt·xi de ..Iocqucvtllc ol c1 vc I that the dyn:unics
of public opinion .111<.i pc l!uc.I rc.lht) 111. ke the redc 1111t1 H1 of \Vords:
nee ed t m ke u e of H, nd
)r the
1l'JlOrancc Itself c n m. kc ll e 1er. But H 111\'0h e
I. ngu.t~l'. In thu gtvmg. d ub1e me. mng tl one" r , lem ,cr.ttiC peoples often m. k<? both the old, nd the ne\\ tgm 1 at1on mb1 lOU . .. !If]
there 1 no accel ted JUd e, no pcnnancnt court t
e 1 e the me mng o

sunple. qu1ck. and e. '·

. word. the phra c:

1

le nung

1

left to '". nder fn:: e

4

Hut. not ju t the I hr. c.: \\' ndcr . ultun.: \\ c n ers • \\ dl. 'T'hc gr, dual n:definition o mor. 1 \Vord .md tenn 1 like t. km~ ~.h)\vn tht ~.1ils
and rernoving the rudder. rh.l
.1 bo. t.
here rern. in~ no \V,lY
to stl'er the boat in the riaht dtrc n Hl. Put n ther \V y, \vhcn the cultural compa loses its nugnc llL rl'fer ence point, li recllons hecon1e rl'Lltive. In tht:se circumst. . nee.:: llH>r<dlty 1 c OJnc .1 rll.lttc.::r o politic.1l
assertion and \vill, not of .lccepted de lllltl )11s .m I t.uh.i.lrds. SeL·ing this
vital link bet\Vct:n Ltnguagt: .1nd culture, on ucius s.1id: "\Vhen words
lose their I11l':lning. peopll' lose their lib "It,_,.
Ironically, ev<:n :1s dl'n1ocr.1cy depends upon Lm,'u.lgc· to lkfine right
and wrong, it sitnultanl'OU!\ly subverts l.1nguage .1nd its mor.1l contL'llt.
To avoid cultural chaos, participation by citi'Zl'Ils ent.1ils =tgreL'rncnt on
v.;idely sharl.'d and accepted n1eaninbrs of right .1nd \Vrong. I l'Il10Lr:lc.:y
could hardly function \Vlthout c1t17ens playing by the "ruks of the political garne." Thus, in a Sl'nSl' language is the linchpin of stability in den1ocracy. However, as \Vonh and tenns bl.'cornl' e111pty vessels vo1d of
1noral content, pohtical candidate~ and public oHiu.1ls can define and
redefine words and ten11s to su1t the1r poltncal purposes, t.ulonng their
definitions of words to enhance their voter appl'al.
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Postmodernism and Democracy
Postmodemism, known as poststructuralism and deconstructionism in
literature, frontally assaulted the meaning of words during the 1970s.
Following the leadership ofJacques Derrida and Paul de Man, 5 this new
theory of literary criticism, questions the historic understanding of language. Now the title of a new cultural age, postmodemism belittles the
importance of consistency and coherence in the meaning of words and
fosters an increasingly relativistic, subjective, and fragmented society.
Succinctly put, postmodemism puts a heavy foot on the accelerator of
democracy's downslide.
Contrasting modemisn1 and postn1odemism, John Louis Lucaites and
Celeste Michelle Condit state that: "Modernism features a commitment
to scientism, and objective, morally neutral, universal knowledge. In
the modem worldview, the universe is a relatively simple, stable, highly
ordered place, describable in and reducible to absolute formulas that
hold across contexts. " 6 According to modernism, words serve as anchors
of stability in society. Or like n1agnetic forces for the creation of unity
and harmony, words help solve problems by drawing people together
on the high ground of words expressed as principles and ideals.
Modernism, however, is not without its faults. By emphasizing the
rational and cerebral over the personal and emotional, modernism creates an imbalance between the head and the heart. Dominated by the
head, modernism exalts rationality, scientific and technological progress,
and material success. On its downside, modernism disparages the importance of individual experience and cultural change in defining words
and developing language patterns.
By contrast, postmodernism errs on the opposite side, placing excessive emphasis on the personal and emotional over the rational and cerebral. Believing that truth is subjective and situational, not objective and
universal, postmodernists contend that cultural change renders objective
and universal truth nonexistent. Words do not shine as beacon lights on
overarching ideals and principles, but rather they generate discord and
disagreement in society, creating circumstances to be managed rather
than conditions to be cured. Since societies construct meaning through
language, dominant elites def1ne truth through power. As Lucaites and
Condit state: "On this view, struggle, not consensus, is the defining
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ch~r.lcteristic

of soci.1l life: ,1c l)rdingl ', oci.1l discord is not a pathology
to be cured but a condition to he productively 111,111.1g ·d. " 7
Posttnodernisnl turn IlH?.llling 011 its hc.1d hy stripping \Vords of their
denotation .1nd c<.. nnot.HJOll . Not unexpectnily the \Vords chcdlcn,gc, dc~' r,zhili:c. wult nnine . .uHi qi/Jt't 11 <.. l1.1r.tcten:ze po t1nodernisn1. As a hrroup
tht:sc \vord tr.1n l.nc Into _pitl .1 de me I in ", spt·ci,ll point of vie\V,
etnph. ,i , r interpret u n. ·· 1 Tnificantly, in kecptn:r \Vith postnlodcrni~t intt: rpret.Hi n. ro spin 1nean ''to C\ olve. e. ·pre . r t:11 n ~.Ht by proctsse of llltild or 1111. !ll1c tl n .. , Predl t. . bly, there ore, truth becon1C:-i cl
subjective Interpretation
ontlc tinT tradJnonal
illustr.He th1 breakd

, nd even .

ni 1

\Vn 111 rne

l

)f hterary criticisn1

tru tur. 1 fonn

mn . I r. hu

lllc

llv rc. ie
~

\\',lnted to

kno\V \Vh,ll the . utht r
• text HHen led, but po ~tnt<.. tur.tlisrn derides
.1uth( n.tl intention.
c rdtng t I t trtlCturalt 111, c ultur.tl cc nvcntions
l ind \\ ntei . 111akin :-r the Cl. I nte ·t of 111e. mn :-r 111 >re nnport,u1t th.u1
the uth r' Hltcndc n1c. 11111 . I o t tru turall n1 cla11ll ''that tht:: \VorkIngs oflanguagc tne cal abl) undennnH:: JllC. run 111 the very process of
Jllak1ng uch n1ean1n
1
1lle 1 d e th t e\ cry nH k: of disco urse
con truct or con ntute the VCl)
t
f truth th.lt It l IJllS to dis1
cover. ''1
un1Jn n7.tn t }1e c n eqtH.-:nce o p
tructtlr 1tsn1 , ·"1. 1-1.
Ab . n1 tate rh t, "In po t tructur.. l
our e h.1 becorne a
very pr n111 ent ten11, UJ plcn1ennn
)Jlte .1 l'~ displ.lcing)
'ttXt' cl the 11.lll1C for th e Vel h,tJ 111 [Cit.d \V}llch I the prilll,lr)' C'Ol1Cl.'rT1
of liter. ry critici 111 ... [po tn1 turah t ) n cive >f dtscoursL' ,ls ~ocial
parlance r I. ngu gc-1n-u e. '' 11 A c rd1ng to f > tllHH.lcrnisnl, bnguagc
no longt:r rc t on a firn1 found. non of
lingui tic systenl."
but i a byproduct of'' o 1al
n huon , cl.
tructur ~, .1nd po\vcrrdationship that ~dter in the co u1 e o h 1 t >ry.' 12
''Reader Response "I heory, · .tnothcr for n1 of po~tn1odern literary
criticis1n, hold th.lt Illl'aning rests cc tnpktdy \Vi thin tht' pl'rson doing
the reading. Thus, .1 lt:Xt co uld conceivably have ,ts 111,111}' me,lnings .1s 1t
has readers. Given that ont reading is as good as another, the text Itself
loses tncaning.
In a word, while tnodernisn1 believes that reason and ~Clence c,ln
reveal objective truth, posttnodernisn1 contends that truth is subjeCtive.
Belief in tnodernisn1 's vic\V of objective truth hdd sv:ay fi·orn the Enligbtenn1ent until the recent past \vhen postn1odernisn1 ushered 1n a ne\v
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era. Now no longer serving as a pillar of stability, language fluctuates like
the stock market.

Conservatism in the Postmodern Era
Both modernism and postmodemism strike at the heart of conservatism,
but for different reasons. Modernism neglects experience, which conservatives revere, while posttnodernism rejects objective, universal, and
certain truth, which conservatives respect. In short, conservatism offers
a balance between the two, harmonizing the cerebral or "head" emphasis of modernism with the experiential or "heart" emphasis of postmoderntsm.
The ascendance of postmodemisn1 in today's America presents the
greater challenge to conservatism. For if words no longer convey meaning as postmodemists contend, then what guides political discourse?
Nothing is more fundamental to political discourse than rhetoric and
rhetorical symbols, especially in today' s technological and informational
age where rhetoric extends into such vast new mediun1s as cable television and the Internet, making infonnation rapidly accessible and instantaneous.
In an era of rapid change driven by technology and influenced by
postmodemism, conservatism serves as a stabilizing force. Despite the
potential for rapid change, political discourse remains locked in slowmoving dialogues along campaign trails, in courtroom clashes, and inside
legislative chan1bers. These extended dialogues, which mirror and mold
culture, allow conservatism significant opportunities to restrain inappropriate change. Characterized by traditional values and customs and a
"go-slow" attitude toward change, conservatism can checkmate changes
that would create instability in society.
Both in belief and attitude, conservatisn1 opposes the poststructuralist
view of language and the impact of relativism and subjectivity on contemporary culture. For exatnple, conservatives oppose the relativism and
subjectivity inherent in Jacques Derrida's definition of language as "an
unregulatable play of purely relational elements." 13 To Derrida, circumstance defines truth.
American democracy, which evolved from long-held traditions and
"self-evident" truths, carefully balances individual rights and majority
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nile as \Veil as go\'ernn1L'Ilt p<.nver .1nd individual fn:cdon1. What happen<; \vhcn postJno<.krni 111 subverts these in1portant tr:1ditions and truth<;
and dt . . rupts these essential b:1Llnces? At krH)\vled~ing the t\.vin threats of
po nnodeinistn .111e.i ever-changin.r truth. Robert C.1se, Director ofthe
World _Journ.1lisn1 Jnstitute. ~.k·clares th.H:
thts confhct of tnlth an I ngu.1ge (\\or d) h. s l ern tnten 1 ted mto an
ourn,'ht ultur. I \\ ar.... In l n:vwu ge . OIH ept of tntth nd dtscourse
comnmnH.. ted through \\ ord \\ ~.. rc tht: .1~ tcptcd mcdlltlll of hum.m intercourse. "I od ', ho\\ ever, thr n.llure o truth .m l tbr role o words .1n.:
m th putc 14

The de. th ( f t1 uth { nd t, 1 eh )d n .. ht . nd \Vn. n re1nove the rnoral
.. nd t'tl11C.} Jotlnng l. ( \VOl d . ](', Vlll._' t he111 Ilclked lfl ,l 1-,'Teat cuJtur.ll
\\',lr. \Vhc: re the) ervc . 1 ,l\Vns 111 the h.uH.h of the powerful. But \Vhat
happen \Vhc: n I n rua e 1 c 1 Ill oral cl thmg? i\Ltunt e lurl.uH.i conclude : ·· h ul ,1 culture reach the l 111t \\here < n 1 tcnc or re.lson.rtving .1re no Ion 't r v. luet r ret o r11zed, r hC'tnn<.. \Vould be: trrekvant.
Such a \\'OJ ld 1 to he rest ted he \VCVer, or tht.: .1bsence of rt'.lson and
judb7111ent. rc the nurk o
Vc:. hemcntl) oppo t l t u h ,1 rt.:tgn f ten or. c.. on crv.ltisnl tights to
n1.1int:11n tnC,lning in \Vord .ls C.Hnt·r o truth ,1nd to ,1tlin11 objective
.md certain truth. I .lnton Ltnker s.1ys th.H. dCCord tng to Art'itotle: "'Politics i , contest btt\VCL'f1 riv.tl p. rtits over \Vh.n vision t)f the good \Vtll
guide our COJ11ll10n ltfe,' ., but .. there 1 n w.1y to spc.1k .1bout politic.
\Vithout t.dkin r .lbout the good. ''JG
)J1 erV.ltlSlll pursues truth s Anstotlc's good \\•hdt' posuno lerrnsn1 c.m de 1nc.:: neither truth nor good.
Postn1odernisn1 sutTers ti·om .1 selt:.i n tl ictc.!d nihilistic handKap . When
truth vani he , f:1lsehood ce.1ses. Sitnuluneously .111 thinb"' becon1e tnH~,
.md all things becoine f:d t. Like .1 hurric.1ne. postmodermsn1 leaves
chaos in it \V:lke, \Vi ping out the referl'nce points of right and \\Tong,
good and bad, and causing considcr:1bk hann to C'-lsential social mstttutions.
t

<

Family and Faith
Two fundan1ental bulwarks of sooety, f:11ndy and faith, reveal the differIng in1pacts of postn1oden11Sn1 and conservatisn1 in shaping An1erican
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politics and presidents. While postmodemism attacks the historic meaning of both family and faith, conservatism seeks their restoration.

Family
Often called the foundation of society, the American family is now at
risk. Postmodem language and life have contributed to the destabilization of the American family as historically defined. Judith Stacey notes
that in the postmodem era the family faces temporal and theoretical
challenges: "no single-family structure or pattern is statistically dominant, and therefore, domestic arrangements become increasingly diverse. " 17 These statistical data reveal a lack of" cultural consensus" about
the definition offamily. 18
Contemporary Western family life is also postmodern in the theoretical
sense that it represents a period of contest, atnbiguity, improvisation, and
doubt .... The postmodern fa1nily ... is a condition of diversity and flux
in which no single-family type represents the practice, or even the ideals,
of the majority. 19
Lacking an objective standard of truth and meaning, postmodernism
has fabricated unforeseen consequences for the family and society. Stacey
indicates that, "Under postmodern conditions, the social character of
practices of gender, sexuality, parenting, and family life, which once appeared to be natural and immutable, become visible and politically
charged. " 2° Family, a longtime linchpin of American society, is no longer
stable and predictable, but now shifting and volatile, adversely affecting
the individual members of families and destabilizing society as a whole.
During the 1990s Republicans gained an advantage in the debate
about "family values" by arguing that the subversion of the traditional
family, that is, father, mother, and children, undermines the stability of
society. 21 Objecting to the Republicans use of "family values," William
Jefferson Clinton responded.
I'm fed up with politicians in Washington lecturing Americans about
"family values." Our fanUlies have values. Our government doesn't. I
want an America where "family values" live in our actions, not just in
our speeches. An America that includes every family. Every traditional
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f.1mtl , and every extended a1nlly. Every t:\\ o-mc< me • mtly nd everv
smgle-p rent f.muly. and every fiJ tcr fam1ly.

FolJo,ving 1r. linton' le.Hi, lldl.u , R dh. 111 lint >11, 111 .1 speech to
the 1< l 6 Den1oc .1tic Convcnti< n, enl.tr"ed tq on the tr, dJtion.11l ' und tood iefinition o the 1ndy . n c. Hcd for llC\\ .u1 I c:xp.HHicd n.ltional
v<?nllnent l rohrr·ant
r the ne'd) e:Xl , n le de lllition of
23
t 1nil '· B) centu ry' end po tn1 den11 111 had re c I ned family.

t:

l·aith
\Vh1le feeling the on cquen e o p tn1 erm 111' redcfimnon o
the family. 1110 t Antcnc. n "n neither pulp tnt the
ea t1 r 1 er e1vc nor cxpl. 111 H 1 lc effe
ordin
1ndt rb. the breakd \VB o the 11111) end hock\V,lVe thr u 1h OCI<.: ty
reVIVIng rehgton nd rc:.: ffirn11n 7 l~c:.:Ctl\ c truth
111 ·n • n long or
tab 1h l) , n d n1 e m n 1n the 1r ll\ c .
7

l·or de de , An1enc. n , rchg1 u , nd nonreh 1 u hke, h 'e been tclhn ..
poll te th t the c urltl) 1 c 1 enencmg "mo . l n 1 , •• or. , t the vel)
lea t, a ''m,~or n1oral problem," refie tc , the) , , 111 , de hnc o C1\ thty,
re pect, re pon 1b1lny.• n
m1ly t. btht . A 1 9
,.II up ~ oll h. d 4<
pcrcem ch ractcn7.Jng 1t
en 1 , • nether 1 percent . m.~ r 1 roblem.
a grand total of 9 pc rccnt- tln . t • tunc \\hen the e no my \\. Aour1 hmg nd en me and "el • rc h. d t lken a preC1JltOu lr p. It 1 th1 ense
of moral en 1 or d1 . rray th. t m, ke Amcnc n , e\ en n nob en. nt ne ,
so ohcttou of rebg1on. 4

Po tn1oder111 111 look upon rdig1on, not. , 1nnly held et > onviction about re.lll 'and nght .md \\ rong, but n1crely .1 preference .unong
a orted vie\v . Lacking .tb olute truth on po tntodenlt nt's reli~rious
n1orga bord, people nuy l hoo e \vh.H they lik<? \Vllhout Lon rete standards for detL'nnining the . oundness o tht·ir choicl:'s. Littlt \Vonder then
that posunodernisn1' religiou ntorg.t bord features diversity .1nd tolerance:.:. In the po trnodern era, .1 ae theti c critt ria h.tve repLKed r.ttional
criteria for n1aking choices front the lllOrg.lsbord, people are left \Vith a
hunger for belief in objectivl' and univers.d truth.
A1nericans understand ho\v religion bent fits a healthy society. Parenting and the f<unily itnprove \Vhile critlle and rnaterialisn1 decline. Ger-
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trude Himn1elfarb discovered that: "a good many Americans believe
that we would all be better off if n1ore of us became 'deeply religious':
85 percent think that such parents would do a better job of raising their
children, 79 percent that crin1e would decline, 69 percent that 'greed
and materialistn' would decrease. 25
Unfortunately this desire for religious faith occurs in a postmodem
environn1ent, which rejects objective truth, in contrast to classical Christianity, which affim1s the tnoral distinctiveness of opposites. Either God
is or He is not. Either rniracles happen or they do not. Either sin exists
or it does not. Either n1an is born into sin or he is not. Today, however,
faith responds n1ore to feeling than to fact. Only a hazy line distinguishes
those who believe fron1 those who do not. That is why Alan Wolfe
argues that post1nodem1Sn1's subjectivity and relativity attack religion
itself, undennining the very reasons why An1ericans tum to it in a time
of uncertainty. Rather than serving as an avenue to objective truth, religion beco1nes but another pathway to postmodern atnbiguity and instability.
Religious students are very tnuch hke nonreligious students in their efforts
to personalize knowledge, to avOid difficult and controversial positions
that nught cause anger m others, and to Insist that, 1f we just try hard
enough, everyone can get along wtth everyone else . . . . Religion has
returned to Atnerica, not as an alternative to the value of relativistn and
personal seeking associated w1th the often quite secular 1960s, but as the
logical extensiOn of the cultural revolut10n first glitnpsed at that titne. 26

Like tem1ites, post1nodemisn1 and its literary con1ponents of poststructuralisn1 and deconstructionisn1 create external change through internal subversion unseen by the naked eye, which in turn adversely
affects the stability of two of society's prin1ary institutions, faith and
family. Its in1pact, however, does not stop there. Not unexpectedly postmodernisnl also plays a tnajor role on the stage of presidential politics.

Clinton and Bush in the Postmodern Era
While leading the nation in the cultural clin1ate of postn1odernisn1, Presidents Willian1 Jefferson Clinton and George W. Bush used rhetoric to
pursue their differing political ends, but postmodernisn1 affected then1
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differently. In the tnain, posttnodern rhetoric Influenced Clinton, while
conservative rhetonc in. ptred l3uc;h. Neither, hovvever, could completely escape the po\ver of the other'c; rhctonc. Conservatisrn restrained
the an1bit1on of Clinton\ po5tn1oden1 leadership, \vhile postn1odernisn1
lin1ited the potential reach of Bulih \ con\ervattve ac;ptrations.

B!ftncatcd Culttoal Clinzc1fc
Tod.1y' politici.1ns con1pete in a bifurcJted cultural clin1ate Influenced
by both objective and subjective truth. Play,vright Arthur Mtller at the
30th annual JetTer<;on Lecture in the Hurnanitie . in a speech titled "On
Politic<; and the Art of Acting.,. said the ne\vs 111edia "have evolved into
'disgt.u5ed theater critics,' en1phasizin~ perfon11ance O\'er 5ubstance.'' 27
Su1nn1ing up Pre. ident Clinton\ perfonn.u1ce on stage for eight years,
Gloria Borger s.1id:
Bill Clinton w~s our fit sl c.1ble-ready president. If there was news. he was
there . Anywhere. clil)'lllllt' . Congn: sion.ll joint St'\SJOI1? He <.ould \\'lng lt
without the teleprompter. Funer,1ls? A gre,H eulogizer. Per\on.11ly einbarrassmg moment-.? Another opportunity to spm .md par<;e If the TV cr~l\vl
had pictures. Clinton would be consr~mtly jogging :tlong the boctorn of
your screen. 2

No president in A1nencan history left behind a \vorse record of rnoral
scandal than Pre ident Clinton. 2' 1 l:.ven before \vtnn1ng the 1992 election, he faced allegations of extratnantal affi11r and sexual 1111 conduct.
The Lc\vtnsky scandal surf.'lced 1n 1998 \vhen Chnton testtfied under
oath in a sexual harassn1ent la\vsuit brought agatnst h1n1 by Paula Corbin
Jones, a fon11er Arkansas state ernployee. Jones' suit stem1ned from an
incident in a Little Rock hotel roon1 tn 1991, when Clinton was governor of Arkansas. In his testi1nony Clinton dented having a sexual relationship \vith Monica Lewinsky, a fon11er White House intern. A
subsequent investigation revealed that Clinton had, in £'let, had such a
relationship, and in 1998 he adn1itted that he had engaged in a relationship with Lewinsky.
When asked under oath in grand jury testin1ony whether there was
absolutely any "sex of any kind, in any n1anner, shape or fom1" between
Mr. Clinton and Monica Lewinsky, the president gave an appropriate
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postmodem answer. "It depends on what the meaning of the word 'is'
is." In the san1e testin1ony, he was asked if Ms. Lewinsky had ever been
alone with hin1, and again the answer was linguistic, "it depends on how
you define 'alone.'" The Clinton scandal was as much an outgrowth of
the dran1atic change in n1orals as the misbehavior of one n1an in office.
Questions about Clinton's conduct in office followed him until the
end of his presidency. In January, 2001, just one day before leaving office, Bill Clinton agreed to a settlen1ent of all legal aspects of the scandal
avoiding the possibility of crin1inal indictment. Under the settlement,
Clinton admitted giving false staternents under oath about his relationship with Lewinsky and agreed to give up his law license for five years.
His legacy may be that as the first postn1odern president, he realized the
implications of ruling a country where the only truth is private truth.
Without a unified public truth he would never be condemned for any
action as along as he denied knowledge or responsibility. Clinton's style
and resiliency are his most lasting legacy.
Putting Mr. Clinton in historical perspective, Michael Novak says
that, "After years and years of substituting therapeutic language for n1oral
language, 'well' for 'good,' 'ill' for 'evil,' Arnericans seen1 sick of therapy. " 30 President Clinton left a legacy Novak believes in that An1ericans
are now en1bracing the conservative rhetoncal tradition of assigrting
meaning to language.
President Bush, like President Reagan before hin1, has returned us to the
n1oral fratnework of good and evil, where our founders began all their
thinking. There is evil in the world, and It coagulates, 1t gathers forces,
and if it bursts its bounds endangers everybody. 'Axis of evtl'? Yes, there
can be such things. How could we ever have doubted it?" What drearns
were we living in, what sort of nliSt, what fog? 31

Using September 11, 2001, as the turning point, Novak contends that
the atrocities comnutted then shook the nation, causing An1ericans to
question their lives and drean1s and in tum creating the reen1ergence of
objective truth and meaning in language through a renewed con1n1itment to neighbor, fan1ily, and country. Sun1marizing this change, Gloria
Borger observes that: "after eight years of nothing but equivocation and
spin, we seem to be getting son1ewhere ... . We're into sin1ple truth,
which is not a bad thing. " 32
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In a "trange and paradoxical way, epten1ber 11, 2001 , ushered the
United tate\ 1nto a ne\v era. With a \Var raging agatnst terrorisn1 in the
\hadO\\~ of a great tragedy on our "oil, the Arnencan people \vant their
president to \peak clearly and platnly and to tnean what he c;ays. l)escribtng the reaction of the pubhc to Bush's vvords, Borger reckons that:
But for .1ll the eloquence of the prepared texts, it w:ts the unbound Bush
'"'·ho bonded With the rution: 'I'm a loving guv
. !but] :tlso someone
who's got .1 job to do.' he s;ud, te.tring up .lt the Whne House And then,
bullhon1 in h.1nd, .tnn .1round .1 Ne'' York firefighter at hrround zero, he
pledged 'the people who knocked these butldinbTS do\\ n will hear from all
of us soon.· Amencans w:1nred to believe l111n, and rhey did. 3

While Mr. Chnton indulgcd hirnsl.'lfin thc cultural trend ofpostn1odern1sn1 and It\ anything-goc~-attitudl.'. Mr. Bu\h found htn1selfliberated
to rever e the trend. The incerity of Georgc W. Bu\h \tood out in bold
relief against the backdrop of S,eptl.'tnbcr 11 and the pubhc's reaction to
po tn1odern tnala1 L'. hdping to product.' for hm1 htgh approval ratin~.
In the \VOr(h of Ann Me r=ea tter\: "Utlt one rl'.1SOI1 for Bu h' . ren1arkably
high JOb approval ranng, beyond unitY ovl.'r the \Var effort, 1s that he
carefully avotds being seen . s an extren11st and conle\ .1cro s as a centri t
\Vho listen s. even a he reassures consl.'rvatt\'l') he's reall\ on thetr side. " 14
'
He appe.1rs genutne ,1nd stable as he stays 1n tep \\lth Mtddle A1nerica.
Mr. Bush's ability to convey stabtbty and stncenty anses fi-on1 his use of
rhetonc and rhetoncal ytnbol .
By contrast. relentless rhl'toncal sptn and revelations of per onal candal dn11inished Mr. Clinton's chann, ch.1nsnu, and con~1derable political skill. His n1orahty, or lack thereof, unden1uned h1s personal aplon1b
and the po\ver of his rhetonc. Cotnpanng Mr. Chnton and Mr. Bush
during thetr first year 1n office, Ran1esh Ponnuru says that:
None of Bush's problems in h1s first year .1s president c01npare to those
besettmg Bill Chnton at the same stage of h1s presidency. The Travelgate,
Whitewater, and Troopergate stones all bloss01ned m 1993. Clinton's
st1111ulus bill was defeated, as was his attetnpt to let open homosexuals
serve In the n1ihtary. Time ran a cover tory on him as 'the Incredible
shrinking president. ' 35

The ti1nes often define opportunities for presidents. While broken
promises and scandals plagued Mr. Clinton during his first year in office,
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Mr. Bush found his first year filled with international conflicts, such as
the downed plane in China and the events ofSeptember 11. Forced into
the role of Commander in Chief, Mr. Bush comforted Americans as he
led diplomatic and military actions around the world. Although Mr.
Clinton did not face the same challenges and in turn experience the
same opportunities for presidential greatness, the scandals of his personal
life prevented him from ever achieving greatness.
Mr. Bush's success sets up even more opportunities to use his rhetorical skill and popular appeal. By expanding the agenda of his rhetorical
slogan, "compassionate conservatisn1," he can craft a pragmatic and progressive conservatism: showcasing the benefits of democracy and capitalism to the world; expanding welfare reform; reforming expensive and
expansive entitlement programs; and eliminating partial-birth abortion. 36

A New Democrat and a Compassionate Conservative
Just as Mr. Clinton used the rhetoric of a "New Democrat" to appeal
to the heartland of America, Mr. Bush has used the rhetoric of" compassionate conservatism" to resonate with the concerns and values of Middle America. Since Middle America perceived the Den1ocratic Party as
too liberal and the Republican Party as too conservative, Messrs. Clinton
and Bush had to lead their respective parties to the center. Compassionate
Conservatism, 37 the title of Marvin Olasky's book, provided the agenda
for Mr. Bush's 2000 campaign. Reacting to the term, Bill Clinton said
during the 2000 campaign that:
This "compassionate conservatism" has a great ring to it, you know? It
sounds so good. And as near as I can tell, here's what it means: "I like
you, I really do. And I would like to be for the patients' bill of rights, and
I'd like to be for closing the gun-show loophole I'd like to do these things,
but I just can't, and I feel terrible about it. " 38

Poking fun at Mr. Clinton's criticism of "compassionate conservatism,"
John O'Sullivan points out that:
Mter the laughter, however, doubts creep in. It is Clinton, after all, who
is famous for feeling other people's pain and even more famous for doing
nothing about it (ask those few overt gays who want to join the military)
or even piling on yet more pain, which he subsequently feels all the more
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keenly (recall those nch people \vhose taxes he later admitted raising "too
much"). After seven veal""" ofcompas-.ionatc hberahsm. the roster ofDen1ocratJC constituents that feel bctr:1yed by Chnton .1dds up to the entire
p.trty, with the sole exccpt1on of fcmim . . ts, for whom he ha.;; reserved h1s
smgle act of fldehty-keepmg lnf,ll1ticidc lcgJI. 9

Mr. Chnton rocked the foundation of truth in language by daring and
detgntng to deconstruct the n1e.1ning of one of the s11nplc)t words in
the Engh<ih language. i.'. His in11nor.1l behavior in conj unctton \Vl th his
anything-goes life .1tH.i hi no-consequences attitude di turbed n1any
An1cncans. Although the t\VO catchy rhetorical phrases. "Ne\\" J)en1ocrat .. and "Cornpassion;lte Conscrvatisn1" appealed to A n1cnca \ nlaln<itre~un. [\ 1r. Clinton subverted the n1e.1ning of language to attain his
personal goals and jettisoned the :-il!Ccess of his Nc\v Democratic tdeas.
Gotng a step further to explore the tug-of-\var over the tenn wmpassion. John 0' ullivan .1ys th.H "Both p.1rtics arc nO\V 111aneuvcring to
occupy the sarne political territory \vhilc denouncing each other .1s extrernist. " 4 & But cls to its origins, l)')ullivan credit~ President R.onald
}~eagan and Bnnsh Prin1e Mini!iter 1\tbrgaret Th.ncher.
After Reagan and Th.ncher forged .1 new post-sociali~t politics in the
Eighties, the parties of the Ldi. .tcccpted c.tpit.llism ("Me too") but
claimed they could run it more comp.1ssion:udy tlun the R.1ght. No·w
the parties of the R.ight arc cl.timmg that they can run comp.l'>ston more
effectively than the Left ("Mt: too too") . Ima~r1ne .1 dcb,tte conducted
between two ventriloquist-. each of whose dummy is sitting on the other
ventriloquist's knce. 41

The Permanent Campa(Rn
Besides the n1ynad nlanifestations of conlp.lssionate conservatisn1,
Messrs. Chnton and Bush sh.1re another Idea, the pennanent catnpaign,
wherein rhetoric plays an Increasingly pivotal part. As Bruce E. Granbeck notes: "Presidential elections serve a wide variety of practical, social
and idiosyncratic functions, ultin1ately affecting the culture's routines,
distribution of resources, and even conceptions of itself If these propositions have n1ore than validity, then the vvays we go about exan1ining
campaign communications need to be rethought." 12 Son1etin1es looking
more like a rock concert than a forun1 of political ideas, presidential
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campaigns incorporate spectacle and the spectacular, requiring a new
leadership style of presidential candidates.
Mr. Clinton introduced the idea of leading by campaigning, which
Mr. Bush adopted, although his advisors steadfastly maintained he would
not. Ryan Lizzie points out that: "A month before Bush took office,
Representative Rob Portman, a close advisor to the president, told the
New York Tirrres, 'People have talked about the Clinton-Gore administration as a permanent can1paign. That's not going to happen with
George Bush.' " 43 Lizzie, however, found that Mr. Bush quickly capitulated to the lure of Mr. Clinton's successful creation of the postmodern
permanent can1paign, a sean1less gam1ent of campaigning and governing.
In support of his conclusion, Lizzie quotes Thomas Mann of the Brookings Institution, who said in his book, The Permanent Campaign and Its
Future, that: "If ever a president has learned from his predecessor, it's
George W. Bush. He is governing by catnpaigning. " 44

Conclusion
So, although Mr. Bush has naturally adopted Mr. Clinton's postmodem
leadership model of the pem1anent campaign, he has cultivated conservative rather than postmodern rhetoric. In both instances, however, the
magnet of Middle America pulled them to the middle and away from
extreme manifestations of liberalism and conservatism. Both are charming and charisn1atic leaders serving in an age of fragmentation and flux,
but their rhetorical means and ends differ. While the postmodem rhetoric
of Mr. Clinton questions the meaning of words and downgrades ultimate truth, the conservative rhetoric of Mr. Bush upholds the integrity
of language in the pursuit of objective and certain truth. But neither
could escape the influence of the other's rhetorical model. Postmodem
rhetoric molded Mr. Clinton's rhetorical style, but conservatism confined him. Conservative rhetoric has motivated Mr. Bush, but postn1odemism has restrained him. By curbing Mr. Clinton's ambitions and
bolstering Mr. Bush's aspirations, the conservative tradition in America
continues as a formidable force in the postmodem era.
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